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Jesse Collings, although a well-known and popular figure in
late nineteenth century Britain, has long been neglected as a meaning-
ful figure in the history of that era. The reasons for that neglect
are two-fold: first, the struggle for economic and political power
within the rural world has been masked by the preponderant influence
of the urban industrial society over the weakened rural society; second,
too often history of this period concentrates on the "high politics"
of the political leaders to the detriment of the issues that were
Impinging upon an increasingly responsive House of Commons. This disser-
tation explores one issue, land reform, and specifically Collings'
struggle for allotments and small holdings, which became one of the
central questions of late nineteenth century politics.
Collings* own background— he was born and reared in rural Devon-
shire—and his journeys as a commercial traveller through the south and
west of England made him conscious of the poverty and depopulation of
the land. In 1872, he joined with Joseph Arch in the National Agricul-
tural Labourers' Union to press for better wages and working conditions.
However, the failure of the Union, due in large part to the "Agricultural
Depression" of the 1870' s and 80' s, caused CollLngs to champion first
allotments and then small holdings as a means of improving the labor-
ers' lives.
In Parliament, in the early 1880' s, he had moderate successes
in opening up charity lands for allotments, but more important, he
made the land issue, with his slogan "Three Acres and a Cow," the
question upon which the election turned in the counties. Because of
that issue the Liberals won in many counties. He might have made real
progress in his programs, except that Gladstone chose Irish Home Rule
as first priority. Collings, after a series of traumatic events, split
with Gladstone and joined Joseph Chamberlain in the Liberal Unionist
party.
The Liberal Unionist-Conservative alliance, after a difficult
beginning, found Collings' program electorally popular. In 1887, they
passed an Allotments Act based on his principles, and in 1892 they
passed a Small Holdings Act again based on Collings' program. However,
the Acts did not accomplish what Collings had hoped. They did not stay
the migration of the rural laborers from the land, and they did not
help revive the fortunes of British Agriculture.
In the years following 1892, Collings changed the focus of
his struggle from the creation of occupying ownerships to the preserva-
tion of the agricultural "interests" in the face of a rapidly expanding
industrial urban society which threatened to destroy and replace the older
forms of English rural life by an agrarian capitalist system. Although he
did have some small victories, he did not succeed in that struggle.
However, he did produce a strenuous critique of the social and economic
forces which were transforming late Victorian society even as he fought
to halt their "dehumanizing" impact.
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CHAPTER I
Resonances (1831-1864)
"Jesse Collings, where is she?" — Cashier, Birmingham bank, 1860.
"Jesse Collings? Who was he?" — Librarian, local history section,
Birmingham Central Free Reference Library, 1971.
Jesse Collings is primarily remembered for his 1386 Amendment
to the Queen's Address. This Amendment led to the ouster of the Con-
servative Government and its replacement by a Liberal Government headed
by W. E. Gladstone. Some more knowledgeable students might remember
that Collings led the fight for allotments and small holdings in late-
nineteenth century Britain. The conventional view is to write off his
land reform ideas as impractical and unworkable given Britain's economic
development. This "conventional wisdom" is inadequate, for it fails to
deal with Collings, his programs, or the time in which he lived.
Collings, some seventy years ago, understood why that would be so.
Historians as a rule deal mainly with the political events
and national occurrences of the times of which they write.
Facts with regard to the land may be duly recorded, but
their bearings on the life of the people are insufficiently
dealt with, misapplied, or passed over altogether.^
The question of reform of the English land system had repercus-
sions throughout nineteenth century Britain, but little is known about
the causes behind the reform movement or about those who struggled to
1
transform that land system. That this is true reveals much about the
nature of what historians study and what they consider significant
in Victorian society and politics.
In our time F. M. L. Thompson in his article "Land and Poli-
tics in the Nineteenth Century" has boldly described the land question
and the failure of any "dramatic" reforms of it as central to an under-
standing of English history. Thompson recognized that beneath the
political developments which found their expression in Parliament and
on the platform, there was a silent struggle taking place, "a struggle
for power, and . . . attempts to use that power to obtain or prevent
one or other solution" to the question of land reform.^
Thompson has suggested three reasons why this important aspect
of British life has been overlooked. First, the battle was between
two societies, an agricultural one and an increasingly powerful urban
society, over "the use of resources on which the national wealth and
welfare chiefly rested." As urban society became increasingly prominent
an aspect of the nineteenth century to which many historians have turned
and the agricultural society declined, even when some land reform was
achieved, it had little impact on the urban scene. It was often over-
looked, and has continued to be so.
Second, throughout the nineteenth century, there was a body of
opinion held by persons called "radicals" who saw a concentration of
power and prestige in the hands of a few, often the landowners (at least
through mid-century). The "radicals" viewed that concentration of power
as a threat to their emergence into economic and political power. They
gathered an amalgam of the "people," the wealthy, and the propertied
in an attempt to dismantle the landed system, but the landed classes
3faced with the specter of their destruction rallied to fight any radical
proposal on land reform no matter how beneficient it might be. The
landed classes could not win the struggle, but they could and did pre-
vent any dramatic reforms until such time as the agricultural depression
of 1877-96 and England's industrial society simply undermined them.
Third, because the "radicals" were unable to find a consistent
inclusive plan of attack, they were often reduced to offering specific
proposals to particular problems. In those cases the claims for each
reform proposal were shown to be invalid or, worse, impractical, and the
"radicals" were castigated for their lack of knowledge and understanding
of rural Britain. Those pointed attacks have been remembered and they
have helped to discredit the "radicals'" proposals .
^
Certainly there are three reasons why Collings' reputation as a
"radical" land reformer has been damaged, and to some extent they explain
his lack of stature in the history of nineteenth century Britain. Col-
lings' proposals for small holdings and his back-to-the-land theories
have been described as "confused idealism" and thrown into the rag-bag
of radical panaceas along with the Free Land Leaguers, the Georgists, and
the bimetallists, without any real understanding of Collings' ideas.
Collings' proposals to return urban laborers to the land as small holders
have been rejected with the unverified assumption that the attractiveness
of urban life drew the rural laborers to the cities, while Collings'
evidence of the economic and social conditions which drove men from
their
rural abodes has been ignored.^ One purpose of this paper is to
take a
searching look at Collings' proposals and his evidence, evaluating
them
so as to better understand him and late Victorian society.
This dissertation has still another purpose and that is to address
the question of the politics of land reform in the 1880's and the 1890's.
In recent years there has been a tendency among some notable historians
to study the politics of those decades in terms of what was happening
at the highest levels, namely, at the Cabinet level or at the Front Op-
position bench. This can be important history, but all-too-of ten it is
history that is abstracted from its context, and which takes place in the
hermetically sealed world of Parliament, bounded by the debates and
memoirs of first- or second-rank politicians. By limiting themselves
to these preconceptions and sources, historians, as in a most recent
book—A, B. Cooke and John Vincent, The Governing Passion—have developed
a circular argument that states that only "high politics" counts, and
then researching only the "relevant" papers and using thosepapers to prove
the premise.^ In this type of narrow political history, Collings is
casually dismissed by writers who refer to him as Chamberlain's "Sancho
Panza," henchman, "barometer," or in one case, Dick Whittington' s cat.^
It is essential that "political history" be extended beyond the
confines of high government politics to encompass what Joseph Chamberlain
called "social politics," that is, the relationship between the needs of
segments of society and how those needs were impressed upon an unrepre-
sentative, but, as the years passed, an increasingly responsive House of
Commons.^ It is in this type of history that the interplay of social,
economic, and political forces can be viewed, and their effects on the
politics and society of that time judged. Understood in this manner,
this dissertation attempts to study the social politics of Jesse
Collings,
who took the issue of laud refonr, specifically allotments and
small
holdings for the agricultural laborers, and brought his proposals to
the forefront of domestic reform in the 1880' s and the 1890' s.
Some historians may question the validity of a study of a man
who is at best an "interesting failure," but as Bernard Bailyn has
recently written: "I turn to the losers sympathetically in order to
explain the human reality against which the victors struggled and so
to make the story whole and comprehensive."^ That is the premise which
underlies this study of Jesse Collings, Agrarian Radical.
* * ic * *
Jesse Collings was born in December 1831 in the village of
Littleham in Exmouth (near Exeter) in Devonshire. He was the youngest
of eleven children—with four brothers—of Thomas Collings, an unedu-
cated bricklayer who in later years prospered as a small builder, and of
Elizabeth Palmer, daughter of John and Ann Palmer, agricultural laborers
Collings remembered his father as a fine, broad-shouldered well-built
man with a kindly face and white hair. His father had been fond of all
his children, but Jesse was his favorite. He loved his father and
remembered affectionately his father buying him books and later visiting
him at a boarding school. When his father died on May 28, 1850, Colling
thought it the heaviest blow of his young life (he was then 19), and in
his bereavement he realized that he had crossed "the dividing line
between youth and manhood."^
Although Collings had been close to his father, it was his
mother who had the greatest formative influence on his values and belief
6As the youngest child, he was not taught a trade like his brothers and
he was kept at home to help his mother with the housework (which began
at 5 a.m. and ended only with darkness). His mother was a gentle woman
who ruled her family by love and two simple axioms: her children should
obey her commands, and always be open and truthful. She was also a
stubborn and independent woman who refused to go to church or chapel,
although her husband went to church on Sundays, taking all the children
with him. She was as Collings later remarked a "deeply religious woman,
but with no knowledge of creeds or care for dogma of any kind ..."
and whose life was lived in accord with the Christian virtues of love
and charity.
(It was his mother* s rejection of church dogma and Collings' own
perception that the Church of England's practice of having the young
children read verses from the Scriptures was a perfunctory task which had
little or no influence on the children's actions that led Collings
to reject the Anglican Church. By the time he arrived at Birmingham to
stay—he had lived there earlier for a year—in 1864, he was leaning
toward Unitarianism. He did not join a Unitarian Church there; rather
he came under the charismatic influence of George Dawson whose broad
principles could include most nominal Christians and whose doctrine of
the "civic gospel" was to have an enormous influence on Collings,
Chamberlain and most of the influential leaders of Birmingham. ^ ^
)
In the times Collings and his mother spent together, she opened
her heart and mind to him. From her lively imagination, he learned the
folklore of Devon, the customs of its people, their proverbs, and a belie
that what happened was destined to be. Collings in his own right became
a fine storyteller. His stories often told in a broad Devonshire accent
entranced and amused both children and adults and made him a popular
figure among his good friends and their children. Collings' grand-
daughter, Jesse Field, recounts that the Prince of Wales (the future
Edward VII) invited Collings to visit and encouraged him to tell his
stories. That warm bond between the two existed until Edward VII *s
death in 1910.
From his mother, he learned of the Palmers, her parents and
their ancestors. Palmers were found in the Broadhembury Church records
as early as 1538. The men's occupation had been listed as yeomen or
sons of yeomen until the late eighteenth century when they were listed
as agricultural laborers. From the articles of considerable value
—
several leather-bound folio Bibles, some good china and silverware—
,
Collings concluded that the Palmers had been peasant proprietors who
"with most of their class" had been squeezed out of existence by various
enclosure Acts.
By the late eighteenth century, his mother* s father had been
reduced to being a laborer, although he was known in the parish (to
Collings' delight) as its finest all-around agricultural laborer. His
mother too had worked on the land, for 6d. a day when young and later
at 9d. a day. One lesson she taught all her eleven children was to love
and understand the working class to which she felt she belonged. Be-
ginning at this early age, Collings resolved "that if ever I should get
into a position to do so, I would devote what powers I had to do some
good to [sia] the agricultural laborers."
At this young age, Collings was to discover the value of land
to
the poor. With his business prospering, Collings' father
rented four
8acres—two acres attached to the house and the other two acres nearby.
On that land the family grew wheat (enough to supply them with most of
the bread they ate), barley, potatoes, and vegetables and kept pigs and
fowls, and fences of rabbits, guinea-pigs, hedgehogs, and ferrets which
Collings tended. His father insisted that meat once a day was necessary
for the family's good health and so for everybody at dinner (noon) there
was a joint of meat. In the mornings there was ham, eggs and milk.
Later when Collings discovered the bad conditions in which many rural
laborers and their families lived often without any plot of land from
which they could supplement their poor diets, he urged that land be let
to the laborers for that purpose. Throughout the 1870 's and 1880* s,
he directed his energies toward supplying an allotment for every laborer
who needed one. It was only in the late 1880 's when other factors
intervened, and he realized that allotments did not serve his larger pur-
pose, the rejuvenation of rural life that he turned to small holdings as
the answer.
*****
It would be useful here to define allotments and small holdings
since both terms appear often throughout this work. The Departmental
Committee of Inquiry into Allotments in 1969 noted that throughout much
of the nineteenth century the term allotments was used to designate any
size holding from one-fortieth of an acre to fifteen acres, although by
1900 allotments V7ere characterized as holdings of less than four acres.
However, there was a subdivision of allotments of less than one-quarter
9of an acre called garden allotments or more commonly, cottage gardens.
About 80% of allotments were less than one acre, some two-thirds being
cottage gardens.
The prime criterion in the nineteenth century for designating
a plot of land an allotment was that the laborer and his family could
cultivate the holding "in their spare time" so that the farmer could
count on the laborer to work for him fulltime.^^ Collings defined an
allotment as up to one acre (and not less than one-quarter acre) if the
cultivator farmed the land, or up to three acres if the cultivator
grazed animals on it. This paper adopts Collings' definition with the
addition that the allotment was rented to a cultivator as a spare time
activity to help supplement the family's diet and income.
The term small holdings especially as used by Collings is open
to much confusion. With that term he referred to an area of land,
usually not less than fifteen acres and not more than fifty acres,
that was purchased or "let" (rented), to allow the cultivator and his
family to make a decent living without having to find outside work.
Although the size of small holdings varied at different times in the
nineteenth century, Collings' definition was most inclusive and so is
adopted here.
There is one other point to be noted here. Collings caused
much confusion because he used "small holdings" interchangeably with
"occupying ownerships" and "peasant proprietorships," especially in his
later years when he championed the purchase of the small holdings by
the occupying o\mer, while vigorously discouraging the "letting" of the
holding to the occupier. That definition of small holdings is
10
adopted here for the sake of Collings' arguments. However, by the
early twentieth century, the term small holdings was used more and
more to identify land let to the cultivator, and where that meaning
is intended, this paper uses the terms small farm or small tenancy in
its place,
The greatest single formative influence on Collings was his
desire for an education, a desire that grew into a passion for know-
ledge which became a part of everything he did. As a young child he
received a rudimentary education in the basics of reading, writing,
and arithmetic first from a church school and then from a school for
tradesmen's sons—at a cost of f6 per year. On his own, he read every
book he or his father could find, often beginning at 5 a.m. and reading
until breakfast and then at night by flickering candle light.
His formal education might have ended there, except that his
mother's sister and her husband had set up a boarding school for the
sons of gentlemen to which they invited him to come for a year. With
his parents' blessings (he was 14), he attended the school. On his
appearance at the school, he was teased about his accent and rustic
clothes, but he soon settled down and was accepted by his fellows and
became a decent scholar in the classics, English (losing his Devon-
shire accent, so he said), and French in which he achieved a fair
degree of fluency. He looked back on that year with nostalgia because
11
at the school he gained a "fresh view of life" and a wider acquaintance
ship with people of different classes than he had ever known before. 1^
It was through education that he successfully competed in the
larger world. His education helped his advancement first in a large
store in Southampton where his ability to speak French was needed to
converse with Channel Island customers and later in Birmingham where
he became a clerk in a ironmongering firm. In the evenings in Birming-
ham, he returned to his flat and read. "I found that books were true
friends, giving much and asking little." In novels and nonfiction, he
explored the world about him and the minds of its "noblest" writers,
and he found in reading (and hard work) a safeguard against the evils
of the city.
He read voraciously, and from the more "solid"books he made
copious extracts of the main points of each book to which he could
refer to refresh his memory at a later time. Among the books he read
(glimmers of which show up in his later writings) were Thomas Carlyle's
Past and Present and SartorResortuSj John Stuart Mill's Principlesof
Political Economy^ and Plutarch's Lives where he firsL learned how the
great estates, the Latifimdia^ had caused the ruin of the great Roman
Empire .
•
^
Collings' view of the role of education in his life and of its
importance in society was illustrated by his first political activity
for social reform. In the early 1860's he lived in a suburb of Exeter
(to which he had moved so as to be closer to his wife, Emily, and do
less travelling himself), and on Sunday evcinings he taught at a Ragged
School in Exeter, as it was the only institution to deal with the
poorest children. On his ovm Collings investigated the slums and then
12
arranged meetings to speak out against the degrading conditions he
found there. When he was asked if he could suggest a remedy, he replied
that the Government had provided the solution, an industrial school.
Recent legislation. Industrial Schools' Acts of 1857 and 1861, provided
that beggars, orphans, homeless, or destitute children under 14 could
be referred to such schools by a magistrate. A committee was formed
to find and run such a place, and subscriptions quickly raised the amount
needed. The school was established and was crowned with success in its
appointed task.^^ It says much about Collings' belief in the value of
education for molding character that he viewed the school as ameliorat-
ing the conditions in the slums, and it suggests the naivete of
Victorian Exeter's society, that education could be considered a
remedy.
Collings' view of the close connection between education and
urban reform revealed an important aspect of his character. He did not
understand the values or needs of the urban laborers who frequented the
public-houses to smoke, drink and talk. His reaction was to lecture them
about their "irregular habits" and to try to inculcate in them the
virtues of temperance and discipline as a protection against the evils
of the city. Collings believed that education would instil those values
in a population that was degraded and enervated by the urban conditions.^
Some years later in speaking of Britain's social problems—drunkenness,
crime, and pauperism— , he concluded that "all who have the welfare of
the people at heart . . . firmly believe that the most backward and de-
graded of our fellow men will do better in the measure that they are
taught better. "^° This elitist view of education persisted in Collings'
later thought and action.
13
The urban landscape had an important influence upon Collings
because in the cities, he became increasingly aware of the many currents
of reform which attempted to deal with the complex problems of Victorian
\
society. In Birmingham in the mid-fifties, Collings joined the Mechanics
Institute where speakers lectured on the important topics of the day. He
alSO found the political atmosphere invigorating. He attended many im-
portant meetings at the Birmingham Town Hall and was impressed by the
arguments and eloquence of Richard Cobden and John Bright. It was also
in the city— in Exeter— that Collings took an active role in political
affairs, first in his campaign for the industrial school, and later in
his campaign to enlist the workingmen's support of the North during
the American Civil War.^^ The city then was the arena where Callings
first made his impact as a reformer.
However, it was in the countryside which he loved so much that
he spent most of his time. He often returned to Devonshire to view the
moors, the rocky cliffs and the highlands reaching into the distance,
an'd to escape the ugliness of Birmingham and the Black Country. For-
tunately, his job as a commercial traveller (for Samuel Booth's iron-
mongering firm) allowed him to traverse the English countryside. His
journey— the mainstay of the firm's business—lay through the midlands,
to the South of England then to the West of England, returning through
Somerset and Gloucestershire to Warwickshire. Collings would spend a
day or more in a country town taking orders, and during his stay he
chatted with the farmers and laborers and their families, thus becoming a
well-known figure. In his conversations with the laborers, Collings
was impressed by their solid character, their accurate knowledge about
14
faming and other aspects of agricultural life. These Impressions con-
firmed his earlier opinions of the worth and skill of the laborers and
of their value to the land.22
In contrast to his feeling ill at ease in the presence of the
urban workers, Collings felt at home with the rural classes. He joined
them in meals, conversations, even recreation and song, and he found
that those experiences were among the most memorable of his life. He
did not forget those people when he became a political figure dedicated
to their interests, and they did not forget him.
15
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CHAPTER II
THE UPTURN (1864-1879)
[I]t is clearly illogical to expect any sensible diminution
either in pauperism or crime, until the self-helping and
self-saving powers in the people themselves are developed
by education,"—Jesse Collings, An Outline of the Mern^oan
School System; with Remarks on the Establishment of Common
Schools in England^ January 1868, p. 43.
The years 1864-79 were very important for the development of
Ceilings' character and the beginning of his plans for agrarian reform.
In Birmingham, he became a member of a group of reformers who although
interested in municipal reform, were first galvanized around the issue
of free secular public education. From their interest in education they
turned to the Town Council as a body responsible for education, and then
(under the influence of nonconformist preachers) as the power responsible
for municipal reforms in Birmingham. Although Joseph Chamberlain took
the lead in both the education and Town Council fights, Collings was
very important in both, and his contributions have often been overlooked.
It was not only municipal reform which occupied Collings, but
beginning in the early 1870' s with "the revolt of the fields," he took
an active and sometimes leading role in Joseph Arch's agricultural
laborers' union. Although he followed Arch's lead in the 1870's, he
was developing his own ideas of rural reforms, reforms that led him to
propose allotments and small holdings.
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It was to be vitally important to Collings' later programs that
he had been involved in both municipal and agrarian reform movements,
because Collings took these two experiences and fused them into a pro-
gram designed (he believed) to ameliorate the problems of the city and
the country. This chapter explores the nature of his involvement with
Birmingham and with agrarian England so as to set out the process by
which he came to be the chief proponent of allotments and small holdings.
*****
Jesse Collings returned to Birmingham in 1864, called by his
employer and friend, Samuel Booth of Booth and Company, who offered
Collings the business. Collings was overwhelmed and willing, but he did
not have the capital. To his surprise, several friends advanced him
money without security, as did some of his customers, and the manager of
a bank who granted him a generous overdraft without security. Collings
offered a partnership to a good customer of his, Charles Wallis, who
accepted it. The new firm was known as "Collings and Wallis." Collings
looking back remarked that he headed one of the largest concerns in Birming
ham, a concern he had entered fourteen years earlier as a junior clerk.
^
Collings and Wallis held a key position in Birmingham's economic
life; they were "factors" in the ironmongering business. A "factor" was
a middleman who catered to the home market, that is,, he collected the
products from the manufacturer and through his travellers and other con-
nections distributed those products to the ironmonger. (Only those who
were concerned with foreign trade were called "merchants.") The work-
shop owner depended upon the factor for marketing his goods (since
most firms were too small to develop their own markets) and for financial
help during the manufacturing process, e.g., money for raw materials and
wages, and sometimes for the actual organization of production. In the
latter case, the factor coordinated the delivery of raw materials and
finished goods and the manufacture of the separate parts and their com-
bination. ^
In the third quarter of the neneteenth century, the factor was an
important person in this transitional form of capitalist development.
Not only did the manufacturer depend upon him, but so did the small work-
shop owner who went to the factor for credit. Thus the factor supplied
the industry with its working capital since the shopowners dopnulrd
upon him for weekly advances, and the factor sometimes set up an able
workman in an industry by offering him a loan to purchase his tools.
Thus the factor could monopolize trade since he Initiated the manufac-
turing and the marketing, and it was common for factors to force down the
workers' wages—although Collings did not—by threatening to give the
job to another group of workers.-^
Collings remained an active partner in the firm for fifteen years
before resigning in 1879 to devote more time to his first love, politics.
During those years, he had done very well, so well in fact that In April
1872 when his own warehouses burned down, he was unruffled.'^
Although he retired from the business, Collings left his money lu
it to appreciate. However, the "depression" wliich devastated agriculture
in the late 1870's and 1880*s was paralleled by a downturn In manufactur-
ing which hit very hard at the iron industry, especially its finished prod-
ucts. The economic crunch and his expenses on politics came close to
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bankrupting him at various times, and from the mid-eighties on, his
finances were precarious.^
Just as important, at least psychologically, the position of
the factor deteriorated such that by the 1890' s, he was not longer an
important figure. The number of small manufacturers had decreased,
many by consolidation into larger companies. The revolution in sales
techniques, especially advertising, retail outlets, branch stores, and
large department stores undermined the whole factor system.^ (When
Collings later disparaged the large capitalist farms which were driv-
ing the laborers from the land, he was speaking of a parallel experience
on the industrial scene, larger and more integrated firms making the
middleman irrelevant in the industrial scene.)
It was not from his Birmingham business and its connections that
Collings developed a greater interest in municipal reform. The impetus
came from George Dawson, the dynamic and charismatic preacher of the
Church of the Savior who drew Collings to his pulpit beginning in 1864.
Dawson's church dispensed with religious creeds and instead developed an
ideal of service to the municipality, service Dawson saw as an index of a
person's religious commitment. He called a town the "solemn organism
through which should flow, and in which should be shaped all the highest,
loftiest and truest ends of man's moral nature." He did not just preach
that the duty of a town was to uplift and improve the life of its people.
He acted—right conduct was his guide. Through his influence small steps
in civic improvement were made in the 1850' s and early 1860's, and it was
under his influence that a new group of men forming in the late 1860's
Q
turned toward public service.
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For Collings and for a number of others, Dawson's emphasis on
the large role that municipal government could play in people's lives
coincided with his plans for the education of the working classes. In
March 1867, Collings convinced George Dixon (a prominent merchant) to
hold a public meeting to form an education association, the Birmingham
Education Society, based on Manchester's principles. On March 14, 1867^
at a public meeting in the Town Hall, the Society was formed with Dixon
elected as its President.
Under Collings' direction and at his expense, the Society under-
took a house-to-house survey where it discovered that over 26,000
children could neither read nor write, and of the rest, few were able
to read or write well. The situation was in Collings' eyes desperate.
The Society at first raised a large amount of money to pay the poorest
children's school fees, but just the fees of some 5,000 children almost
bankrupted the Society. The only solution was free public education
with the schools supported out of rates. In June, Dixon moved a reso-
lution in the Town Council that the Council be empowered to raise rates
qfor educational purposes.
The resolution generated a good response; however, when Collings,
Chamberlain and the other "hard-core" nonconformists called for support
only of unsectarian schools, a large minority of the Society which
backed the use of public money for denominational schools seceded and
formed their own organizations on denominational lines.
With the publication of Collings' Remarks on the Establishment
of Common Schools in England in 1868, the Birmingham
Education Society became
the ardent exponent of rate-aided unsectarian public schools
to
24
which all children should be compelled to attend to receive a basic
education. Those like Collings who were unequivocally for unsectarian
schools met together in February 1869 to form the National Education
League based on those principles. Although Dixon was the chairman, the
actual work fell to Chamberlain and Collings. By February 1870, the
League had 113 branches all over the country and was responsible for
many public meetings. Among the most vigorous supporters for the League
was Jesse Collings who spoke not only in Birmingham but also in his
native Devonshire. ^
^
It was soon apparent to the Leaguers that the use of local rates
for education meant that the municipal rating body, that is, the Town
Council, would be responsible for selecting the members of the School
Boards. Beginning in late 1869, more members of the League became
representatives of the Town Council (among them was Joseph Chamberlain)
so that by 1870, eleven Leaguers were on the Town Council. However,
the 1870 Education Act called for separate School Board elections. I'lhen
the election was held in Birmingham in December 1870, the Leaguers,
failing to foresee the results of cumulative voting, split their votes
and elected only six League members to the School Board to nine denomina-
tionalists—eight Churchmen and one Roman Catholic. The election had two
important results: first, it led the Liberals to develop the powerful
electoral organization—the caucus—which was to become so important
in Birmingham politics, and second, it forced the Town Council to take
an activist stance in educational matters in an attempt to counter the
denominational-oriented School Board.
In the next few years, Collings from his position on the Council
directed his energies toward the Lndustrial schools committee which
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included setting up a municipal industrial school. Ceilings also
served on the free library committee which he headed beginning in 1872.
As chairman of the committee, Collings moved to open the Reference '
Library and Art Gallery on Sunday afternoons and evenings for the bene-
fit of the working classes. He argued that the Library and Art Gallery
should be opened on Sunday because the only other places of recreation
open were "the streets and the public-houses." Collings' resolution
was opposed by the religious community who exerted strong pressure on
the Town Council to oppose it. On April 3, after an intense meeting,
Collings' resolution was carried by a large margin amidst "great cheer-
ing." Collings later recalled that on Sundays thousands of working-
class men and their famil ies visited the Art Gallery and used the
library, and in Collings' view were all-the-better for their education. -^^^
Collings' interest in bringing the many aspects of "education"
to the people was further illustrated in 1879 when Collings decided
that, since most people could not afford "high class music," their taste
for good music was "undeveloped." His remedy was to set up concerts
and distribute the tickets to the lower classes who could not ordinarily
afford to attend concerts. The concerts included works by Handel,
Haydn, Louis Diehl—"Dear England"--, Garrett~"Oh, My Luve's [sic]
like a Red, Red Rose",—and Collings was pleased to record that the con-
certs were packed. Following that success, the Birmingham Musical Asso-
ciation was established to give concerts on Saturday nights for a charge
of 3d. to 6d.l5
The education issue catalyzed many Birmingham residents and
became the rallying point for Birmingham nonconformists. The strong
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interest pulled together many differing elements and individuals and
welded them into an organization. It was this organization that
became the backbone of the National Education League, and it was the
League that became the basis for the Birmingham Radicals. The League
members were educationalists fully committed to unsectarian education,
a stance which immediately brought them into conflict with other impor-
tant groups in the city. The League then became their most powerful
weapon to ward off either denominationalists or "economists" who opposed
any higher rates. George Dawson's and Robert Dale's (a leading Birming-
ham nonconformist preacher) unique contributions were to channel the
energies tapped by the education issue and extend them into municipal
reforms.
The education issue had two further effects. It threw together
many leading Birmingham men and formed them into a cohesive group whose
impact on the city was immeasurable. Out of that group, the Birmingham
Radicals were born. The other effect was more personal. Chamberlain and
Collings thrown together in their work on education were immediately
drawn to each other and within a short time were best friends—and re-
mained so until the ends of their lives.
*****
Education also played a part in Collings' interest in the agri-
cultural laborers. He had long been interested in education in the rural
areas, including practical education in the science and techniques of
farming. However, "the revolt of the fields" revealed to Collings other
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aspects of rural life which came to demand precedence over education,
namely allotments and small holdings.
The "revolt of the fields" surprised no one who was acquainted
with the plight of the agricultural laborers, the only surprise being
that it came in the winter of 1872. A contemporary observer noted that
many laborers received only 10 s. (in some places 12 s.) per week, too
small an amount to support a family. It was true that the laborer and
his family could make four or five times that amount at harvest time, but
that arduous work lasted only a few weeks, and if it rained or the
harvest was bad, starvation was a real possibility. The back-breaking work
Involved in laboring often begun at an early age meant that in later
years many suffered debilitating illnesses. Most frustrating to the
laborer, he was at the whim and mercy of the farmer who had almost
absolute power over the laborers* wages and prequisites. And if the
laborer was sufficiently "docile," he and his family might be generously
given a dole of soup, blankets, coal, and even clothing from the farmer.^®
The bare living wage given the laborers meant a standard that
was detrimental to the health of the laborers and their families. Too
often, their food consisted simply of bread, burnt crust tea, skim
milk and cheese. In some places, the men were forbidden to keep pigs
or hens to supplement their diets because the farmers feared that food
would be stolen to feed the animals. In far too many areas, there were
no allotments by which the laborer and his family could increase their in-
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come.
By the early 1870' s, the countryside was experiencing some
prosperity as economic conditions improved, but there was no consistency.
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In one village, wages and working conditions were improving, while in
the neighboring villages wages were stagnant. The result was ferment
among the laborers, especially those who felt cheated of the prosperity.
Then on February 7, 1872, Joseph Arch, a Primitive Methodist
lay preacher well-known in his area for his plain speaking, addressed
a meeting of laborers, and he "spoke out straight and strong for Union. "^O
Some two or three hundred laborers signed up that night.
The news of the meeting spread like wildfire. A week later, at
the same place, Arch addressed over a thousand laborers. There he
called for wages of 16 s. a week and nine-hour days. He warned them
that some landlords were offering raises so as to buy off the men.
Arch set the tone for the union when he admonished the laborers that "if
they had recourse to violence and riot and incendiarism, or if they
wantonly destroyed any kind of property, they must not look to Joseph
Arch to lead them," Arch saw himself as a "peaceable Wat Tyler." He
reminded them they were met there "to gain our freedom by lawful means*
not to lose what little we had by lawlessness."^^
The success of Arch's meeting encouraged other local efforts.
Some of these unions quickly set out to make their new-found strength
felt. In Warwickshire within a few weeks after Arch spoke, the unions
called upon the farmers to raise their weekly pay to 16 s., for some
laborers a 4 s. raise. The farmers refused and the men struck. The
farmers hoped to "cow" the workers back to work by a lock-out, but the
farmers themselves were under pressure as they needed laborers to work
the fields. The qtiestion was who could hold out longer.
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The outbreak of the strike received much publicity, expecially
in the Liberal London Daily News, the Radical Royal Leamington Chronicle,
The Birmingham Daily Post, and even the Times. The "revolt of the
fields" elicited a considerable response from sections of the British
public. For the first time, the public saw the seemingly servile "Hodge"
(a term used to refer to the average farm laborer, often a term of
ridicule) stand up and ask to be treated as a human being. The laborers'
cause found quick and powerful support among Radicals in Birmingham,
whose close proximity to laborers in neighboring Warwickshire made them
aware of the indignities suffered by agricultural laborers. Though few
Birmingham Radicals had Collings' personal interest, they did what they
could to sustain the laborers through monetary and leadership contri-
butions.^^
The organizing of the local unions into a county-wide union was
begun at a meeting of agricultural laborers at Leamington on March 29.
Following Arch's speech, some sympathizers, including Jesse Collings,
called on the laborers to unite in their struggle to acquire a decent
life. Collings spoke sensitively of the laborers' wretched conditions,
but he expressed hope for them in unified action. Their program should
be to develop a close connection to the land (through ownership of
allotments or small holdings), better education, and higher remuneration
for their labor.
After the speakers had rallied the crowd, the laborers settled
down to establishing a Warwickshire union. An executive committee of
eight (including Collings) was formed, with Joseph Arch as its chairman.
In the following weeks Arch and his supporters were able to bring the
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strike in Wellesbourne to a successful conclusion. That success plus
his fine speaking ability made him appear a natural leader for the
laborers, and letters poured in from all parts of the country asking
for help and advice in starting unions.
In April the call went across Britain for a congress of agri-
cultural laborers to meet again at Leamington, this time to form a
national union. The approximately sixty delegates (two from each
county had been called for) elected Arch president of the national
union, the National Agricultural Labourers* Union. The delegates then
set up an executive committee made up of agricultural laborers with
Joseph Arch presiding over it to run the day-to-day activities of the
unions. The Conference then named four trustees, one of which was
Jesse Collings, to invest and oversee the union's funds.
That evening Collings spoke at a meeting of two to three
thousand laborers gathered for the Conference. In his speech he urged
the laborers to bend every effort to make the union a success. Some
union members had spoken of emigration as a cure for the low wages and
depressed conditions. Collings disagreed . Any emigration that occurred
should be strictly "voluntary" because he believed that remunerative
work could be found in England for almost all laborers. He ended with
a proposal which was at the heart of his convictions, that laborers
should work to amend the land laws so that they could become landowners
While Collings was speaking, he was given a telegram from
Brimiugham informing him that his warehouse was on fire and urging him
to come immediately. Many years afterwards he wrote with obvious pride
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that he had crumpled up the telegram, finished his speech, and did not
return home until after the meeting was over. He remarked that "this
grand movement was worth all the warehouses in the kingdom. "27
The next day, the delegates settled down to writing proposals
for organizing cooperative farms and cooperative societies. One was
written by Collings on the need for practical agricultural education.
Following the papers and other minor items of business, the Conference
ended, not with fiery exhortations or wild cheering, but on a subdued
note with a prayer for the future.
Despite Arch's emphasis on purely union concerns, he and the
other union leaders cooperated with political factions (particularly
the Radicals) at meetings where common programs were advocated. In
November, Arch appeared at an electoral reform conference held at St.
James' Hall, London, with Joseph Chamberlain presiding. In his speech
Arch linked two concerns—agricultural and electoral reform—which
became important parts of the Radicals' political programs. Arch called
for electoral reform as the best means of improving the laborers'
condition.
Two Birmingham speakers, Mr. J. S. Wright and Jesse Collings
called for electoral refotTns that would make possible greater partici-
pation by urban and rural workers. Collings called for an end to the
system of preferential voting in favor of "equality of voting." He
remarked that "whatever the constitution of the American House of
Representatives, there was perfect equality of every citizen before the
law."^° Among those gathered there, the speeches aroused great en-
thusiasm.
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Certain Radicals and Liberals were quick to link their policies
with the laborers' movement in an attempt to gain more recruits for the
Radical wing of the Liberal party. The numerous meetings sponsored by
both Radicals and NALU attempted to pull together these two groups in
support of their goals.
Collings articulated the close relationship that must necessarily
exist between the laborers and the Radicals when he appealed to the men
to keep their organization strong because with it, they would be a new
power in the land. As a result of their power, they would be given the
franchise. The enfranchisement of the laborers should be "the first
real step towards the settlement of the land question, which question
[sic] cannot be settled without the aid and without the votes of the
millions of men who are most closely interested in it."^^
Not only Radicals, but many Liberals saw in their laborers'
organization real political advantage. A. J. Mundella stated the case
for the political advantages to the Radicals and Liberals: "We are
going to enfranchise the rural population. ... I think this is the
turning point in our career as a party. . . Mundella saw the laborers
movement as a way to erode Conservative strength in the counties; so he
helped sponsor a mass meeting in May 1872 at which he attempted (but
failed) to get prominent Liberal party leaders to endorse what was then
only a provincial movement.
The years 1872 and 1873 saw many successes for the agricultural
laborers, but as 1873 passed into 1874, the agricultural laborers found
themselves faced with growing opposition from the farmers. In February,
the laborers in the area of Newmarket (in Suffolk and Cambridgeshire)
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asked the farmers for a 1 s. per week raise- The farmers who had in
the previous year formed the Newmarket Farmers' Defence Association
refused. When the men struck, the farmers responded by a lock-out of
all union men. In less than a month, twenty-five hundred union men
were locked out not only in Suffolk and Cambridgeshire, but also in
Norfolk, Essex, Bedfordshire, Lincolnshire and Hampshire; the Eastern
Counties lock-out had begun.
It was quickly apparent to Arch and other union leaders that the
<^
farmers meant to break the unions. The farmers gradually gained the
upper hand. The strike was mediated in Lincolnshire thus preserving
the unions, but only at the cost of no rise in wages. Elsewhere
mediation efforts failed, and the farmers gradually forced the men back
to work. The men were forced to return because the unions were unable
to sustain the strike benefit that had already cost them almost £24,500
from March through August.
One of the reasons that money was unavailable was simply that
NALU*s organization at different levels was expensive to maintain, a
good portion of its income being spent on administration. This would
have been defensible if the administration had been efficient, but it
was not. In addition to problems of administration, the National Union
was unable to collect more than half of the money that its membership
should have provided. From 1875 to 1878 the union floundered despite
the best efforts of Arch and the Executive Committee.
From the very beginning of the Union movement. Arch had been
charged by a few voices not only with making money, but with using it
to elevate himself above his own class. By 1878, these unproven charges
exacerbated the discontent felt over Arches "dictorial*' rule.
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Even within the Union, important men wanted greater changes in
the central administration than Arch was ready to give. A number of
districts disturbed by the expenses of the National organization called
for a redistribution of power. Arch refused and from the rank-and-file
he received the support of the agricultural laborers. ^6
The Union was his, but the cost was very heavy. After this
struggle, many good friends of the laborers, including Howard Evans and
Jesse Collings, both early activists for the Union and members of the
Consulting Committee, severed their links with the Union. Collings
and Mr. J. S. Wright of Birmingham were replaced as Union trustees by
two more "loyal" Arch supporters. Collings and Evans, though both
separated from the Union, later agreed to work with the Union for the
benefit of the agricultural laborers. Arch had achieved his victory,
and it seemed clear that the great majority of laborers still supported
him, but the internal warfare and bickering had deprived the Union of
good friends, and many—unlike Collings—never worked as part of the
Union again.
It is apparent that Arch was an authoritarian leader who
refused to share power or responsibility with his supporters and alienated
every good friend by his actions and mistrust. Collings and the other
Executive Committee members were constantly called upon to save the Union
from financial collapse, which they could do only so long.
Yet beneath this argument over finances, there was a fundamental
disagreement over goals between Arch and Collings. Arch saw NALU as
a trade union in which the goal was to increase the laborers wages. Afch
was operating within a class system while Collings, with his emphasis
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on allotments, was developing his idea that land could help the laborer
transcend his class—although here Collings failed to recognize his own
"middle class" conceptions. For that time, Collings' program was "pro-
gressive," but its denial of any clash of class interests held the seeds
of a conservative reaction.
Not only were the friends of the Union alienated, but the labor-
ers themselves, sensing the downfall of the Union, sought other policies.
Many chose emigration abetted by ex-union leaders who became agents for
colonies while other branches converted the union into a sick-benefit
society and halted most trade union activities.
One very important outgrowth of this search for new policies
was the increasing emphasis that the laborers gave to acquiring their
own land, either in allotments for part-time farming or small holdings
for full-time farming. The most promising source of land was that owned
by local charities which used the revenue for ''charitable purposes."
To get the charity lands broken up for allotments and small holdings,
the law required that the Charity Commissioners, who were usually men
of property, give their approval, which they seldom did.
In the late 1870' s the struggle between the land-hungry laborers
and complacent landholders intensified. In that contest, the laborers
looked for a party to take up their cause. Gradually but steadily they
joined to support the Liberal party, and a number of their leaders
accepted miner roles in the Liberal party. And certain elements in the
Liberal party, especially the Birmingham Radicals led by Jesse Collings,
prepared to carry the cause to the halls of Parliament.
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Although he spent much time actively assisting the agricultural
union, Collings found more and more of his time taken up with municipal
politics. In 1867, George Dixon with the support of the Birmingham
Liberal Association won a Parliamentary bye-election for the Liberal
party. Following the victory and with Dixon's help, by 1872, the National
Education League had captured the Liberal Association. From that point on,
the Association was the political arm of the "hardcore'' nonconformist
Liberals, known more appropriately as the Birmingham "Radicals." After
that year, as often as not, Town Council elections were fought between
Liberals, many of whom had been Radicals in their younger days, and the
new Radicals of whom Chamberlain and Collings were only the most con-
spicuous partisans.
The Radicals by their tactics and programs first politicized
and then polarized Birmingham municipal politics. They made adhesion
first to Thomas Avery, a leader of the Town Council, and later to
Chamberlain the test for the Liberal Association's support. In practice,
this meant that anyone that disagreed with the Association's proposal
was its enemy, a policy that led the older Radicals to join the Conserva-
tives in opposition. However, it was clear that Chamberlain's proposals
for reform had broad support, and in most cases Chamberlain won over any
waverers, such that by 1876, Chamberlain and the Birmingham Radicals were
m control.
The Birmingham Radicals were municipal reformers, that is, they
were interested in improving the physical environment in which the people
lived. They were not, however, aware of any way to change the social and
economic patterns which produced those conditions. (It was only Collings'
schemes for allotments and small holdings that challenged those underlying
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patterns and promised basic changes. Collings^ schemes did have one
aspect that could broadly be termed "urban reform," in that Collings.
believed that the urban slum dweller would return to the countryside if
he were allowed to own his own land-)^^
The gas and water schemes were administrative measures designed
to secure an orderly supply of gas and water for the community. Only
the Improvement Scheme held out the promise of going beyond an adminis-
trative measure, but it did not fully do so. As Collings remarked the
Scheme led to the eradication of the "miserable tenements" which made up
the "filthy, disease-stricken slums" in the center of Birmingham. How-
ever, when the rebuilding began, nothing was done to house the poor who
had been removed to make way for the "fine shops, offices, institutions,
etc." An observer noted that the Improvement Scheme contributed to the
growing opposition to the Radicals as the Scheme brought "hardships" on
many persons and "considerable ill-feelings and discontent . "^^ It is
possible that the Conservative workingman's vote came from those people
who felt ill-used.
Collings played a large role in helping Chamberlain run the Town
Council and plan its measures and bye-laws. He also took a very active
role in the National Education League. Collings worked so hard at those
tasks and at his business that he overt^orked himself and suffered the
worst of his many nervous breakdowns. During his illness, he was afflicted
by sleeplessness, impatience, irritability, and depression. It was only
by the utmost self-control that he kept himself from knocking things
around or "doing something savage." The doctor had ordered him to take
a six month rest cure which Collings did in travels through Egypt, Malta,
Greece, Italy, and the Austrian Empire.
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This was for Collings an ordeal. Unable to work, he found the
"ennui and aimless feeling of passing time like this
. . , almost un-
bearable.
. \ Sometimes he was feeling better, other times he suf-
fered a relapse which brought him close to despair. "At home I could
fight these miserable attacks by business, the club, municipal and
other matters of interest," but there were none of that on this journey.^"^
Collings was a man obsessed by the need to work. He could not
and would not govern his work so that he didn^t overtax himself. A
doctor warned him that by his constant overwork, he would suffer re-
lapses as he did especially in those times when he was under a great
strain,— 1886, and 1892. He often suffered minor attacks of depression
for which a journey—sometimes with Chamberlain—was the usual cure.
It was the constant compulsion to v/ork, to accomplish something, which
was the hallmark of his life and though he paid for it, he continued to
be a thorough and unrelenting worker for social reform. The six month
rest cure did achieve its goal and in the fall of 1876, Collings returned
to Birmingham and resumed his municipal and business duties.
In November 1878, as a reward for his services to the munici-
pality, Collings was chosen to be the new inayor. Chamberlain, who
introduced him remarked that no man "ever recognized more distinctly
the true dignity and importance of our municipal work." Collings' col-
leagues agreed and unanimously elected him mayor. In his acceptance
speech, Collings remarked that serving Birmingham was "an honour and a
reward in itself." Collings observed that his service to Birmingham
was his recognition that local self-government lay "at the root of all
those good qualities which exist in the public character
.
"^^ In the
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previous years the Council had changed the face of Birmingham and given
its citizens a good and decent life. So Collings dedicated himself to
the further improvement of the life of the people.
That winter, Britain was suffering from a depression in trade
and twelve weeks of continuous frost which caused the unemployment of
thousands of persons. Collings' organized a subscription list called
the "Mayor's Distress Fund" which raised some f10, 000. The city was
then divided into wards, and each ward had a relief committee of volun-
teer workers that made house-to-house visits with presents of food,
fuel, clothes, and blankets. Collings observed that the aid helped
thousands of families through that severe winter.
The winter also brought national politics into local politics,
when a meeting was held in December 1878 to protest a war with Afghan-
istan. There had been troubles at protest meetings earlier, and when some
young men tried to disturb the meeting, Collings had them thrown out.
For that, Collings and other municipal officials were summoned for
u ft
alleged assaults on one of the persons ejected from the meeting.
Collings decided to fight the case on the "principle" that the
chairman had the right to throw out persons attempting to prevent a
public meeting from being held. Collings to his chagrin lost the case
when the Stipendiary Magistrate found that there was no legitimate reason
for ejecting the plaintiff from the meeting. Collings was fined 20 s. (fl)
which he refused to pay, because the Magistrate's decision had been so
constructed that there was no basis for appeal.
The case was controversial and certainly hotly contested, but
there were good arguments on both sides. Collings attitude grew more
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fierce as the controversy swirled, and finally he dared the Magistrate
to put him in jail. He was not put in jail because some unidentified
person paid his fine. 5°
Collings' childish reaction did not help him and, as an elected
official, he was in effect disobeying the laws he was sworn to uphold.
Collings believed that he had stood on "principle" and that he was right
The incident revealed Collings' stubbornness in holding to his "princi-
ples" and his belief in his own correctness when he was convinced he
was right. That reaction could and did lead him into trouble, but it
also sustained him in the dark times when his hopes for agricultural
reforms were thwarted at every turn.
In November 1879, Collings gave up the Mayoral duties and the
Council thanked him for the "able, energetic and impartial manner" with
which he discharged his responsibilities. Two years later the industria
classes of the town presented Collings with a testimonial of their high
regard for his efforts on their behalf,—especially in education and
the "moral elevation of the artizan class. "^^
Right after he gave up the mayoralty, Collings and Chamberlain
took another cruise which for both of them marked the end of one era and
the beginning of another. Both were to leave municipal politics and
enter national politics (with Chamberlain in the Cabinet). From this
era, Collings took with him his growing concern for the agricultural
laborers and his realization that before the laborers could experience
any moral elevation they had first to secure their livelihood upon the
land. Collings was to carry that realization with him into his new era.
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up, which accounts for the internal squabbling within the Society and
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CHAPTER III
PROTESTS AND PROGRAMS (1880-1885)
If we the people are true to ourselves and our
principles, there will be changes brought about
—
not by violence or rebellion, but by the quiet and
benificent action of just and equal laws. ... —
Jesse Collings, Address on the Irish Land Question^
at Ipswich, December 1880.
In the years 1880-85, although Collings ranged over many areas
and activities in his ceaseless quest to improve the welfare of the
British people, his fame rested upon his advocacy of the agricultural
laborers' cause. This chapter attempts to explore both his cause and
his fame.
The chapter is divided into three sections, Ireland, education,
and land reform. Collings* views upon Ireland have been included because
in his concern for the Irish tenant farmers, he enunciated pleas for
equal rights and equal justice in a society dominated by the proper-
tied, landowning classes. Although the focus was Ireland, Collings'
references were just as germane to Britain as to Ireland. His beliefs
about the efficacy of education in creating a more humane and just society
was the mainspring for his actions to uplift the laborers from their
degradation. Collings' involvement with the Irish tenants and his con-
cern to build a better society combined with the real distress suffered
by the rural British working classes caused him to propose allotments
and small holdings as the best solution to the social problems which beset
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Britain. His reasons for that solution and thelref f ect in the political
arena are the themes of this chapter.
Upon their return to England, Collings and Chamberlain again
immersed themselves in politics—Chamberlain in the Commons, Collings
in the countryside. Collings, as president of the National Liberal
Federation, strove to preserve the Birmingham Radicals' supremacy
in that organization. The Federation officers tackled the immense task
of welding together the different associations long enough for common
programs to be set out and strong candidates for the next election to
be chosen. The Federation with its popular reforms and core of local
representative associations was able to set up standards which Radicals
and Liberals had to meet in order to secure the "active support, for
the most part voluntary and unpaid, of thousands and tens of thousands
of voters."^ Within a short time, however, Collings reduced his activ-
ities in the Federation as he accepted a bid to contest Ipswich as a
Liberal.
Ipswich was a middle borough which had only partly absorbed the
new industrial economy and the newly developing party politics. As it
had not absorbed the emerging British society through democratic pro-
cedures, Ipswich's politics were decided by family connections and
corruption. At least, the corruption was nonpartisan, the voters were
willing to be bribed by either party. Elections had been voided in
Ipswich earlier in the century but the accompanying bad publicity did
little more than d^ive the corruption underground."
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Ispwlch had a shady past and an unsavory reputation In 1880,
yet Ceilings accepted its bid. Evidently, he did not believe the cor-
ruption was so general as to destroy the chance of his election. Fur-
ther, he was convinced that he could put an end to corrupt activities.
Naive, perhaps, but in keeping with Collings' view of the purpose of
politics: "Next to religion—indeed I hardly put it next because it is
such a sacred thing— the highest and noblest thing is the science of
politics." For Collings, politics was a religious platform on which
he could preach to Parliament and people. He wished for a life of
peace and leisure, but
there is work to be done; and if a man will be earnest
about it, and be faithful to his highest thoughts regard-
less of any consequences, he will at least succeed in one
thing—he will bring questions before people and rouse
their life and interest, however, much they disagree with
him. ^
If this sounds like Calvinism transmogrified, the similarity
is not accidental. The ideal of the "civic gospel," its need to improve
the civic environment and the life of the people within it, could
easily be extended from the city to the country. That vision could
be realized in a government founded on the principles of justice.
That government Collings believed would not
go about the world making wars, but [would] look into every
cottage and into the condition of every Englishman, and see
what can be done to better the same, and to bring the people
into that condition which we know they ought to enjoy.
If not a household name in Ipswich, Collings was at least well
known for his activities in support of Joseph Arch's National Agricul-
tural Labourers' Union. Suffolk was one of the strongest areas of
union activity, besides being the scene of the farmers' attempt to crush
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the union in the Eastern Counties Lockout. ^ He had made a number of
friends among certain Liberals there, and he was popular for his cham-
pioning of the rights of the laborers. As President of the National
Liberal Federation, he had that organization's staunch support.
Generally overlooked in this connection was the Birmingham
Radicals' attempt to build a cohesive Parliamentary faction after the
debacle of the "new party" in 1876-77. Chamberlain and Dilke had at-
tempted to build a strong faction within the Liberal party to press
for Radical programs, but the "new party" had come to little.^ The
National Liberal Federation had been in part a response to that failure,
and the Federation promised at least a set of commonly agreed-upon pro-
grams. However, in 1880, the Birmingham Radicals in order to strengthen
their hand in the Federation and in Parliament placed a number of their
residents including Collings in nearby constituencies.^
Collings with characteristic energy threw himself into the fray
while his campaign organization worked hard to discredit a Conservative
candidate, Mr. Bulwer. Ipswich was soon filled with placards showing
Bulwer superintending the flogging of a soldier. Within a few days,
certain ladles later found to be "friends" of Collings exhorted the
voters not to cast their ballot for a man who could order the flesh
torn off a man's back. When these activities were questioned, Collings
denied any wrongdoing, and he disputed the contention that any placards
had been Imported from Birmingham. Bulwer had been beaten "by an im-
portatlon from Birmingham, but it was not in the form of a placard.
(Bulwer' s reference to outside moneys suggests that corruption may have
played its part, though Collings denied it.)
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Chamberlain acknowledged that Collings had made a "gallant
fight," and that "on the whole things look promising." Happily for
Collings, the promising outlook was confirmed when he was elected, in
harness, however
, with a Conservative.^
The evident success of the Birmingham Radicals and the National
Liberal Federation encouraged Chamberlain to demand at least one Cabinet
position for the Radicals or they would form a "pure left" party.
Chamberlain stated his position on the new government and its policies
quite explicitly. "One or both must be radical. . . ." Chamberlain's
threat combined with Dilke's support did force Gladstone to open a place
for Chamberlain in the Cabinet. Gladstone had decided to defang the
stronger opponent by putting him in the Cabinet where collective decision
making would act as a brake on Chamberlain's designs.
From London, Chamberlain wrote Collings asking him to stay at
the house where "I shall treat you sans ceremonie [sic] , but we shall
see more of one another if we are in the same house and I want a long
talk with you after all that has passed."^-' Collings did stay with
Chamberlain. On May 20, Collings took his seat in the House of Commons.
The arrangement worked well both for them and the Radical faction in
Parliament. As Chamberlain was a member of the Government, he was unable
to lead the opposition to modify or kill measures which had Cabinet ap-
proval. Collings served to signal fellow Radicals concerning Chamberlain
and his views on these important issues. Collings performed this task
so well that he became known as "Chamberlain's barometer
. "^
^ Unfortun-
ately, that appelation was used later to disparage Collings' work as
motivated and controlled by Chamberlain, a judgment which underestimated
Collings' own character and intelligence.
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The first order of business in the Commons was Ireland, then
deeply disturbed by economic and political problems. The long "wet,
cheerless summer" of 1880 combined with the two previous poor harvests
had damaged profitable farming. The landlords' reaction was eviction.
Under the Irish land system, improvements made by tenants who were
arrears in rent did not have to be compensated for by the landlords in
reclaiming the land. Collings, Chamberlain, John Bright, and W. E.
Forster, the Irish Chief Secretary, denounced the landlords for their
heartless behavior. Forster proposed the Compensation for Disturbance
Bill to give the tenant the money equivalent of his improvements. The
Bill was passed by the Commons, but in the upper house, it was "denounced
trampled, and thrown out." The Bill's demise signaled an explosion of
agrarian rebellion in Ireland and the development of a new weapon of the
oppressed against the oppressor, the boycott. ^ ^ Forster pressed for co-
ercion, that is, the suppression of civil rights and the use of the
military to govern, but he was overruled in the Cabinet.
Distressed by the Government's inaction and fearing further
demands for coercion, Collings explained his views on Ireland to his
constituents. Collings recalled the 700 years of English mistreatment,
through cultural and physical annihilation, of the Irish. When the Irish
Catholics had resisted, they had been defeated and reduced to little
better than slaves as their land had been taken and their commerce de-
stroyed. As tenant farmers, the Irish were subject to the whims of
absentee landlords who often by their provocative actions invited the
tenants' agrarian crimes.
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Collings believed that the present disturbances were the result
of this intolerable situation. Some 1942 people possessed 13 million
acres, while the thousands of landless poor were reduced to misery and
starvation. In these difficult economic times, the landlords raised
the rents, and evicted the tenants when they could not pay. The Govern-
ment's attempt to intervene— the Compensation for Disturbance Bill—had
been defeated, and it was no surprise that the Irish tenants joined the
Land League to protect themselves from the landowners.
The Irish landowners called on the Government to protect their
property. Collings agreed that life and property must be protected, but
that must include everyone's.
To me the property of the tenant is as sacred as that of
the owner, and the groans and misery, and the starvation
which result from the eviction are as much, to my mind,
agrarian outrage as when a landlord is struck down. I
protest against all violence, but we must not protest
against violence of one sort and forget the other.
Collings knew there were outrages but many were the private acts of
vengence by excitable or ignorant people, and these acts were blown out
of proportion by the newspapers. The Land League manifesto distinctly
argued against outrages and counselled its members to control their
passions, and use reason and judgment to demonstrate the wrongs done to
them.
Collings believed that the remedy for Ireland's "Land Question"
was the 3 F's : fixity of tenure so that the laborer could benefit from
his work, fair rents decided upon by a tribunal to secure justice for
both sides, and free sale by the tenant of his improvements and his farm
to the landoxroer or incoming tenant. As part of this program, he argued
that the land should be broken up into farms of 30 to 40 acres and sold
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to the tenants so as to give the Irish peasants a stake in their
land. ^5
The government faced two choices, these reforms or coercion.
Collings believed that the enemies of reform—Conservatives and Whigs
—
were allied to stop any such changes. These MP's argued that there
could be no land reform until agitation ceased, but when had any reforms
been "wrung from the priviledged classes except by agitation. The
Irish people wanted justice and the English people had to support their
struggle (and that of Chamberlain and Bright) for land reforms.
The Government chose coercion, a decision Collings castigated.
The Liberal Government had come to power promising to end the agitation
in Ireland through reform measures. Instead they turned to coercion to
end the agitation. He was especially bitter because he saw this action
as a return to past cycles of using coercive measures after half-hearted
attempts at reform had failed.
To Collings the landlords* practice of evicting tenants without
paying any compensation was coercion which exceeded any crimes committed
by the Land League. He wrote to one correspondent:
You may not class an 'outrage' and Irish crime the cruel
evictions now taking place—hundreds per week— the details
of which are heartrending, and often result in starvation
and death, very often in despair and crime. I do so regard
them . They are plebeian, it is true, and have few among
the English to care for them, but the sufferings of the
poor are as acute as those of the rich.^^
He also despised the Government's sanction of the landlords' actions,
and their later sending in troops to be present at the evictions to
"prevent trouble." Collings saw clearly that the Government had become
the allies—unwitting or not—of the landlords. The powerful were given
protection while the powerless suffered.
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Collings in his fight against coercion was considered pro-Irish.
He was only in the sense that he supported the Irish tenants and farmers
against the depredations of the Irish and English landlords. Collings
saw the struggle in Ireland (as he did that in England) as one between
the rich and the poor. His sense of justice led him to support the
poor, a position he shared with the Irish party.
However, he did not share with the Irish party their desire for
a separate Ireland. At that point in time, the Irish party was concerned
with political and economic reforms for Ireland, and the movement for
a separate Ireland had not yet taken shape.
When the promised Land Law (Ireland) Bill was introduced in
April, Collings was at last in agreement with the Government. He fought
successfully against an amendment to weaken the Bill.^° When the Bill
passed, many Liberals believed that Ireland had been given what she
desperately needed, land reform, albeit only a first step.
It was not enough. Neither the Irish party nor the Irish people
were satisfied, and agitation continued. In October 1881, the Government
under some provocation jailed Parnell and some of his lieutenants. The
Land League retaliated with the "No Rent Manifesto" and prospects for
peace seemed bleak. Chamberlain and Parnell worked out the "Kilmainham
treaty" which freed Parnell for his help in forwarding "liberal principles
and measures of general reform" including Irish land reforms.
The Phoenix Park murders blasted the hopes for peace. Like all
who heard the news, including Parnell, Collings was terribly upset,
and more so since he believed the murders had destroyed Chamberlain's
conciliatory schemes. He advised Chamberlain to continue his efforts
toward reconciliation and carry on with a "liberal" policy. Meantime,
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Collings also telegraphed Captain O'Shea to get the Irish party to issue
a manifesto denouncing the murders. Which they did.^^
Despite Collings efforts to stop coercion, the hue and cry
V
forced the Government to introduce its Prevention of Crimes (Ireland)
Bill. Collings noted that every Liberal MP had seemed to criticize
this Bill, but then said they would vote for it. "That was a phase of
Liberal ism he [Collings ] had yet to become accustomed to . "
^
Collings' struggles for the Irish and against repressive
measures caused real concern among his Ipswich constituents. His
strong speech against the 1881 Protection of Person and Property (Ire-
land) Bill had offended a number of his Liberal electors; so he faced
his opponents at a large public meeting and won them over. Shortly
after, the Ipswich Council of Liberal Associations passed a unanimous
resolution thanking him for his "advocacy of the rights and liberties
of the people" and expressing their confidence in him,^^
However, Collings* refusal to support the Prevention of Crimes
Bill (1882) brought him greater opposition from his Ipswich constituents.
He again returned to Ipswich to face his opponents. He told his listen-
ers that coercive measures only increased the outrages and made them
worse. When he at first appeared before them, he had warned them that
"
I could not vote for Coercion Bills . . . " and he had not changed
his mind. Although his position was unpopular in Ipswich and cost
him some votes, the Irish Nationalists were impressed by his stand. In
fact, in the 1885 General Election, they specifically exempted him
when they directed the Irish in England to vote only for the Conservative
2 5
candidate.
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Collings was a devoted believer in free education for all the
people. "I want a whole people comfortably educated, not simply a few
to be highly educated and the rest to be consigned to comparative
Ignorance, or only the knowledge of the 'three R's.*"^^ The institution
for this national education was the common school where, besides the
"three R's," the children would be given a taste for art, science, and
natural history with practical courses in physiology and domestic econ-
omy for girls, and mechanics and botany among others for boys.
Collings, though pleased with the Liberal Government's commit-
ment to education, exhorted them on to further efforts. When A. J.
Mundella, spokesman for the Government on education, called attention
to the strides made in school attendance, Collings pointed out the other
side of the coin—an estimated 500,000 children not even on the school
registers, and too many children in the schools who left after the
Fourth Standard (age 10) and forgot most of what they learned by 14.^^
At the same time, Collings attacked Conservative attempts to
degrade the Fourth Standard to just the "three R's" or to abolish that
Standard altogether. The Conservatives could not turn back the clock,
Collings argued, and teach only agricultural trades because the concept
of the common school was rooted in the hearts of the people as a way to
improve their children's lot. "They submit to compulsion for it. They
are content to be taxed for it," and they would not allow education to
be taken from them.^^
For Collings, the real enemy of education, however, was its
cost. Drawing upon his experiences as a member of the Birmingham School
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Board he remarked that in the last year, 2,000 children had been taken
before the magistrates for non-attendance, the majority of cases being
due to the "real inability of the parents to pay the fees." The school
board did achieve dramatic results in filling the schools with willing
pupils when the fee was lowered from 3d. per week to Id., and Collings
hoped that Mundella would use his power to reduce school fees to Id.^^
Beyond that, Collings argued that the real answer was free
schools. The principle of coercion under which the school then oper-
ated must carry as its conclusion the abolition of fees, for it was as
absurd to ask a child to pay for going to school as it was to ask a
soldier to pay for becoming a soldier. Free education would secure
regular and good attendance by the students. The time to do it was
now before another generation was lost through no education, Collings'
proposal was not taken up then, and the issue survived to be a corner-
stone of Chamberlain's "unauthorized programme. "^^
Collings, intensely concerned with schooling of the poor, was
angered when he saw the agricultural laborers cheated of it by the
Charity Commissioners. One of the tasks of the Commissioners was to
oversee endowed schools for the rural poor and make sure that the
endowments were properly used. Beginning in the 1870' s the cost of
education rose in response to compulsory education and, as more middle class
and wealthier people sought higher education, attempts were made by the
trustees and commissioners to convert these endowments to higher educa-
tion. Collings angrily denounced the continual abuses committed by
the Commissioners confiscating the property of the poor in the "interest
of the wealthier classes." Too often the Commissioners took no notice
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of the local opinion whether from Town Councils or public meetings about
their schemes, since they were immune to pressure from the unenfran-
chised people in their district.
\
V
In February 1884, Collings joined battle with Charity Commis-
sioners in Wiltshire and with the Government in a running battle that
lasted over 10 years. A certain Alderman Dauntsey had left property
in trust to the Mercers' Company (of London) for an almshouse and a
school for the poor of West Lavington, Wiltshire. The Wiltshire Com-
missioners had just completed a deal to sell the property (worth fl50,000)
to the Mercers' Company for only f30,000, only £700 of which would go
to W. Lavington for the almshouse and the free school, the rest going
to establish a "middle-class school" somewhere else in Wiltshire.
Mundella admitted that the poor in West Lavington did use the
free school, but he argued that the school was inefficient and badly
attended and that under the new scheme it was hoped to improve the
school. He also promised to carefully consider the interests of the
poor though he added that he had been informed that "the provision for
them will far exceed in the future anything that has been done for them
in the past."^^ Collings remained unconvinced.
In August 1885, with the Conservatives in power, Collings and
Chamberlain challenged Stanhope, the Government spokesman, who had
argued that the endowment had not been for a free school but a secondary
school, which is what Dauntsey wanted. Collings and Chamberlain argued
that whatever the bequest stated, the free school was now being taken
from the poor. Stanhope replied that the courts had decided that the
Dauntsey trust was not a charity property and thus free from the
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Connnissioners' control, but in a humane spirit the Mercers' Company
had offered sums for the school and almshouse-
Collings refused to accept that judgment, and he continued
his fight for the rights of the West Lavington poor. In March 1889,
he and the Company reached a compromise in which the Company promised
more aid to the poor to allow those who were qualified to receive
instruction in higher subjects up to the Seventh Standard. In 1894,
the school was finally inaugurated.
Collings persevered with the fight for free education for all
because he saw in education the means for creating a moral and dis-
ciplined people.
We may pass Savings Banks Bills, or Licensing Laws for the
encouragement of thrift and morality, but I venture to say
that it is in the full and rapid development of our public
schools—by creating self-help and self-respect among the
people—that our main hope of permanent improvement lies.^^
For Collings (and many other Victorian reformers), education
became the vehicle by which individuals might raise themselves from
the squalor and ignorance in which so many lived. Collings truly be-
lieved that men and women could create a climate in which people exposed
to learning would demand it for themselves and their children. Believing
that, he acted upon it. He struggled relentlessly against ignorance,
superstition, and oppression, struggles with few victories and more
defeats, but struggles which he maintained throughout his life.
In one sense, his view of education was elitist. Proud that he
had made his v/ay by his own work and with no formal education, he assumed
that the forms and values which he had achieved were those which all
persons wanted and by which all could progress. Education meant the
60
implantation of middle class values— thrift, hard work, self-discipline—
to the lower class in the belief that those values transcended class
and culture, if indeed Collings recognized any differences. Education
was social control. Collings was pleased to see that the young people
"who formerly constituted our difficult, if not our dangerous class"
were well employed and good citizens because they were educated citi-
zens. Yet, even recognizing this aspect of Collings* belief in
education, and however narrowly he conceived it, the process of edu-
cation meant freeing the people from ignorance. Reading and writing
taught for whatever reasons commanded knowledge and thought far
beyond the confines of those who taught them. For whatever course
was embarked upon to change English society, education was fundamental
to its direction and its scope.
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Collings devoted more and more time to the problems of agricul-
ture and its attendant effects upon the laborers as the economic depres-
sion of the 'seventies spilled over into the 'eighties. On August 25,
1881, Collings tabled a motion looking toward the creation of a peasant
proprietary class, a motion with which his public career became
closely identified— to his detriment as well as his benefit. His
motion though it made no headway in Parliament created a stir and
caused one newspaper to comment that it was "a most significant and
pregnant incident of the sitting. ..." The Executive Committee of
NALU requested Gladstone and the Liberal leadership to support Collings'
\
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motion to restore the connection between cultivator and the soil. The
committee pledged itself to work for the motion "by all legitimate
means" and Arch was requested to appeal to the Farmers' Alliance
for its support.
However, the farmers were not persuaded, and fearing that
peasant proprietorships would disrupt the labor on which they were
dependent, they showed clear hostility to Collings and his proposals.
In October at Ipswich, Collings responded to the farmers^ antagonism
and spoke out against the Alliance for bringing in a measure relating
only to the landlord and tenant farmer and leaving the laborer "out-
side its scope." As it became clear that the Farmers* Alliance policy
was simply to "keep down Rates, Rent, and Labour," the Radicals ended
their support of the Alliance. When Collings came to write "The
Agricultural Labourer" article for The Radical Pvograrme^he left the
farmers "outside the scope" of his article.
Also in October, Collings, in an effort to rouse further support
for the laborers, turned to the National Liberal Federation. He warned
the delegates assembled for the Conference that "English landlordism
was reducing England to precisely the same conditions as it had done
in Ireland." At the moment, he argued, the English people were not
aware of it since only one-seventh of England's income came from the
land, but they would soon feel it as the land went out of cultivation
and. fewer people lived "wholesome and proper lives." Though there were a
lot fewer laborers on the land than when Collings had lived among them
thirty years ago, their condition had not improved. The laborers' con-
ditions were not represented in the Press, and the farmers and the
landlords did not bother with the laborers' plight; therefore Collings
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urged the Federation to take up this cause and appoint a committee to
study this social danger.
The tentative nature of Collings* solution—a study committee
—
contrasts sharply with his strong attack on the landlords. Most likely,
Collings felt that the issue was then too divisive to call for decisive
action. As he wrote later, he and the leaders of the Federation directed
its actions and framed its resolutions with a view toward securing
the concurrence of the large classes of Liberals (the
non-demonstrative, stay-at-home, non-thinking, arm-
chair, timid, etc., etc.) without whose support and
votes, in spite of appearances, success was impossi-
ble. ^0
The time was evidently not ripe for action, but the ground was being
prepared.
Over the next few months, Collings and Arch put aside any
lingering hostility over Collings' resignation from the NALU Executive
Committee in 1878 to preach land reform to the English working classes.
In January 1882, Arch and Collings were to address the St. Thomas Ward
Liberal Association in Birmingham, but as Arch was unable to appear,
Collings, the principal speaker, launched an attack on the poverty
and destitution which affected the rural classes. Collings remarked
that for the ten years ending in 1873 when trade and commerce were
flourishing, "pauperism was at its highest." Many people claimed that
poverty was caused by improvidence and drunkenness, but they confused
the effect with the cause. Pauperism flourished because so few had
land on which to support themselves and their families. Yet 100 per-
sons owned four million acres, and 1,000 persons ov>med ten million of
England and Wales' thirty-eight million acres of farmland.
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It was not just the possession that counted but also the
tremendous political powers that enabled these landowners to "in-
fluence the votes of tenants in whole districts" and return the land-
owner's choice to Parliament. Not only did the landowner control
politics, but (even as an absentee owner) he gained the increased value
of his lands near the large towns. If the land was unoccupied, it bore
none of the local burdens, though the land grew in value every year.
The best solution as Ceilings saw it was to have the govern-
ment facilitate the acquisition of land by the rural laborers. Some
people questioned the funding and the value of this proposal, to which
Collings replied that the country spent millions annually on pauperism
and "enormous sums for armies and for purposes of war," when it could
better spend those monies to insure "the welfare and prosperity of the
country. "^^
Turning his attention to the workingmen in his audience,
Collings declared that the agricultural laborers' fight must be theirs,
too, because whatever organization they established, labor would "never
have its proper position until this land question is settled." Working
men must unite and fight not only the Tories but also the Whigs, for
they "are both alike opposed to the real sovereignty of the people; the
fight between them is but a mimic warfare. "^^
In early 1882, as part of his program, Collings introduced
the Allotments Extension Bill to force the trustees of charities to
give allotments to laborers who wanted them. On May 17, moving the
Second Reading, Collings called the bill a necessity to correct the
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inadequacies of earlier legislation. The object of this Bill "was
to oblige the trustees of charitable and common lands to let such
lands in small lots to labourers and cottagers instead of letting
them in large quantities to farmers and others.
The Bill had general Liberal support, and the Government
gave it grudging support. The Conservatives for the most part op-
posed it. They were led by Sir Walter B. Barttelot, a Chairman of a
Charity, who feared that the Bill would force the trustees to let as al-
lotments all their good lands. Still, Barttelot and the other opponents
favored allotments, but only those which were so small that a man could
not expect to support himself and his family working one alone.
The Bill passed with no division and was sent up to the Lords
where the Lords, fearing to veto it or attack its compulsory principle,
weakened it by replacing the county courts with the Charity Commissioners
in settling land disputes. They also placed a caveat in the Bill that
the trustees did not have to let "unsuitable lands," an appropriately
vague phrase which the trustees of many charities interpreted to mean
no allotments. The Bill was returned to the house and, despite Collings*
reservations, the amendments were accepted and the measure entered the
statute books as the Extension of Allotments Act, 1882.^^
Even with the Lords' amendments, Professor Hasbach estimated
that about one-quarter of a million acres (out of one-half million)
should have been put at the disposal of the laborers. However, the
trustees obstructed the act in every possible way, from letting the land
on a long lease to farmers, to charging exorbitant rents for allotments,
to demanding a one-half year rent advance or to just refusing to let
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the land. In many cases, the trustees' intransigence, which was too
often supported by the Charity Conunissioners, reduced the Act to a
nullity. Still, Collings felt that the Act forced the Commissioners
to have regard for the wishes of the poor. And he believed that
when the laborers saw charity lands being let as allotments, they
would better understand the benefits of political power and join the
Radicals in agitating for a new franchise Bill.^^
For his successful efforts, Collings received a unanimous
resolution of thanks from the Executive Committee of NALU. Joseph
Arch in a front page article in the English Labourers^ Chronicle con-
gratulated Collings for his success and added that he had "earned
the gratitude of every labourer in the kingdom. ..." In his Christ-
mas message to the laborers. Arch saw two bright spots for the future,
the coming extension of the francise and Collings' Allotments Extension
Act. Arch hoped that the laborers would realize how much Parliament
could do for them if they had representatives like Jesse Collings.
In March 1883, Collings intended to present a motion to give
the cultivators of the land a "proprietary interest" in it, but at
Gladstone's request he postponed his motion. The postponement caused
NALU to send a memorial to Gladstone expressing their displeasure and
regret at his decisions especially since they felt they had received
so little from this Parliament. Gladstone in his reply expressed his
regret that Collings' motion could not be discussed, but there was
other more pressing work to be done.
In July 1883, without Gladstone's support, Collings at last
Introduced his motion to have Parliament facilitate "the acquirement
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by agricultural labourers, tenant farmers, and others of proprietary
rights in agricultural land." In viewing British agriculture, Collings
found the farmers
unable to compete either with the American farmers or
with the small land proprietors on the Continent, the
result of which was that the farmers in England had
fallen into a very bad comdition, and labourers not-
withstanding their increased wages were relatively
little better off than they were before the war.^°
The laborers were "still in a starvation circle" and would continue
to be until they had the chance to acquire their own land.
Labourers were being "squeezed off the land" and many emigrated
to the colonies where they supposedly became Britain's customers, but
Collings argued that these men would have been as good customers "if
allowed to remain here and cultivate the waste lands of Devonshire
and Warwickshire." Other laborers migrated to the cities
where the competition for the means of sustaining life
became proportionately keener, and where they were obliged
to herd together in dense masses, and ultimately swelled
by the displacement of others who have grown older and
less able to labour, the list of paupers.
This migration to the cities was a workingman's problem because these
rural laborers brought competition which lowered wages for all.
The only solution was occupying ownership. The state must pro-
vide funds (three-quarters of the purchase price) while the labourer to
demonstrate his seriousness would provide one-quarter. Collings was
particularly concerned that the procedure be handled by the more effi-
cient and understanding local authorities.
Everything that concerned the social well-being of the people
must be better done by local authorities than by Imperial
authorities; and the more important the duties of local
authorities were made, the higher v^ould be the qualifications
of the men who would undertake thent. '
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Collings proposed that local authorities be allowed to pur-
chase estates on which they would build roads and drain the land, and
let 5 to 30 acre plots. He urged that small farms would draw the
people from the cities, check the migration to the cities and their
slums, diminish pauperism, bring new life to the toims and villages,
benefit industry by stimulating demands for manufactured goods and
promote the comfort and well-being of the whole population. Unless
this was done Collings foresaw "a war of classes." The vast British
proletariat, larger than any other in Europe, demanded and deserved
a "fair share of the comforts, enjoyments and material benefits of life"
which it was Parliament's duty to bring about.
Collings' motion received scattered support and opposition,
but mostly indifference as the House was counted out—less than 40 MPs
being present—after a short debate. Sir John Little Green, Collings'
biographer, wrote that this action showed the lack of interest by
Gladstone and the Liberal party in this subject. True enough—though
the Conservatives also evinced little enough interest. Green continued,
however, that from that time onward, the subject "became one uppermost
in a large part of the public mind. . . ."^^ The reasons for the change
were essentially twofold, "The Radical Programme" and enfranchisement
of the laborers. It was the introduction of both into the political
arena that brought Collings' proposals to the fore as a primary issue
for both Liberals and Conservatives.
Collings realized after the dismal reception which his motion
for a peasant proprietorship had received in Parliament that he had to
mobilize stronger public support, and in that vein he joined some fellow
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Radicals in an attempt to set out a common plateform for all Radicals
to rally around. Starting in August 1883, the Fortnightly Review
under the editorship of Chamberlain's good friend and admirer, Thomas
Hay Sweet Escott, published a series of articles dealing with domestic
issues under the rubric "The Radical Programme." Collings took charge
of the article in "The Agricultural Labourer" which appeared in the
November issue. Collings showed Chamberlain a draft in mid-October
and Chamberlain was very enthusiastic. "It is excellent— the best
thing you have done. I have not cut out or altered anything. "^^
Collings* article on "The Agricultural Labourer" was in many
ways the culmination of his speeches and writings on the condition
of the agricultural laborer. The reforms he advocated were no longer
tentative and halting, circumscribed by speaking style or constrained
by Parliament'scustoms. Reform was simplicity itself. Emancipate the
laborer
from that servile condition to which ages of class
legislation have reduced him, and which violates every
principle of social and political freedom. On the
strong but labour-bent back of the labourer is reared
the antiquated structure of the English land system
. . . which has at length broken down. . • .^^
Having described the present conditions, Collings proposed re-
forms to revive the countryside. First must come "the possession of
the franchise, without which the laborer cannot be regarded as a free
man." Second, free education must be established for the rural poor
because so few could afford even the minor expense of school fees.
Third, the dwellings of the agricultural laborers must be improved and
more cottages built to house them. Fourth, the interests of the poor
should be handled by a power directly responsible to them, representative
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county government. Finally, the State must intervene to establish
"occupying ownerships" and to allow laborers to rent allotments and
to have cottage gardens included with the laborer's cottage. ^"^ All
of these tasks must be accomplished quickly or the peasant class—"the
backbone of the nation"—would disappear.
Some commentators feared that the rural classes when given
the vote would opt for the Conservatives, but, Collings argued, the
parties would be realigned over these new and important issues.
Collings believed that the people when armed with education, news-
papers, the knowledge and example of "America," and the forces of
modern civilization would prevail over monopoly, privilege, class ef-
forts, prejudice, and angry assumptions.^^ Collings did not doubt
that party realignment would come over the issue of land for the
laborers.
In August 1883, he had sent out a circular to the laborers
and their friends pointing out the advantages of allotments and asking
for funds to carry on an association dedicated to securing allotments.
The response was so vigorous that Collings held a meeting of the
subscribers at Birmingham on December 6, 1883. At this meeting, Col-
lings was elected president of the organization, the Allotments Exten-
sion Association. That evening he. Chamberlain, Henry Broadhurst, MP,
and the Reverend Stubbs addressed the meeting and called upon working-
men "to support your agricultural brethren in their efforts to secure
the rights which recent legislation [the Allotments Extension Act] had
given to them." In the succeeding months, Collings addressed meetings
of urban workingmen and asked them to support the enfranchisement of
their brethren, the agricultural laborer. He also strove to build up
in the counties the organization of the Allotments Association,
establishing the Association as "a definite movement in the way of
organization for land reform," an organization Collings used with
great success in the 1885 election.
In February 1884, Collings returned to the pages of the
Fortnightly where he touted occupying ownership as the best defense
against the land nationalization schemes of men like Henry George.
Collings, as he had in Parliament the year before, pointed to the
great popularity which Henry George's book. Progress and Poverty was
enjoying throughout Britain and which demanded as an answer a prac-
tical system of land reform which would restore free and independent
cultivators. Free trade in land was offered by some as a reform, but
as long as land was valued as a means of social and political influence,
capitalists would and did drive the price of land far above what
farmers and laborers could afford to pay. Others argued for a lassez
faire policy, but Collings saw only a "fine irony" about exhortations
to self-help addressed to "half-starved toilers" and agricultural
laborers "feasting on bread and onions."
In rude and barbarous societies 'each for himself was a
characteristic doctrine, but in a truer civilisation the
gentler and more humanising creed of 'all for each and
each for all' is gaining ground.
Many persons had at last recognized that only the actions of a
representative government could make life worthwhile for the poor.
People no longer could accept a "political economy" which trumpeted
England's wealth, a wealth resting its greatness upon poverty,
pauperism, prostitution, semi-serfdom, and a degraded proletariat.
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Collings with considerable feeling wrote that the welfare of human
beings could not be left to "freedom of contract./' but required
"State interference to preserve the natural rights of the people.
Referring to his heroes, the Prussians, Stein and Hardenberg, Collings
noted that they had raised the social and material condition of the
rural population by making them small holders, while England had unfor-
tunately done the opposite. It was time to reverse this trend and
have the state aid (through the local authorities) those who wished to
purchase small holdings, and loan them money to erect dwellings upon
the land. At the present time the laborer was discouraged in his hopes
to possess land and it was apparent that "the lower rounds [sic] of
the social ladder have been deliberately broken away, and it is almost
impossible for him to ascend. "^^
Yet the only hope to keep the laborer on the land was to aid
him to acquire land. Collings perceived three ways to accomplish that.
Levy a special and progressive tax upon the land compelling the owner
to cultivate it or sell it. Have the Government purchase Crown lands,
suitable wastes and commons, lands held by corporate bodies, and charity
lands. Finally, have the Government halt all legal enclosures and il-
legal encroachments by "land-grabbing" landowners who were destroying
the peasant proprietary class. Once the rural classes were enfranchised,
they would demand the restitution of the land taken from them by illegal
means. "The people of both town and country will join in the demand,
and it will be for all upholders of the rights of property to aid."
Thus the right of property of rich and poor would be protected for the
welfare of Britain.
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Collings in print and on the platform argued vigorously for
peasant proprietorships, an issue which he saw increasingly mixed with
the need for the extension of the franchise to the laborers. At the
October 1883 meeting of the National Liberal Federation in Leeds, the
Federation called for parliamentary reform to take precedance over
other Government bills. Gladstone, seeming to heed the call of the
Conference? suggested the possibility of a Franchise Bill. In February
1884, Gladstone introduced the Franchise Bill with no mention of redis-
tribution of seats to equalize constituency populations.^^
In the debate, Collings admitted that some laborers or villagers
might not know how to use the franchise, but the "way to teach a man to
use a responsibility was to give him that responsibility." The Commons
could not judge the natural right of every man of age and sound mind
to exercise his citizenship. Although some members felt it was a tre-
mendous thing to give the franchise to 2,000,000 people, Collings re-
minded them that it was a more tremendous thing to try to hold it from
them. Collings told the Government that they must persevere with this
Bill even if defeated upon another question, because they had pledged
themselves "to the people of England." If they failed to proceed, they
would be guilty of an act of treachery to the people.
In July, the Lords threw out the Bill. The next months were
full for Collings as he attended demonstrations all over the country whi
protested against the Lords' rejection of the Bill. Collings attended
four important demonstrations—Leamington, London (at Hyde Park),
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Birmingham, and Stoke—as did numbers of agricultural laborers.
Ceilings spoke at the gatherings and pushed the adoption of strong
resolutions which gave "enthusiastic support" to the Liberal Govern-
ment for pressing forward with its "wise, just, and beneficial mea-
sure of parliamentary reform. "^^
In October, Parliament was recalled and the Bill passed in its
July form and sent to the Lords. This time, however, conflict was
avoided between the two houses when Gladstone promised a Redistribu-
tion Bill in consultation with the Conservative leadership in return
for quick passage of the Franchise Bill. A compromise was agreed
upon, and in December the Representation of the People (1884) Bill
Was enacted.®'^
In December 1884 (and later in March 1885 with the same result)
,
Collings introduced a Bill to establish a peasant proprietary through
the acquisition of land by the occupiers. The Bill received some
support and much opposition and it did not progress in Parliament.
More important, in supporting the Bill, Collings uttered the expression
that later epitomized the 1885 General Election—"Three Acres and a
Cow." Collings himself pointed out that the slogan was not original,
Jeremy Bentham in his Political Economy referred to "two acres and a cow,"
and the author of the History of Kent dealt with "Three Acres and a Cow."
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Others have disputed the claim and assigned it to various persons.
Whoever first gave it expression, the slogan became closely associated
with Collings and his program of agricultural reform, and gained national
prominence during the 1885 election.
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On June 8, 1885, the Liberal Government, split by dissension
over domestic issues—Chamberlain and Dilke had already tendered
their resignations to Gladstone— fell on an amendment to the Budget
V
as the Irish joined the Conservatives. On the 23rd, Lord Salisbury
formed a minority Government instead of pressing for an immediate
dissolution.
With the Conservatives in power, many Liberals, especially
the Radicals, wished to embarrass the Government and strengthen their
faction in the coming election. Collings found the issue, the Par-
liamentary Elections (Medical Relief) Bill. Collings had discovered
that any man who accepted medical assistance for himself or his
family from the Poor Law administration automatically lost his vote
because he had accepted Poor Law relief. Months earlier Collings
had repeatedly introduced a Private Member's Bill to end this unfair
treatment of the rural poor. Three times the Bill had been killed in
the Commons by the Liberal Government's opposition. The fourth time,
the Bill passed the Commons and just when the Lords seemed ready to
kill it, the Liberal Government reversed its field and fought for the
Bill's passage. Too late. The Liberal Government was defeated just
as the Lords were considering the Bill.^^
Collings decided to bring in the Bill again, when to his sur-
prise (and to the chagrin of certain Conservatives), the Conservative
Government decided to introduce its own Bill on the subject. One Con-
servative asked Balfour if he intended to go further in dealing with
voting disqualification, and when Balfour replied in the negative,
the MP replied that he had trouble believing this since the Government
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"had shown themselves very apt pupils of the Hon. Member for Ipswich
(Mr. Jesse Collings)
. . .
/''^^
The reasons for the Conservative conversion throw light on.
contemporary politics of the time. In essence the switch was purely
political. Balfour, with uncharacteristic directness, admitted that
the Government was taking up this Bill because Chamberlain and the
Liberal party had made a "political and class issue" of the Bill. In
Ireland, medical relief did not disqualify a man from voting; therefore,
if this Bill was not passed, the poorer classes of England would come
to believe that they were being unfairly treated with greater hard-
ship and inequality than their fellow Irish citizens. In Balfour's
eyes, Chamberlain and the whole Liberal party organization from
"Cabinet Ministers of high standing," future party leaders, and down
to the "humblest wire-puller of the Caucus" had spent the last month
telling the agricultural labourers that "they are being kept out of
their rights"by a "particular Party and a particular class" from
"purely selfish motives. "^^
Chamberlain, replying with obvious relish, thanked Balfour
for complimenting the National Liberal Federation and himself (though
as Chamberlain explained he did not preside over the Federation) be-
cause it was "a compliment for which we can be more grateful than that,
in this question, and perhaps in many others, it may control the
action of Her Majesty's present Government. "^^ It was true. Chamber-
lain conceded, that the Liberals had repented late, but not as late as
the Conservatives. It was apparent that Balfour had little sympathy
with Collings or the agricultural laborers, yet the Conservatives brought
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forward this Bill. Chamberlain taunted then with converting in an at-
tempt to win the laborers' votes—to show the laborers that "Codlin
[the Conservative] is their friend and not Short [the Liberal].
. .
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Though the measure was a Conservative Government Bill, Collings
was the chief proponent of the Medical Relief Bill. When a fellow
Liberal attacked the Bill on grounds of political economy as corrupt-
ing and degrading the laborers, Collings responded that this was setting
up political economy as an abstract principle, "and dealing with it in
the manner and to the extent to which they might deal with the North
Pole and the Solar System, instead of remembering that they were deal-
ing with human beings." Even if the theory was right it had to be
regulated by the "common necessities of human life."
Collings proposed a new theory as a substitute to political
economy. The political economists had argued that the State could
not intervene to help a person because that would lead to a loss of
independence and self-respect , and that the most the indigent person
could hope for was private charity. Collings reversed the equation,
in effect he stated that "free relief given by a charity was . . .
more demoralizing than the relief given by the community in their
corporate capacity, which was what he understood by the poor rate."
Private charity demoralized because it made the recipient dependent
upon the person who gave it, whereas the corporate community gave of
itself so that the person might join the community to the benefit of all.
But that community could not come into existence until all men
could participate in it. When an Hon. Member talked glowingly of the
"Guardians of the Poor," Collings declared it a misnomer. "It should
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be Guardians of the poor rate elected for the administration of the
poor rate." The Guardians, instead of looking after the interests
of the poor as the Poor Law intended, "were elected by men of property
to keep down the rates, which they succeeded in doing by the exercise
of cruelty and oppression." At work in Collings' mind, though only
vaguely understood and never articulated were the beginnings of the
slow and halting steps toward the welfare state.
For those who feared that removing disqualification by ac-
cepting medical assistance would lead to removing all disqualifications
for receiving any assistance, Collings simply argued that the laborers
needed and deserved medical assistance and should not be deprived of
their vote because they were too poor to find any help except from
the parish.
The Conservatives though espousing concern for the rural poor
attempted to construe "medical relief" in its narrowest sense to cover
only medicines. Collings protested because the Government knew that
medical officers often gave patients such articles of comfort as beef-
tea and port wine, and surely in these cases, these were medicine.
Collings moved an amendment resolving that medical or surgical assist-
ance include "all matters and things supplied by or on the recommen-
dation of the medical officer. ..."
When it came to the vote, Collings' amendment passed by 50
votes, 180 to 130. The Conservative Government, after losing this
crucial vote almost dropped it, but under pressure from Collings and
the Liberals, and with some hesitation, the Government allowed the
Bill to pass through both houses where it became law on August 6.
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The Lahourevs' Chronicle, which had followed the debate closely
for its readers, described the debate over the amendment as Collings'
attempt to get the "mutton chop" as well as the "jalap. collings
had persevered and now the laborers could have both. In the pages of
the Chronicle, Collings was hailed, and Arch felt that the laborers
were deeply indebted to him that the Act had been passed in time for
the laborers to vote in the November 1885 election.
The question remains why the Conservatives took up the Bill.
It seems clear that they wanted to defuse this issue in the country-
side. They seemingly took up this Bill in an attempt to outbid the
Liberals for the laborers' votes. Collings with real insight noted
the difference: he and his friends were "true believers in the temple
in which for the moment, they were all worshippers; but Hon. Members
opposite were mere conformists to a creed which in their hearts they
disliked. "^^ Perhaps, as the Liberal MP, James Bryce suggested, the
Conservatives believed that "the poorest class of voters, being most
dependent on the Squire, would be most likely to vote with the Squire."
Most likely both reasons were true. The Conservatives like the Liberal
did not really know what they had created by the 1884 Franchise Act and
the Medical Relief Act, and this uncertainty gave them hopes for Conser
vative victories in the counties.
Whatever their reasons, the Conservatives were to be disap-
*»
pointed as the Liberals scored big gains in the counties. Part of the
credit must go to Schnadhorst and the NLF which at the Reverend Tuck-
well's request had reconstructed the rural divisional Liberal Associa-
tions into parish organizations with real responsibility for selecting
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a candidate. Part of the credit must go to the Reverend Tuckwell, the
"Radical Parson" whose ideas for missionary work among the laborers by
lectures, leaflets, and election tracts helped awaken the laborers'
Interest. In June 1885, Tuckwell contributed much to the Liberal suc-
cess by his influential pamphlet which though written for the Liberal
electors of Rugby, became a "best seller" and spread all over Britain
and was widely reprinted, translated, versified, and even sent across
the oceans to the United States and Australia. Important in that pamph-
let was his assertion that the secret ballot protected the laborers
from reprisals by the Conservative squires. ®°
Finally, much of the credit must go to Collings. He had strug-
gled for many years to bring the laborers' cause to the fore, and fin-
ally with Chamberlain's and other Radicals' assistance and the need
of the Liberal party for an election issue, he had freed the rural
laborers to speak not only with their voices but with their ballots.
When he was confronted by Conservative claims that the Medical Relief
Act had been taken up simply for the election, he replied that it was
true. But he
could not . . . see why that should not be so. Elections
were not for the purpose of returning certain men, but to
secure certain measures which the constituency wished;
and he trusted, therefore, that it would be a question for
the electors. ^-^
On August 14, Parliament was prorogued and the following month
Chamberlain began a series of speeches in Scotland on reform. Instead
of pushing the complete Radical Programme which had just been issued
as a book (in July) with an introduction by himself. Chamberlain set-
tled on three primary issues— free schools, compulsory land purchase by
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local authorities for allotments and small holdings, and fiscal reform
which would be achieved by graduated property taxes of various kinds.
When Gladstone issued a pallid election manifesto, Chamberlain at-
tacked it and insisted on the education and agrarian proposals, which
led to Whig, G. J. Goschen, to dub them the "unauthorized programme.
In October as the election approached. Chamberlain was confident
that free schools and allotments were the keys to electoral victory. He
wrote Mundella: "We shall sweep the country with free education and
allotments and the Tories will be smashed and the Whigs extinguished."^^
Collings campaigned in the counties with his usual zest, causing
Chamberlain to worry that he might overtax himself but since Collings
was doing such good work. Chamberlain dared not "say anything about it.
I suppose we must win the election and then go to sleep for a month."
In the counties, Collings found the laborers ready to vote for the
Q C
Liberals with their promises of land reform.
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^
J- Hanhara, EleoHons and Party Management. Politics in theTzme of IKsraelz and Gladstone, London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd.,
1959, pp. 137, 140. Hereafter cited as Hanham, Elections. In'March'
1877, Chamberlain had kept Manchester and Leeds from joining with
Birmingham in forming the Federation because their claim to equal
representation "would render prompt and united action an impossibility
xn the future." Chamberlain to Collings, March 2, 1877, Chamberlain
Papers, JC 5/16/64.
^Ihid., pp. 68, 143, 282. In Ipswich, the family connections
belonged to the Cobbolds, who controlled much of Ipswich's political
life.
3Collings and Green, Collings^ II, p. 168.
^Tbid., pp. 168-69.,
^W. Hasbach, A History of the English Agricultural Labourer,
London: Frank Cass, 1966 (1908 original), p. 297. Hereafter cited as
Hasbach, English Agricultural Labourer. In 1890, the Eastern Counties
Labour Federation, with its center in Ipswich, led the way for the
temporary resurgence of agricultural unionism in the 1890' s.
^Stephen L. Gwynn and G. M. Tuckwell, The Life of the Rt. Hon.
Sir Charles W. Dilke in two volumes, Volume I, London: John Murray,
1917, pp. 214-15. Hereafter cited as Gwynn and Tuckwell, Dilke. On
most occasions, the "new party" had been Chamberlain, Dilke, and Mr.
Dillwyn with occasional support from Joseph Cowen, Edmund Dwyer Gray,
an Irish Nationalist and owner of the Freeman's Journal , and Mr. Burt.
^Some other victories for the Birmingham Radicals were Mr. J.
S. Wright and Mr. Seeley for Nottingham, and Mr. Wiggin and Mr. Bass
for East Staffordshire. From the Owl Cartoon, April 8, 1881, published
in Birmingham.
^3 Hansard^ CCLXVIII, April 27, 1882, 1611, 1614.
^Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Collings, March 28, 1880, Chamber-
lain Papers, JC 5/16/92. Owl Cartoon, April 8, 1881. The vote tally was
Mr. Cobbold, a Conservative, 3 , 142 votes; Collings with 3,074 votes; Henry
West, a Liberal, with 3,025 votes; and Mr. Bulwer with 2,779 votes.
Chamberlain was so pleased with the results that he gave way to his im-
pish humor and invited '^Triumphant Jesse** and his "august spouse" and
"transcendent daughter" to join him and John Morley for dinner for a
small celebration. Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Collings, April 1881,
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/99.
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Chamberlain to T. H. S. Escott, April 22, 1880, T. H.S Escott Papers. "If the New Government does not frankly accept theRadicals, my place is outside-and if I am free I can play no small
? ' * Joseph Chamberlain to John Morley, April 16 1880in Garvin, Chamberlain, I, p. 294. Garvin, Chamberlain, I, p. '305
where Garvin quotes Parliamentary veteran. Lord Blachford, "Chamberlainiwasj tolerably well muzzled by the Board of Trade." Dilke later ac-
cepted the position as Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs where he was
to be held in check by Lord Granville.
^1 Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Collings, May 16, 1880, Chamber-
lain Papers, JC 5/16/96.
Jones, Politics of Reform, 1884, p. 248.
^^Garvin, Chamberlain, I, pp. 321, 324. Parnell enunciated
this policy of social ostracism~"as if he were a leper of old"~which
was used not only against "unjust" farmers, but landlords and their
agents.
^"^Jesse Collings, Speech on the Irish Land Question, delivered
at Ipswich, in December 1880, printed by the Birmingham Reform League,
1881, p. 9. Hereafter cited as Collings, Irish Land Question.
^^Ibid., p. 10.
"^^Tbid. Collings reminded his listeners of a quotation from the
Duke of Wellington: "But for the fear of revolution I would do nothing."
^''3 Hansard, CCLVIII, February 4, 1881, 216. Collings mentioned
some Irish landlords' "vicious" behavior and argued that it was not sur-
prising that when faced with this behavior, the peasants should turn to
an illegal power to protect them when the legal powers could not.
^^Collings and Green, Collings, II, p. 147. The italics are
Collings' o\m.
^^3 Hansard, CCLVIII, February 4, 1881, 213.
^^Ibid., CCLXIII, July 26, 1881, 1953. The amendment came from
Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, a Liberal, during debate on the Third Reading.
The amendment lost 241 to 205 (1956-59).
^^C. Cruise O'Brien, Parnell and his Party, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1964 (corrected impression). Chapter III, part 3,
"Kilmainham," pp. 72-79. Cf. also Garvin, Cliamberlain, I, pp. 344-58.
22jesse Collings to Joseph Chamberlain, May 7, 1882, Chamberlain
Papers, JC 5/16/18. Garvin mentions the manifesto in Chamberlain, I,
p. 364.
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"3 Hansard, CCLXIX, May 25, 1882, 1657. The Government's
reasons for the Coercion Bill reminded Collings of the treatment once
used on lunatics. "They were first loaded with chains, and when such
cruel tortures produced madness, that madness was appealed to as ajustification of the treatment." (1658.)
^'^Collings and Green, Collings^ II, p. 138.
^^Ibid., p. 147. The emphasis is Collings'. Even in 1887, he
did not join with the other Liberal Unionists and Conservatives in
voting a Coercion Bill. Nor did he speak in favor of it. 3 Hansard,
CCCXII, CCCXill, and CCCXVII. The Times, November 7, 1911, p. 11.
2^3 Hansard, CCLIV, August 2, 1880, 2034.
^'^Ibid., CCLXXXII, July 26, 1883, 646. The Fourth Standard is
equivalent to the fourth grade in the U.S. In 1880, Mundella had
proudly announced that between 1870 and 1879, the number of children on
the school registers had increased by 119%, the average number of school
attendances by 125%, new accommodations for students by 121%, while
grants per pupil increased by 56%. Ibid., CCLIV, August 2, 1880, 1966-67
^^Ibid., CCLIV, August 2, 1880, 2035.
^'^Tbid., CCLXXXII, July 26, 1883, 646-47. Mundella though an
ardent advocate of education did not reduce the fees.
^^Ibid., 646-47. Collings, Common Schools in England, pp. 17-18.
For Free Schools, see C. H. D. Howard, "Joseph Chamberlain and the
'Unauthorized Programme'" in English Historical Review, LXV, No. 257,
October 1950, p. 486 where Chamberlain hoped that free education and
allotments would sweep the country in the November 1885 election.
^"^Ibid., CCXC, July 17, 1884, 1484. For example, see Tbid.,
1485 and Ibid., CCLXXXVIII, May 22, 1884, 991-92. The Charity Commis-
sioners in this case overruled the trustees who wanted the school es-
tablished at Tonbridge. The Government declared it had "no power to
vary a scheme which Parliament has sanctioned, and which is now law."
3^3 Hansard, CCLXXXV, February 28, 1884, 91. The Court of
Chancery had fixed a sum cf f60 per year for the West Lavington School.
^^Ibid., CCC, August 10, 1885, 1575.
3^3 Hansard, CCLIV, August 2, 1880, 2036. See Rural World,
March 9, 1889, p. 135. Also December 29, 1889, p. 16 for attack on
the Charity Commissionerp ' Dauntsey scheme.
^^Ibid., 2036. Collings told the Commons that there was among
the working classes a demand for learning and even if there was no
demand, "then it was their [Parliament's] business to create one."
^^Ibid.
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A 1 /^u°^^^''^^ ^""^ Cotlings, II, pp. 123-25. Collings' motiondeclared that in order to increase the productivity of the land, haltthe decline of the rural population, and promote Britain's industries,provision should be made for the acquirement [sia] by agricultural
labourers and others of proprietary rights in the soil they cultivate."
^^Hanham, Elections, p. 32. Jesse Collings, "The Radical
Programme, IV, The Agricultural Labourer," in the Fortnightly Review,
Volume XXXIV, New Series (July 1-December 1, 1883), No. CCIl'l, November
1, 1883, pp. 609-25. Hereafter cited as Collings, "Radical Programme."
Collings and Green, Collings, I, pp. 130, 133-34, 136. In his Address
on the Land Questzon to the St Thomas' Ward Liberal Association,
Birmingham on January 11, 1882, printed in Birmingham, 1882, Collings
remarked that as far as the farmers were concerned, the labourer was
always "outside the scope of every measure of reform." (p. 21.)
^'^The Times, October 23, 1881, p. 10. The Conference was held
In Liverpool.
'^^Edith Henrietta Fowler (Hon. Mrs. Robert Hamilton), The Life of
Henry Hartley Fowler, First Viscount of Wolverhampton by his daughter,
London: Hutchinson & Company, 1902, p. 217. Hereafter cited as Fowler,
Viscount Wolverhampton.
^
^Collings, Address on the Land Question,^. 8.
'*^Ibid., p. 28.
^^Ihid., p. 29.
'*'*3 Hansard, CCLXIX, May 17, 1882, 941. Collings wanted laborers
and cottagers and all who wanted allotments to be able to apply to the
county courts, which were cheap and easily approachable for orders to
compel the trustees to carry out provisions of the Bill.
^^Ibid.y 944-45. Mr. Hibbert, Pari iamentary Secretary for the
Local Government Board promised Government support, but with considera-
tion of certain clauses. Hasbach, English Agricultural Labourer*^ pp. 306-7
^^^Hasbach, English Agricultural Labor4rer^ p. 307. Hasbach
quotes Howard Evans' comment on the effects of the Lords' Amendments:
"It was as though a Chinese had bound up its feet and an Indian had
pressed its nose flat." (p. 306.)
^^Collings and Green, Collings^ II, pp. 142-43. Howard Evans,
Radical Fights of Forty Years ^ London: published by The Daily News and
Leader^ 1913, p. 52. "The tricks resorted to by the trustees are simply
infamous." Collings wrote to Evans in 1913[!] that because the Charity
Commissioners were "not friendly to the Act, they will have to be fought
ere long." (p. 53.)
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^^English Labourers' Chvoniale, December 23, 1882, p 1 Arch
especially thanked Collings. and Howard Evans who then was making a
register of charity lands so that the laborers could know which landfell under the Act. Also English Labourers' Chronicle, November 11,
1882, p. 1. Arch exhorted the laborers to stand together because thanks
to Collings' work, "You have a brighter future before you than your
fathers' had."
'^^Collings and Green, Collings, II, pp. 154-57. The memorial
requested that Collings be given time at the earliest possible moment
to present his motion.
Hansard, CCLXXXII, July 20, 1883, 96. Collings and Green,
Collings, II, p, 158. I have relied upon Hansard rather than Green's
loose rendering of Collings' speech.
^^Ibid., 97.
^^Ihid.y 99. By 1884, Collings had reduced the laborers' amount
to one-fifth. Collings, "Occupying Ownership," in the Fortnightly
Review, Volume XXXV, New Series (January 1-June 1, 1884), No. CCVI,
February 1, 1884, p. 260. Hereafter cited as Collings, "Occupying
Ownership." It is Interesting that Lord George Hamilton's propo-
sition for the State to advance the whole amount of the purchase to
the laborer was more "radical" than Collings was prepared to go, though
Collings later came around to Lord Hamilton's proposal.
^^Ibid., 101.
^^Collings and Green, Collings, II, p. 162.
^^Josoph Chamberlain to Jesse Collings, October 18, 1883, Chamber
lain Papers, JC 5/16/105. Collings received the proofs, corrected them
and sent them back to Escott. When the "corrected" proofs were returned
to Collings, he found that they had not been corrected. Jesse Collings
to T. H. S. Escott, November 10, 1883, T. H. S. Escott Papers. Collings
had written at Chamberlain's urging, "A Radical in Russia" for the Feb-
ruary 1883 issue of the Fortnightly. Jesse Collings to T. H. S. Escott,
November 12, 1882, T. H. S. Escott Papers. Fortnightly Rcvirw, Volume
XXXIII, Now Series (January 1-June 1, 1883), No Cxblll, February 1, 1883,
pp. 205-20. Escott solicited Collings' advice on Escott' s book on "Eng-
land"—most likely for the revised edition of Escott's best known work,
England: Its People Polity and Pursuits. In 1885, Chapman and Ha LI issu
the "New and revised edition." Collings was unsure of huw much help he
could be to Escott, but he was willing "to read the chapters as you sug-
gest. ..." Jesse Collings to T. H. S. Escott, November 10, 1883, T. H.
S. Escott Papers.
S^Collings, "Radical Programme," p. 609. The articles which in-
cluded ones on Housing of the Poor, Religious Equality, Free Schools,
Taxation and Finance, and Local Government and ireland were reprinted In
1885 in one book with a preface by Chamberlain. Collings' article became
Chapter V of that book. Hamer {ed.). Radical Programme^ Chapter V, "The
Agricultural Labourer," and Introduction, pp. xvi-xxil.
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^"^Thzd., p. 624. Collings also wanted common lands illegallv
enclosed to. be returned to the poor and measures taken to prevent anyfurther illegal enclosures.
^^Ibid.
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59coiiings and Green, Collings, II, pp. 164-65. The Allotments
Extension Association was the forerunner of Collings' Rural Labourers'
League.
6°Collings, "Occupying Ownership," p. 257. Cf. also 3 Hansard,
CCLXXXII, July 20, 1883, 100.
61Ibid., p. 258
Ibid., p. 263. Collings wanted the State to advance four-
fifths of the purchase money while the local authorities took one-half
per cent over their borrowing rate to pay off the debt in 66 years. Also
the local authorities were to be authorized to loan these occupiers one-
half to two- thirds of the money for erecting their dwellings. Collings
evidently responded to critics of his article in "The Radical Programme"
that his scheme was too costly and did not deal seriously with the
laborers' dwellings.
^^Ibid.y p. 266.
^^Jones, Politics of Reform 1884^ pp. 3-4.
Hansard, CCLXXXVI, March 24, 1884, 687. The major provisions
of the Bill extended to the counties the flO occupation, household, and
lodger qualifications and a new service franchise (which allowed those
persons to vote whose rent was deducted from their salary) in all parts
of the United Kingdom. Jones, Politics of Reform 1884, p. 5.
^^Collings and Green, Collings^ II, p. 172. Green mentions that
there were over 4,000 laborers from the Kent and Sussex Union at Hyde Park
Jones, Politics of Reform 1884, p. 8. Also George Dixon to
Joseph Chamberlain, November 4, 1884, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/27/5
where Dixon hoped Chamberlain would do all he could to get the Franchise
Bill carried, because in an election without it, the Parnellites would
be masters of the situation.
^^Collings and Green, Collings, II, pp. 175-76. Howard, "Un-
authorized Programme," p. 484 suggested that Chamberlain coined the slogan
in his Bradford speech on October 1, 1885. Garvin in Chamberlain, II, p.
79 gave the credit to the Conservative Edward Stanhope. The Reverend
William Tuckwell in his book. Reminiscences of a Radical Parson, London:
Cassell & Company, Ltd., 1905, p. 52 suggested either Lord Tollemache or
Frederic Impey (of Birmingham). Hereafter cited as Tuckwell, Radical Par-
son. There is no unequivocal answer, though the sJogan is most commonly
associated with Collings.
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^* Balfour, President of the Local Government Board, in the1885 Conservative Government had much fun at the Liberals' expense indescribing this death-bed repentance. 3 Hansard, CCIC, July 13, 1885,
982, Balfour added that the Liberal conversion came so late that theyhad no time for a "last dying speech and confession."
Ibid. y 1003. The Conservative was Lord Edward Cavendish.
At a later point, Mr. Bryce, the Liberal MP pointedly remarked that he
wished to know what Collings thought on a certain point since "what the
Hon. Member for Ipswich thought to-day the President of the Local Govern-
ment Board would think tomorrow." Ibid.
^
July 21, 1885, 1429.
Tbid.^ 985-87. Hicks Beach had previously warned the Liberals
that If they did not disqualify Irish voters who received medical relief,
they could not do It to English laborers (986).
^^Ibid.y 991.
'^^Ibid., 993. "Codlin" and "Short" are from Dickens' "Little
Nell" but the reference Is to the Reverend Tuckwell's election pamphlet
where the characters were used to refer to the Conservatives "Codlln"
and the Liberals "Short." "Short" was a very sympathetic character,
Codlln was not. Tuckwell, Radical Parson^ Appendix A, pp. 227-37.
'^^^Tbid.j 977. The Liberal opponent was Leonard Courtney. Collings
had previously attacked Courtney's "Inhumanity" (975). Collings called
this argument for political economy that of "the schoolman and the Pro-
fessor," but humanity stood against them and would win over them.
'^^Ibid.y 974-77.
^^3 Hansard, CCIC, July 21, 1885, 1468, 1640 and 1653-55. Har-
court pointed out that the usual remedy for typhoid was port wine or
champagne, and in that case it certainly was medical relief (1894).
"^"^Quoted In Collings and Green, Collings^ II, p. 174. "Jalap"
was a popular name for medicine.
Hansard, CCIC, July, Ic, 1885, 973.
'^'^Ibid., July 21, 1885, 1427.
^^Tuckwell, Radical Parson, p. 39, 41. See Appendix A, pp. ll^-'il
for the text of the pamphlet and p. 43 for the furor his pamphlet caused.
8I3 Hansard, CCIC, July 21, 1885, 1468.
Q^Howard, "Unauthorized Programme," pp. 484-85
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Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Collings,September 20 1885, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/108 where Chamberfaln
complained of Gladstone's manifesto, but remarked that it was better
differences then since Gladstone was "squeezable andwill probably give way to our views."
rx. u ^
a letter to an aristocratic correspondent.Chamberlain was more explicit on the role the laborers would play in theLiberal victory, "Remember that I told you a year ago that we should
get the agricultural labourers who are not so stupid as you—who havelived among them all your life and who consequently know nothing aboutthem—have supposed. We are going to sweep the counties. ..."
Chamberlain to Lady Dorothy (Nevill)
, October 7, 1885, Austen Chamber-
lain Papers, AC 1/4/5/2. However, as the euphoria wore off and perceived
that the l^migs would not be extinguished, he moderated his language and
even seemed conciliatory toward them. Howard, "Unauthorized Programme,"
pp. 486-87.
8 5Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Collings, October 12, 1885
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/110.
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CHAPTER IV
COERCION AND COMPULSION (1885-1887)
"[T]he agricultural vote is to become a lever for reforms
of every description"-"?^^ Times^ January 18, 1886, p. 8.
In 1885, Jesse Collings was regarded as one of the most advanced
Radicals in the Commons and so was heartily distrusted by the Whigs and
Conservatives, yet within two years they welcomed him into a close al-
liance against his old allies in the Liberal party. It has generally
been assumed that Collings' movement into the Liberal Unionist party
was motivated by Chamberlain's opposition to Gladstone's Home Rule policy
The truth is much more complicated and interesting.
Collings at first supported Gladstone's policy, and it was only
after a prolonged crisis which ended with three shattering blows on
April 1, 1886, that Collings made the transition to Chamberlain's posi-
tion. Even then, he did not give up hope for reconciliation between
Gladstone and Chamberlain.
In the meantime, Collings was forced to deal with the Conserva-
tives (who came to power in July 1886) in order to pass his land reform
legislation. In 1887, the Conservatives turned around and accepted the
principles of Collings' Allotments Bill and passed it as their own mea-
sure. Their reasons illustrate both the nature of the Liberal Unionist-
Conservative alliance and the continuing popularity among the rural voter
of proposals for allotments and small holdings.
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This chapter explores the political events that resulted in
Collings* break with the Liberal party and the interplay of party
politics and social reform in these two crucial years.
*****
A fever raged in the counties, and the Radicals having raised
the cry of rural reform, seized upon it to ride into power. Collings
fought at Ipswich and the surrounding countryside; Joseph Arch for
Northwest Norfolk, Henry Cobb for Rugby, Doctor (later Sir) Walter
Foster for Chester, Thorold Rogers for Bermondsey, and other Liberals
who suddenly joined their ranks. ^ Collings spent much time touring
the countryside furthering the electoral chances of those Liberal can-
didates, spending so much time assisting them that he was unable to
carefully watch over his own Ipswich division, an omission he later
had cause to regret.
Unfortunately, the election was a stalemate which left the Con-
servatives with Irish support in power. Many Radicals, led by Chamber-
lain, wanted to keep the minority Conservative Government in power where
their "do nothing policies would rouse the country against them," but
Gladstone, by his advocacy of Irish Home Rule undercut Chamberlain's
strategy. The Liberal leaders—Chamberlain, Hartington, and Harcourt
—
were opposed to Gladstone's policy, but were unable to agree on an op-
position program. The initiative lay with Gladstone.
The leaders were filled with despair and anger, but among their
followers—and none more so than Jesse Collings— there was hope and
promise. Harcourt in talking with men like Collings and Broadhurst—
the non-commissioned offers of the Liberal party—found a "general and
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ignorant toleration of the idea of an Irish Parliament." When Harcourt
argued with Collings about the difficulties, Collings replied: "Oh,
these are administrative details which you statesmen must deal with."^
Thus Jesse Collings was carried along on a tide of optimism, believing
as did so many others that the Irish question would be at once solved
and social reform brought to the fore. Collings and Chamberlain once
so entwined seemed set on opposite tracks in the coming course of events.
In the weeks before the 1886 Parliament met. Chamberlain and
Collings prepared a domestic program designed to embarrass the Tory
Government and to strengthen the Liberal party. The one clear result
for the Liberals in the 1885 election was their convincing victories in
the counties. Many Liberals realized that they must offer concrete,
practical programs which would strengthen their hold on the rural elector
However, the Conservatives were still the Government and their program
would dominate the opening of Parliament. The Liberal strategy was to
attack that program as inadequate and offer other proposals in its
place. The most obvious point of attack was a Conservative weakness
—
the land question. Collings and Chamberlain already out in front on this
question through the "Radical Programme" orchestrated the attack in the
first weeks of January.
^
On January 11 at the second annual meeting of the Allotments and
Small Holdings Association in London, with Collings, President of the
Association, in the chair, and Chamberlain, the main speaker, the offen-
sive began. Altogether there were 27 Liberal MP's in attendance with
distinguished visitors including Schnadhorst and a very large attendance
of members from the provinces.
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Collings began the meeting by explaining the reasons for his
1885 Allotments Extension Act, and why they needed another measure from
the Government. Earlier legislation had ordered the trustees of charity
lands (who held almost one-quarter of a million acres) to break up their
lands for allotments for the laborers. Although Collings had hoped that
the trustees—mostly clergymen, squires, and farmers—would follow the
Act "willingly and honestly," they had raised every possible obstacle,
and they had been supported in that course by the Charity Commissioners.
Although the Allotments and Small Holdings Association had been success-
ful in assisting the laborers, new legislation was needed, the Allot-
ments and Small Holdings Bill. This Bill would give local authorities com-
pulsory power—without which any measure would be inoperative— to acquire
land, and thus assist the laborer to secure "three acres at a fair price. "^
Interestingly, Collings grounded his appeal for the Bill in
political terms. The last election, he argued, had showed that the
laborer wished to be free of the landlords and agents—of any influence
which could be exercised to his detriment. The real objections to
allotments and small holdings by the landowners were that they made the
cultivator politically independent. Those gathered there knew that there
"was an amount of village despotism which dwellers in towns could hardly
understand." That despotism could be broken if this Bill were passed.
The listeners were well aware that the Liberal successes in the counties
were primarily due to the political independence shown by the laborers
and it needed no reiteration that this independence be protected.
Chamberlain argued that land reform was of "vital and urgent
national importance." The laborers would regard it as a breach of faith
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If this question was not dealt with at the earliest possible moment.
Touching swiftly and surely on the political issues, Chamberlain warned
that this Bill must be put before Parliament soon. They must press the
Bill at least to a division on the Second Reading because if the Bill
failed, the friends of the laborers must be able to "point to the party
and the persons to whom that failure is due, ..." otherwise the
Liberals would not receive the support of the rural electors again.
Chamberlain was gratified at the fine work done by Collings and
the Allotments Association in the past election. He hoped that this
Association would not confine itself simply to allotments and small
holdings, but rather "become the great political organ of the labour-
6irs • • • •
Chamberlain, Collings, and the Radicals were attempting to create
a political faction within the Liberal party which could seize the levers
of political power from the current leadership. They challenged Glad-
stone's Irish policy by attempting to inflate the rural laborers* issue
to a position from which it would overshadow other issues (much as
Gladstone was trying to do with his Home Rule policy).
By January 16, it had become apparent that the Conservatives
were repudiating their contacts with the Irish Nationalists, a process
which could only result in their dismissal from office. On January 21,
the Queen's Speech was read to the Parliament, and though there was no
statement of a coercion policy toward Ireland, it was evident that the
Conservatives were leaning in that direction. Shortly thereafter, W. H.
Smith, the new Chief Secretary for Ireland, announced that coercion was
necessary.
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The Conservative Government's action goaded the Birmingham
Radicals into action. Their long opposition to coercion, especially
in Chamberlain's and Collings' cases, and their fundamental view that a
coercive policy could not work in Ireland and their hopes for Irish
support in Ireland compelled them to stand with Gladstone and preci-
pitate the Government from power.
^
The Conservatives were out to make Ireland the issue, and either
force a new election upon it or split the Liberal party. If the Con-
servative strategy was clear, the Liberal response was not. Here Chamber-
lain and Collings provided a diverting solution. With Chamberlain's
assistance, Collings had introduced an Amendment to the Address regretting
that no measures were
announced by Her Majesty for the present relief of those
classes, and especially for affording facilities to the
^
agricultural labourers and others in the rural districts
to obtain allotments and small holdings on equitable terms
as to rent and security of tenure.^
Clearly, Collings, Chamberlain, Harcourt, and Dilke had put forward the
Amendment to embarrass the Conservative Government and strengthen Liberal
claims to the rural voters' gratitude.
When on January 21 Gladstone called together most members of
his old Cabinet to discuss a strategy for turning out the Government,
the leaders seized upon the Amendment as a means to avoid a division over
the Irish question. (This also meant that Gladstone was compelled to accept
a part of the "unauthorized programme" as a "stalking horse" to mask the
real divisions within the party. )^
The Liberals by this decision had finessed the real issue,
Ireland. They had given themselves time, but they had failed to resolve
I95
the critical issue. No one, as the speeches on the Amendment proved,
was deceived that Gladstone was set upon bringing in an—unacceptable
to many Liberals and Radicals—Irish Home Rule Bill.
However, the "stalking horse" had a life of Its own. Any success
that the Amendment engendered would inflate the cause of the rural
laborers to a prominent, if not pre-eminent, position. Gladstone, when
he spoke for Collings' Amendment, seemingly embraced this part of the
"unauthorized programme," for otherwise he could be charged with mere
"self-interest and personal advancement." For the moment. Chamberlain
and Collings held that in abeyance.
On Tuesday morning, January 26, the Government announced that
they would bring in an Irish coercion Bill. That night Collings moved
his Amendment. He told the House that they should have no doubt that a
depression existed both in town and country, and "especially among the
labouring classes in the rural districts." It was a mystery how a man
could support his family on the "miserable pittance" he received as a
day laborer, yet everywhere the land cried out for labor. "It was said
that farmers could not afford to employ labour. But it was certain they
could not afford to farm without labour." Because the laborers stood
idle and without hope of decent emplojrment, they fled the soil to the
detriment of the land and the community.^
Collings remarked that he felt no need to say one word in favor
of allotments and small holdings, for everyone, including Mr. Chaplin,
the Chancellor for the Duchy of Lancaster who had opposed them, now
supported them, seeing how the laborers expressed their interests at the
polls. The laborer was not a fool and did not expect to get three acres
and a cow right away, but he wanted a legitimate means to acquire land.
96
because when he got it "there was little doubt that by his own thrift
and his own efforts the cow and many other things would speedily follow."
The laborers rejected the paternalism of the landowners, and called for
legislation which recognized that
where a fair and a legitimate demand for land existed, it
should be had at a fair price, and on a tenure that wiuld
not depend on touching the hat to either parson or squire;
but on condition that the holders of it should be indepen-
dent, paying rent for it and cultivating it.^O
The disadvantages of the present land system were two-fold.
First, it forced Britain to import food (not including corn) at an
estimated £50,000,000 annually. Yet British agriculture should be
able to produce every penny's worth of it, especially as prices were
so much higher than they were forty years ago. Second, Britain had
the land and the labor, but both stood idle and her people paid the
economic and social costs.
The legislation and enclosures of the past centuries had reduced
the small independent farmers to "mere hirelings." Deprived of land and
employment, the laborers in successive migrations moved into the towns,
creating a proletariat that existed nowhere else in Europe. Collings
appealed to the Conservatives to recognize that his measure was a "con-
servative" one meant to save them from the danger which the present
land system had allowed to develop. And in ringing tones, he declared
that if they resisted this measure, in the end, they would lose and
fare far worse because of it.
Interestingly enough, the attack on Collings' Amendment did
not deny the need for and the desirability of allotments for the laborers.
(Perhaps the election was too near to let either party openly criticize
allotments for the laborers.) Rather, the opposition based its arguments
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on three points: (1) the political nature of the amendment; (2) the
agricultural depression as a cause of the laborers' and farmers'
plight, and; (3) the economic and social undesirability of giving the
laborers small freeholds.
A. J. Balfour, then President of the Local Government Board,
argued that should this amendment pass, it would not affect a single
laborer in the country. In fact, it was clear that the Liberals wanted
nothing more than to turn the Government out, but they feared to move
a vote of "No Confidence" in the Government. Facing the assembled
Liberals, Balfour noted that the real issue was not allotments, but
Ireland, "which while you have the agricultural labourer and his for-
tunes on your lips, during the whole course of the debate, I doubt not
occupied your minds. ""^"^
Though everyone was aware that Ireland was obscured for the
moment by Collings* amendment, the debate illuminated some social and
economic presuppositions governing land use in Britain. Chaplin, the
Chancellor for the Duchy of Lancaster, and chief spokesman for the
Government, argued that allotment and small holdings would not remove
the effects of the agricultural depression. In his opinion, it would
only "tend to aggravate and increase" the depression. Those who have
suffered most were the small freeholders because unlike the tenants
they had no one to lean upon in these hard times. As Balfour observed,
anyone who knew the French and Belgian peasants would concede that they
1 2
were worse off than were the English laborers.
The most divisive issue was clearly captured by Joseph Arch
in this his maiden speech in Parliament. Collings object, he argued.
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was "not so much to cure agricultural depression as to cure the poverty
of the agricultural labourers." Large numbers of laborers now earning
poor wages or none at all would be glad for the rent of an acre or two
at a fair market price. To put an end to pauperism, the laborers must
have allotments and freeholds by which they could supplement their in-
comes or even support themselves and their families.
The debate over the Collings Amendment revealed two significant
features, the almost unanimous support of allotments for the laborers
though disagreeing over the use of compulsory powers to acquire allot-
ments, and the overwhelming resistance to small holdings. The speakers
on both sides of the aisle praised "a large extension of allotments"
(Chaplin) through "legislation in favour of the agricultural labourer"
(Gladstone), because more allotments would be of "vast advantage to
the community" (Goschen).^^ Evidently the various Royal Commission and
Select Committee reports on the condition of agriculture, the newspaper
accounts concerning the conditions of the laborers and the propagandizing
activities of various Radicals, Liberals, Conservatives, Socialists,
Land Nationalizers, and others had by 1886 converted the extension of
allotments into a justifiable and practical public solution for the ills
of the rural laborers. Lord Randolph Churchill's "Dartford Programme" of
October 1886 and the Conservative's Labourers' Allotments Bill of 1887
can be viewed as recognition of the large consensus which the issue
could gather from all parts of the political spectrum. To no small de-
gree, Collings had contributed greatly to the establishment of the
consensus. ^ ^
The debates reflected the inner-workings of the land system in
Britain. Small holdings were a threat. They threatened to destroy the
A-
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farmers' and landowners' control over the rural population by freeing
the laborers from their influence. Arch and Collings recognized that the
"abominable tyranny" must be ended so that the laborers could be as "free
and unfettered as the squire. "^^ if that were so, a whole system of
political power In the counties would come toppling down.
Also, the rural economy would be affected. Independent small
holders no longer available to farm the land were a real threat to the
underpinnings of an agrarian system which depended upon a laboring force
tied to the land, but not necessarily of it. The implementation of a
small holdings scheme would have necessitated a major restructuring of
the British agrarian land system, a scheme both squire and landowner saw
as a rending of their way of life.
The opposition to small holdings could be—and was—successful
because the rural laborer, unwilling to be any longer a dependent crea-
ture could in the nineteenth century migrate to the industrializing
villages, and then to cities, to be replaced upon the land by mechani-
cal Implements made in the cities. The agrarian land system was saved,
but, ironically, for the lord and the squire, only at the cost of their
political power.
The final vote on Collings' Amendment was significant. The Govern
ment was turned out by a majority of 79. Ominously, eighteen Liberals, in
eluding Hartington, Goschen, Sir Henry James, and Leonard Courtney
voted with the Government, and 76 Liberals abstained. If the non-
voters defected, the Liberal party would be faced with the loss of power.
On Saturday, January 30, Gladstone set about to form his Third
Ministry. After some haggling, Gladstone prevailed upon Chamberlain
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to accept the Presidency of the Local Government Board with a seat in
the Cabinet. In taking the Local Government Board, Chamberlain asked
that Collings be the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board. Gladstone
acceded to the request, but in his letter to Collings, he apprised him
that as an economy measure, he was lowering the salary f300. Collings,
replying the same day, February 5, stated that he welcomed the oppor-
tunity to join Chamberlain at the Board, but the reduction in salary
cast a poor reflection upon his office, and thus, "with great respect,"
he declined the position if the salary was to be reduced.
Gladstone, attempting to mollify Collings, pointed out that the
reduction would also affect the Secretary to the Board of Trade, and
thus should not be seen as any downgrading of Collings' position. The
following day, the 7th, Collings stated more forcefully his view (and
Chamberlain's) that it was an inopportune time
for apparently reducing the status of the Local Government
Board when it is specifically charged with important legis-
lation for the benefit of the rural population which has
just contributed so largely to the success of the Liberal
party. ^ ^
He argued that salary reduction would be seen by the laborers as a
"low opinion both of the work I have to do and of my personal capacity
to discharge it." Rather than accept this view, Collings asserted
that he wished to remain outside of the Government. The relatively
obscure problem had blossomed into a full scale confrontation.
On February 5, hearing of Gladstone's proposed reduction Chamber-
lain had written an angry letter to Harcourt complaining that Collings,
who had won Gladstone "more votes than all his peers put together,"
was given this reward- Chamberlain wished Gladstone to know that
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his action made Chamberlain doubt whether Gladstone attached "any
importance to the presence of either Collings or myself in his Govern-
ment.
. .
."2 0
Harcourt stepped in to cool things off. He wrote Chamberlain
telling him that he had intervened with Gladstone. The following day,
Gladstone promised Harcourt that if Collings held out, then he would
give way to Chamberlain's will, but not his reasons. Gladstone was
compelled to give way. That day. Chamberlain was able to report to
Collings, "Mr. G. has given way at last with a good grace." Adding with
relief and frustration, "I wish he had never raised the question. "21
The matter had exploded suddenly and beyond all reasonable
limits. It is hard to see what Gladstone could expect the £600 saving
to effect, and his persistence in the face of Chamberlain's strong op-
position shows insensitivity, if not bad judgment. Chamberlain's agi-
tated response suggests that the tensions he was under were affecting
his judgment. He felt slighted, when he should have recognized it as
another example of Gladstone's tactlessness. Gladstone may have been
more tactless than he realized, since Collings was still not committed
to opposition to a Home Rule scheme.
Collings, in this exchange, was not guiltless, nor completely hon
est. It is difficult to accept Collings' views that the reduction in sal
ary would lower the rural laborers view of him, since they were unlikely
to know or care. More likely, despite Collings' disclaimer that the
matter was not a precuniary one, money was one root of the problem.
After Collings' unseating in April, Chamberlain established a testi-
monial so that Collings could pay his election expenses, and, in 1889,
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Chamberlain, Dixon and others gave him £2000 for his private expenses. 22
This need for money more fully explains Collings' resistance to Glad-
stone's proposals and Chamberlain's fierce support of him. The storm
died out quickly, but it showed the anger and mistrust in the air.
The new Liberal Government was at last settled, but now it
needed a program. Chamberlain and Collings at once began to prepare
a Local Government Bill. The Bill proposed to establish parish, district,
and county councils, to give them the power over licensing (with provi-
sion for compensation), and to give these local bodies the "powers of
purchasing land for allotments and to hand over [to them] the adminis-
tration of local charities." Chamberlain later complained that despite
the work done on the Bill, he was given no instructions as to details,
nor was the Cabinet interested in rendering judgment upon its intended
provisions. Whatever Chamberlain and Collings or others felt about
needed social reforms, their voices were not decisive.
The decisive voice was Gladstone's, and on March 13, he called
the Cabinet together to discuss the Government's first major program,
the Irish Land Purchase Bill. When Chamberlain inquired in what context
the Bill would be passed, Gladstone replied that he envisioned a separate
Parliament for Ireland with full power to deal with all Irish affairs.
After futilely arguing against the Bill and Home Rule, Chamberlain
resigned.
To a large extent, Garvin was right to claim that Chamberlain's
position meant the substitution of his plan for Gladstone's on Ireland,
a break with the Irish party, and Gladstone's imminent retirement. When
Gladstone chose his plan of Home Rule, separation was not longer "pre-
ventible by any possible composition on details.
"^^
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Chamberlain was out of the Government, but Colllngs, Chamber-
lain's Parliamentary Secretary, did not follow him and resign. When
Chamberlain was replaced, the Local Government Bill appeared dead.
But Collings resurrected it as a private members Bill and was given a
day, April 1, for it. But circumstances intervened.
The November 1885 election in Ipswich had not been easy, and
Collings' victory margin had been only 60 votes ahead of the nearest
Conservative opponent. Immediately after the results were known, the
Conservatives charged fraud and petitioned to unseat Collings and his
Liberal Colleague, Henry West. The respondents—Collings and West-
were charged with bribery, intimidation, and general corruption. On
April 1, Justice Denman was pleased to report that there had not been
"the slightest pretense for charging anything like personal corruption
upon the part of either of the Respondents . . . and ... if any such
charge as that had been made, it would have been treated very indig-
nantly, because there is not the slightest pretence for it."^^ However
the petition also charged bribery by their agents.
The judges found no extensive corruption and, in fact, all
the charges were confined to one ward, St. Clements, out of the five
into which Ipswich was divided. In the ward, the secretary of the Lib-
eral Association promised money and paid it to a voter, which came
"within the definition of bribery, and compels us to hold that the
election of those gentlemen is void." There was also the proven case
of outright bribery perpetrated by several canvassers in the Respondent
cause.
Justice Cave, summing up, declared that he believed the Respon-
dents and their election agent took "all reasonable means" to avoid
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corrupt or illegal practices, and sincerely desired that the election
should be pure-" However, the law made them responsible for the
corrupt and illegal acts of their agents and consequently "the election
must be declared void." Even worse, Collings and West were saddled
with costs for the election and petition. April 1,1886, was a dark
day in Collings* life.
Both the Manchester Guardian and The Times gave the case and
its results a place in their columns, but there was a great difference
between what was or was not said. The Guardian of April 2 gave the out-
lines of the cases and the judgment rendered. Its only other comment
on the case was a small article announcing that the Ispwich Liberal
Hundred and Fifty had adopted two staunch Gladstonians to run for the
vacated seats, this on the night of April 1, only a few hours after
Collings' unseating. The two unsuccessful Conservative candidates were
unanimously readopted. The article ended, "[the] contest is already
being carried on with vigour on both sides." Collings suffered not only
the indignity of being unseated, but was not even given the chance to
redeem himself. The blow was delivered by his own party, by men staunchly
loyal to Gladstone.
The Times editorial remarked that Collings and West had lost
their seats through "no fault of their own" and they had done all they
could to keep their agents, "—imperfect tools—" from any illegal
practices.
They have done all that men could do to maintain a standard
of electoral purity, and they have failed by no fault of
their own, and have not only lost their seats, but are to
be heavily mulcted in costs for the trial which has ended
in unseating them.^^
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After those kind words, The Times wrote a political obituary
for Collings. It remarked that Collings in his short time in Parlia-
ment had "figured as a very prominent personage." He took his seat as
the rural laborers' friend and finding the Conservatives lukewarm to his
"great cause ... he lost no time sweeping them away" and putting in
the Liberals. "It is not often that the fate of Governments is decided
by the action of men of Mr. Jesse Collings stamp," but though the
Conservative Government was foredoomed to fall, it fell on Collings'
Amendment and he deserved the credit for it, and received recognition
for it, in the form of the Parliamentary Secretaryship to the Local
Government Board. "Nothing can rob him of that credit."
The Times went on to wonder why he had not chosen to resign
when Chamberlain had. "If he had resigned a day or two ago, it would have
been more or less of a blow to the Ministry which he placed in power. . .
,
but his resignation became a personal affair and offered neither support
for Chamberlain nor censure of Gladstone. This point is interesting
and suggests that Collings was much more independent of Chamberlain than
he has generally been given credit for. Collings could have resigned
with Chamberlain and with good reason, but he chose to stay. Doing so,
he weakened Chamberlain, but it seems that he was willing to risk that
in order to pass his Allotments and Small Holdings Bill.
On April 1, that dark day of his judgment, Collings' Private
Member's Bill was sent up for debate on the Second Reading. Dr. Foster,
the Liberal MP from Chester, introduced the Bill, telling the members
assembled there that the Bill embodied the principles which had won such
support— including Gladstone's— in the debate upon Collings' Amendment
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to the Address. The Bill was designed to bring back and keep the
agricultural classes in the rural districts by allowing small holdings
of 10-40 acres if the laborers could pay part of the purchase price, by
allowing allotments of up to one acre of arable land and three acres of
pasture land, and allowing compulsory acquisition of land only "under
conditions which were necessary to the welfare of the community."
The debate was desultory with Harcourt the most prominent
Liberal spokesman urging passage and the Conservatives as a group op-
posing it. The pace was so desultory that the Bill was talked out as
the Liberals made no attempt to save it.^° Collings, already upset about
his unseating, his being denied a chance to run again in Ipswich, saw
his Bill crushed not by a division, but by indifference, by the same men
who had ridden it as a "stalking horse" into power. Collings was bitter
—
and deservedly so. The Liberal party—his party—had treated him badly.
He did not forget that.
The Times had written of Collings: "He has flashed before us
this year as a splendid meteor, brilliant but short-lived, and he must
submit now to the common fate of his kind."^^ Looking back, it is appar-
ent that the circumstances were never again so favorable to Collings'
—
and Chamberlain's—hopes for local government and agricultural reform.
The 1885 election had brought those reforms to the fore, and for the
first time, a large number of MP's were dedicated to their passage. The
ft
split over Home Rule destroyed that unity at the very moment when public
opinion was prepared to recognize the need for those reforms, and the
opportunity never recurred again at anything like the same strength.
Collings had hung on to office with tenacity in hope that he might
still accomplish something. The triple blows of April 1 ended that il-
lusion. On the 4th Collings forwarded to Gladstone (with regrets) his
107
resignation as Secretary to the Local Government Board. 32 They did not
correspond again. The office which he had gained in conflict, he tamely
returned.
That April month was not only hard on Collings; it was difficult
for Chamberlain, too. After his resignation, Chamberlain in despair
cried, "Collings, my career is ended. "33 ^^^^ enormity of the struggle
depressed Chamberlain, and the consequences seemed likely to be felt in
his own bailiwick, Birmingham. But the danger in his own city roused
Chamberlain to activity, and he got the Management Committee of Birming-
ham Liberal Association to invite him to speak before the "Two Thousand"
on April 21.
That evening Chamberlain delivered a stinging attack on the
Home Rule and Irish Land Purchase Bill. With his speech finished—to
loud applause— Schnadhorst moved a resolution in support of Chamberlain,
which was passed enthusiastically
. Here the Gladstonians counter-
attacked and proposed an adjournment until Liberal opinion could be
sampled. The Chamberlainite control of the "Two Thousand" was momen-
tarily endangered. When Dr. Dale vacillated, Collings intervened to
prevent adjournment, arguing that those in attendance there understood
the Bill, and the vote was not on Home Rule, but rather "whether those
alterations in the form of Home Rule should be adopted, which would unite,
or which they hoped would unite, the Liberal Party. "^^ Collings, with
a sure touch, had disarmed the doubters by seeming to concede the prin-
ciple of Home Rule and that the resolution was just over matters of
detail. This was not the case, but few recognized it. Over some oppo-
sition, the resolution, while declaring confidence in Gladstone, urged
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him to conform to Chamberlain's view. Chamberlain and his supporters
had secured their base in Birmingham if not irrevocably, then at least
for the immediate future.
What could have happened was apparent only two weeks later
when the Gladstonians on the General Committee of the National Libera-
tion Federation adopted an amendment proclaiming "unconditional confi-
dence" in Gladstone and Home Rule. Most of the Birmingham committee
members resigned, ending forever Birmingham's hold on the Federation. 36
In early May, both Gladstone and Chamberlain, through Labouchere,
made attempts at compromise. On May 8, Chamberlain wrote Collings sug-
gesting that Gladstone had at last given way over Home Rule. Two days
later. Chamberlain wrote Collings to come up "as soon as possible."
Chamberlain had been assured that Gladstone had made a "complete surrender"
which would cause a terrific row in the Liberal party and would possibly
cause Parnell to revolt. He wanted Collings' help, because in the midst
of the confusion. Chamberlain found himself "worked to death. "^"^ But
Chamberlain's hoped-for coup never occurred because, when Gladstone
rose to speak, he offered no compromises to the Chamberlainite faction.
The chasm had widened perceptibly, and both Liberal factions confronted
the fact that they must soon choose between Gladstone and Chamberlain.
Collings had already chosen—Chamberlain. From an ecstatic
supporter of Gladstone's Home Rule Bill in December, he completely re-
versed himself. There is no clear demarcation point, nor did Collings
ever explain his reasons for the shift. Whatever his reasons, they most
likely revolved around the bad taste left by the April 1 debacle. After
those blows, Collings returned to his home where Chamberlain's sympathy
and generosity (and cold logic) exerted a powerful pull. By mid-April,
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Ceilings was firmly in the Chamberlaini te faction and already at work
undermining the Gladstonian position in Devon and Cornwall. Collings'
decisive intervention at the April 21 meeting only made public his
choice.
May was the crucial month for the Chamberlainites
. On May 11,
Powell Williams warned Chamberlain that many Liberals were "stark mad"
about Gladstone and that as far as he could see, most accepted the
principle of Home Rule with an Irish Parliament. The Chamberlainite
tack must be ''Home Rule certainty^ but not taxation without represen-
tation. " That point had won widespread support while an outright
attack on the Bill would cause a revulsion in Gladstone's favor. "If
you can destroy the principle of excluding the Irish members you will
destroy the Bill without doing harm in the constituencies."^^
However, possible Gladstonian victory compelled Chamberlain
to ally himself with the only other strong Liberal opponent of Gladstone,
Lord Hartington, to defeat the Government. During the next two weeks,
the Chamberlain and Hartington groups tried to convince waverers within
the party to join them. Many waverers, however, were alienated by the
Hartington-Conservative links.
On May 27, Gladstone made a seemingly conciliatory speech
promising to reexamine the question of Irish representation at West-
minister and promising to drop the Bill until the autumn session if it
passed the Second Reading. Dale and Bunce felt that Gladstone had caved
In and that the Bill was merely a non-binding resolution. Collings
came down hard on that optimism, remarking that the "Bill is the Bill
and in future time will state its own principles." It was true that
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they had gained their immediate object of stopping the Bill; however,
by voting against it, an MP "kept himself absolutely clear and uncom-
mitted to consider the new Bill next session on its merits and act
accordingly. "^0
After protecting Chamberlain's rear, Collings proceeded to
sketch his views of Chamberlain's course in the altered circumstances.
He failed to see how Chamberlain could vote for the Second Reading,
but he could leave the other dissident Liberals the freedom to do so.
Two days later, in response to Chamberlain's request, and with an eye
to Birmingham feelings, Collings wrote that Chamberlain should make
clear that they had always sought the unity of the Liberal party. Thu
he had minimized his opposition to just the 24th clause, but that it
was the better solution for the whole Bill to be withdrawn. Chamber-
lain should emphasize the Government's wisdom in dropping the Bill
after the passage of a Second Reading, otherwise too many would think
Gladstone had won just because he carried the Second Reading. Chamber
lain should stress the advantages that would be gained from reconsider
ation of the Bill. It would allow time for a new scheme on different
lines to be drawn up that would command the support of the "united or
nearly united party."
It seemed clear to Collings that Gladstone's new tack had
probably attracted sufficient wavering Liberals to pass it by a small
majority,
I think it will be better to have the second reading by
a small majority as Gladstone I hope and think is at the
top of the rise just now and a dissolution now—though it
would not give him a majority—would be more favorable
to him than it will be months hence.
Ill
With a sense of relief he added that, on the whole. "l am glad things
have taken this course. ..." Chamberlain could at last relax knowing
the decision would be understood as a victory for him "or rather a
defeat for G. 0. H."^^ Clearly, Collings had become again Chamberlain's
effective first sergeant. But even as he constructed Chamberlain's
course, Gladstone, challenged to say whether he would remodel the Bill,
cried, "Never! Never!" Collings and Chamberlain's hopes evaporated
with those words, and they were left with only one recourse, to fight.
On June 8 at one in the morning, 94 dissident Liberals "crossed
the Rubicon" and voted with the Conservatives. The final tally was 313
votes for the Government (228 Liberals and 85 Nationalists) versus 343
against (249 Conservatives and 94 Liberals). The Liberals dissolved
Parliament and resolved to fight the issue in the country.
The elections were scheduled to begin July 1. The dissentient
Liberals had much work to do. In Birmingham, the Conservatives though
achieving some local successes had mostly been frustrated by the
Liberal caucus, and now saw a chance to use the split to their advan-
tage. However, the national Conservative organization had pledged their
cooperation to the dissident Liberals who voted with them against Glad-
stone, and the local Conservatives grudgingly obeyed.
However, the Birmingham dissentient Liberals were more concerned
with the reactions of their former Liberal allies. Political alignments
among the Birmingham Liberals were confused, but the dissenting Liberals
held the trump card. Of the MP's five—Chamberlain, Bright, George
Dixon, William Kenrick, and Powell Williams—were all known Unionists and
they carried their organizations with them. The other two were Glad-
stonians, Henry Broadhurst at Bordesley and W. T. Cook for East Birmingham
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It was soon apparent that Birmingham's Gladstonian Liberals
were disorganized and hopelessly divided and thus prey to the Birmin-
ham Liberal Association which was firmly controlled by the Chamberlain-
ites. After the defeat of the Home Rule Bill, Henry Broadhurst, realizing
that he would be dependent upon the Chamberlainltes for his election
resigned his candidacy and fled to safety, Nottingham. ^ ^ The opportun-
ity was heaven-sent for the dissentient Liberals, Seeking the strongest
candidate, they turned to Jesse Collings.
The local Conservatives were angered by this move because they
had hoped to contest and win Bordesley if the Liberals split. However,
the Conservative leadership had already decided that they would support
Collings as the "Unionist" (a term first used to denote the dissentient
Liberals who wanted to keep the "union" of Ireland with Britain intact,
and later referring to both Conservatives and dissentient Liberals)
candidate in return for Liberal Unionist support for the Conservative
Henry Matthews in East Birmingham. Though some Conservatives fumed
in private, they obeyed.
The local Conservatives had no real complaint. The>' recieved
enough votes or abstentions from the dissentient Liberals to elect
Henry Matthews, the first Conservative MP for Birmingham since 1847.
Matthews won on a low poll of 61 per cent against the sitting Glad-
stonian Liberal MP, W. J. Cook, with a margin of 789 reversing his
loss by 618 votes in November 1885.^^
Bordesley, however, was the crucial division for the Liberal
Unionists. The contest was between the Gladstonian Liberal, Lawson
Tait, and Jesse Collings. Collings was faced with one overriding
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problem. Because of the strong party identification favoring the
Liberals, it was Collings' task to convince the Liberal voters that
he represented the real Liberal party. Collings threw his strength
and fire into the campaign and he simply overwhelmed Tait by A, 475
votes to 1,040, over eighty per cent. However, the total vote was
less than half of the 1885 election figures which suggests that many
Liberals were confused by the split in the party, and unwilling to
commit themselves to either faction.'*^
In the English and Welsh counties, the Liberal MP's fell from
152 to only 83. The Unionist majority was 118 with 394 Unionist MP's
(316 Conservative and 78 dissentient Liberals) opposed by 276 Liberals
and Irish Nationalists (191 Liberals and 85 Nationalists). Gladstone,
realizing the magnitude of his defeat, resigned on July 21.
Garvin argued that the counties had been won in 1885 by the "three
acres and a cow" slogan, while in July 1886 Collings' opposition to
the Liberals and the Liberal failure to act on agricultural reform
turned the laborers toward the Unionists or toward apathy. The Rev.
Tuckwell, strong Liberal though he was, agreed that the laborers' defec-
tion had caused the tide to flow against the Liberals "and not unde-
servedly. "^
As if to dramatize their hope for reconciliation, the Liberal
Unionists sat on the Opposition benches with the Liberals. Chamberlain
put his views on reconciliation very clearly to Collings. Only Glad-
stone stood in the way
If he retired all would come right pretty quickly. All
action intensifies differences which it is our object to
remove and I believe we must "lie low" till the inevitable
disapoearance of the G. 0. M. [Grand Old Man, i.e., Glad-
u ft
stone] from the scene.
^
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The Birmingham Liberal Unionists argued that they had not
abandoned their Liberalism. As proof they pointed to the Tory Radical,
Randolph Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer. Churchill did not
disappoint them. He reached the apogee of his Tory Radicalism with his
speech at Dartford in Kent on October 2, 1886. Practically adopting
whole parts of the "unauthorized programme," he promised that the
Government would establish a genuine popular form of local government
with compulsory powers to acquire allotments and freehold plots by
agricultural laborers. Churchill put as the first priority, legisla-
tion by the Unionist Government to redeem the promises and the pledges
they had made to the agricultural laborers. He added, "I do not in the
least wish to detract from any credit which may be justly given to men
like Mr. Jesse Collings or Mr. Chamberlain, who undoubtedly were fore-
most in bringing this subject before the public mind of England. "^^
The Times saw the handwriting on the wall. The Government
would attempt to satisfy the claims of the rural laborers "and the ideas
of Mr. Chamberlain" with legislation for the acquisition of small free-
holds and allotments by local authorities. Balfour in his speech on
Collings' Amendment in January had favored it for allotments, as did
Salisbury with his proposal for breaking up glebe lands. Although The
Times doubted that there was any considerable demand for small freeholds
or whether they would even be of any benefit, "it seems clear that the
experiment will have to be tried. . . ."^^ It appeared that Collings'
agricultural reforms had at last found a home.
The Liberal Unionists and especially the Chamberlainite group
needed Chruchill for, without him, they believed that Conservatism was
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an arid, dry, negative philosophy. Their world collapsed on December
23, 1886, when Churchill resigned after the Cabinet dismissed his ob-
jections to increased naval and army estimates-and (Hurst argues) the
blocking of his local government reforms.
Chamberlain and Collings and many other Liberal Unionists feared
that their hopes for reform from the Conservative party had been wrecked.
Chamberlain then made a conciliatory speech to the Liberals which became
the basis of the Round Table Conference. In Birmingham Chamberlain's speech
caused Dale and Harris to press Chamberlain so hard toward negotiation
and reconciliation that he wrote Collings plaintively: "Will you come and
protect me?"52 collings did, and apparently Chamberlain made no commit-
ments to them.
When Harcourt, ever ready to support reconciliation, cautiously
took up Chamberlain's proffered peace overture, Chamberlain forwarded
his proposals to him. Chamberlain added a stinger at the end, saying
that if nothing came of the Conference, then the Liberal and Radical
Unionist Associations would be established in every consitituenc^j and
that, unfortunately, would give the Tories an easy time. That jarring
note must certainly have heightened Harcourt 's desire for peace, since
the Liberal party was still so disorganized by the split.
Chamberlain sent Collings Harcourt 's letter and his own reply
for Collings' comments. Collings presumably on his own went to Dale
and both decided to write Harcourt, making clear that they were doing
so without Chamberlain* s knowledge, and encouraging him to grasp
Chamberlain's olive branch which could "reunite the Liberals on a
common platform," with "nobody wearing a white sheet." Collings' letter
was a sincere plea to his good friend to help bring peace to a divided
party and reform to an expectant Britain. Bluntly he argued that the
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Gladstonians must recognize that "the Country for the present at least
has declared against Home Rule" and that it was necessary for the
Liberals "to set that question aside, and unite on a platform composed
of the other great liberal questions on which as far as I know, all are
agreed." Collings* letter was important for revealing to Harcourt that
Ceilings, too, was working and looking toward unity. Nor could Harcourt
overlook Collings' following among the rural laborers where the Liberal
party needed to recoup its losses.
Collings, writing the same day to H. H. Fowler, a strong voice
of moderation and compromise within the Liberal party, revealed how
deeply the Liberal Unionists felt the loss of Churchill's influence in
directing Conservative policies. Collings argued that with his ouster
the two Liberal camps could reunite as of old on a cry of agricultural
reform and county government for England, Scotland, and Ireland. "It
would give me great pleasure to go through the counties as in 1885 for
the old platform, the old Government and the old Leader, and so end
this negation of political life." Collings, with prophetic instinct,
remarked that "now is the time
—
perhaps the only time—for trying what
can be done."^^ Collings was by instinct a Liberal, and, by logic a
Unionist, and those two loyalties tormented him as he strove for both
personal and political reconciliation.
Chamberlain kept Hartington informed of the negotiations, but
he opened his heart only to Collings. On January 5 he was optimistic
that chances for reunion were good, though all depended on the "inner
mind" of Gladstone and his followers. "If they are sick of their posi-
tion and want an excuse to get out of it we shall do good business. If
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they think they hold the winning cards nothing will come of our Con-
ference."^^ V
By the 10th, only three days before the first meeting, however,
he was less sanguine. He found the Gladstonian negotiators a bad lot,
especially his old friend John Morley, who he believed was frightened
by the Labouchere section of the Liberal party and thus unwilling to
make concessions. Chamberlain wanted Collings to come to see him right
after the first meeting when they could have a "long chat" over the
situation. Chamberlain, as he had told Collings, proposed his land
scheme, which would be independent of the Home Rule Question, to solve
the obvious economic problems of the Irish farmers and laborers. The
Liberals could not agree and for the moment the plan was shelved.
Still, progress was made. By the next day, Chamberlain felt that with
the exception of "separate treatment" for Ulster, the other questions
were reduced to matters of detail and not matters of principle. ^"^
The third meeting on February 14, St. Valentine's day, contained
no hint of that heartwarming custom— the atmosphere was definitely cool
—
and no real progress was made. The meeting was adjourned so that
Harcourt could prepare a draft of the positions so far agreed to, but
that draft was never written. Some Liberals including Gladstone had
attacked Chamberlain and some even proclaimed his imminent surrender,
words which goaded Chamberlain into a vitriolic attack which seemed to
presage a return to his hardline position. On Febraury 25, Chamberlain's
letter appeared in the Baptist. In fiery language, he struck out at
Gladstone., arguing that so long as the Liberal party supported disrup-
tion of the British Empire, "so long the party will remain shattered,
) I s ftimpotent, and all reform will be indefinitely postponed.
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The Conference had already reached an impasse, but Chamberlain's
letter destroyed any last chance, however remote that was, of succeeding.
It also had deleterious effects on the Liberal Unionists. CoUings,
who so long had hoped and worked for reconciliation, was upset by the
letter and though he talked at length with Chamberlain, he could not com-
pletely accept Chamberlain's reasons for the letter. 59 Some other Liberal
Unionists who had wanted reconciliation realized that they had to choose
between Liberalism and Unionism. This realization combined with their
despair over getting real reforms from the Conservatives accelerated the
return of Trevelyan and Henry Cobb and others to the Liberals.
The advanced Liberal Unionists appeared isolated and impotent.
But in mid-May, they broke out of the isolation in spectacular fashion in
the bye-election at St. Austell, Cornwall. In April, the Liberal MP,
Mr. Borlase, resigned andabye-election was set for May 18. Mr. Borlase
had won the seat easily in 1885, and he had been unopposed in 1886. The
Liberals expected little trouble in electing their new candidate. From
the Conservatives they received none, but the Liberal Unionists, needing a
victory and banking on Collings' name and connections and on Leonard
Courtney's support from the neighboring constitutency, chose a popular
local man to run.^^ The contest was fierce.
Collings and W. S. Caine, another Radical Unionist, led the
Unionist assault. On Friday the 13th, Collings wrote Chamberlain that
they were in the midst of a "severe fight" and, though he wasn't sure
that they could win because there had not been enough time to knock down
the "Gladstonian infallibility business," still, they "would knock the
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Parl.[ s^c] majority all to pieces." The night before in an improvised
meeting in the midst of Gladstonian miners, Collings had given them a
one and a half hour speech (which they took well) showing up Gladstone
and vindicating "the converting patriotism, etc., etc. of yourself and
the Liberal Unionists." He was off again this night to address the
miners where only the other night Herbert Gladstone had made a "long
and abusive speech. "^^
W. S. Caine, the other spearhead of the Liberal Unionist cause,
summed up the gratifying results for The Times. The Liberal Unionists
had in a tremendous campaign reduced the Gladstonian margin from 2,281
votes to a mere 211. Another three days would have been enough to turn
the Liberal Unionist minority into a majority. As it was, the Liberal
candidate issued a statement only two days before the poll: "I do
support the principle of a Parliament in Dublin, subordinate to the
Imperial Parliament, and empowered to deal with purely Irish affairs and
those only."^^
The Times happily declared that the election was "a blow
to the tottering cause of the Separatists." The Times continued that
with the recent Liberal Unionist resignations from the Liberal Eighty
Club (May 14), there could be no "reunion on any basis of compromise
and toleration." The Liberal Unionists and the Conservatives should
attack the Liberals in every constituency as their success at St. Austell
division proved they could.
For the moment, the Liberal Unionists were excited and sure of
their power, but their happiness was premature and their power fleeting.
The succeeding months saw them at the mercy of Conservative reactionary
policies and taunted unceasingly by their Liberal enemies.
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Many Liberal Unionists with evident misgivings had supported
the Coercion Bill for Ireland. They voted for it and supported the use
of closure against its opponents because they believed it was needed
but only workable in conjunction with a land reform bill. Under pres-
sure from Chamberlain, Collings, and other Liberal Unionists, the
Government brought in an Irish Land Bill. The Bill was too much in
favor of the landlords and of too little use to the tenants. Chamberlain,
Collings and other sympathetic Liberal Unionists protested against the
Bill and though promising to vote for the Second Reading to avoid bring-
ing down the Government, they promised to amend it in committee. The
Conservatives gave in and allowed rents to be determined by land courts
in disputes between landlords and tenants. The Act was cut up by the
Lords SO that it lost much of its effectiveness, but for the first time
since 1880 the Irish tenants were given some relief.
In August, in defiance of Chamberlain and other Birmingham
Liberal Unionists, the Government vowed to suppress the Irish Land Lea-
gue, which was leading the resistance to high rent payments to the
landlords. When Gladstone brought forth a "condemnatory motion,"
Chamberlain, Collings and three other Liberal Unionists voted with
Gladstone though the Government won. For months, the Birmingham Liberal
Unionists had struggled to hold Birmingham for coercion. In April, the
"2000" broke away and voted against coercion, and Chamberlain was so
distressed that he considered resignation from politics. Collings and
Powell Williams "loathed" their positions as defenders of things-as-they-
are, halfway reforms, and coercion, and they yearned to return to the
Liberal party. Dr. Dale, confused and unhappy, almost went over to the
Liberals. Onlv Chamberlain and Home Rule held them back.^^
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In July, when things seemed darkest for the Chamberlainites,
the Conservative party turned again to them for help. The reason was
a Liberal bye-election victory in the Spalding division of Lincoln-
shire. The seat had been occupied by Mr. Finch Hat ton, who had proudly
proclaimed that in his division the laborers had been given allotments
by his family for over 100 years. However, the Liberal candidate,
Halley Stewart, turned a Conservative majority of 288 into a Liberal
majority of 747 by calling for allotments for all laborers who wanted
them.^^
The vote was a stunning defeat and just two weeks later, the
Government in need of a measure to regain its popularity, took over
Collings' Allotments Bill and made it a Government measure. Harcourt,
after noting with some humor the Government's change of position after
the Spalding bye-election, argued that the Bill as constituted would not
work. It failed in three areas: (1) it did not have workable compul-
sory powers; (2) the local authorities must have the compulsory power
to acquire land "at reasonable prices" or the landowners would just up
the rent to stop the laborers from acquiring land; and (3) the limit
of allotments to one acre was too small since it made no provision
for pasture. It was better to leave the size of the letting to the
local authorities as they were the best judge. Harcourt then added
that despite these defects the Liberals would vote for the Second Read-
ing though he did not believe it would ever "produce the results at
which it is aimed. "^^
To this reasoned—and accurate—critique, Collings answered
angrily. He derided the Liberals for attacking the Conservatives'
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actions when they had ridden this Issue Into office and then kicked It
over. "I cannot conceive ... any lower depth of degradation In poll-
tics for hon. and rt. hon. gentlemen to accept a Resolution which places
them in power, and at the same time, in their inmost thoughts having no
intention whatever of giving effect to it."
He reminded Harcourt and the Liberals that when in power they
had done nothing to pass an Allotments Bill though they might satisfy
their consciences by voting for a private Member's Bill on a Wednesday
afternoon. In fact, from 1881-85, neither side did much except allow
the question to be "talked out, counted out, (and) kicked out."^^ It
was only in the last two years that the question had received its due
treatment.
Turning to the Bill itself, Collings admitted that the Bill
needed a good county authority, but the Government promised this for
later. He saw three necessary amendments: (1) set the Act in motion in
rural areas so it will not be a dead letter; (2) provide for methods
of purchase; and (3) provide the complement of an acre of arable land,
namely, three acres of pasture land. The Bill would be a real blessing
to urban and rural laborers and he hoped that the Government would
pass it this session.
The Bill, not surprisingly, passed the Commons easily, though
not with the amendments which Collings asked for and which Cobb, now a
Liberal, tried unsuccessfully to add before passage. The Bill was
given its Third Reading on September 5 and then passed the Lords easily.
But as its most strenuous and well-informed critic, the Reverend
William Tuckwell, pointed out, the Bill "not only bristled with points
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which made it odious to the labourer, but was unworkable through its
complications." Tuckwell recorded the failure of the Act, even after
1890, when the Act was amended to make it more workable. It was,
he argued, a failure, and it had no appreciable results in increasing
allotments
.
In late 1887, there were few things to cheer the Liberal Union-
ists as they saw their band gradually diminished by defection and the
Liberal resurgence. Chamberlain even warned Hartington that his un-
conditional support for the Conservative Government would lead to the
extinguishing of the Liberal and Radical Unionists at the next election.
Chamberlain called on Collings to come chat with him over the situation
which seemed "more and more hopeless," but a talk might at least clear
his head. Both were disturbed because neither the Liberal Unionist Whigs
nor Conservatives supported any real social reforms. When Chamberlain
left for America in October, 1887, he left behind a Liberal Unionist
party weakened by internal divisions, unsure of itself, its programs and
in what direction it was heading.
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^^Ibid. y p. 33. Randolph Churchill wrote Chamberlain on June 21,
accepting the deal by saying "Mind you run Collings for Bordesley."
Quoted in Ibid.
^^Tbid.
, p. 34. Matthews* vote was only 217 more than he received
in November 1885. The 1886 totals were Matthews 3,341 to Cook 2,552.
Garvin, Chamberlain, II, pp. 723, 254.
""^Ibid.y pp. 34-35.
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Radical Parson, p. 60. Tuckwell argued that theLxberal losses were due to the failure of the Liberals to deUver on
fJced "tr""
-fo-'and the workingmen found their interests sacrLi to a measure which no one amongst them had ever heard."
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GmrJ^an, October 4, 1886, p. 5. The Times, October
4, 1886, p. 10. Churchill also called for closure to be introduced inParliament have landlords pay extraordinary tithes, change railway ratesin favor of domestic producers over foreign producers, make land transfer
cheaper and easier, and fund more public elementary education.
^^rne Times, Ocotber 4, 1886, p. 9. 3 Hansard, CCCII, 518-20
January 26, 1886, for Balfour's supprot of allotments.
Slyi^gton Spencer Churchill, The Life of Lord Randolvh ChurahilZ,
Volume II, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1906, pp. 238-48. Hereafter
cited as Chruchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, II. Hurst, "West Midland
Politics," p. 40. Hurst in Liberal Reunion (p. 65) cites Chamberlain's
anger at Salisbury for holding up local government reforms. The loss of
his only ally in the Cabinet on this issue must have further pushed
Chamberlain to attempt to reconciliation with the Gladstonians
. Though
Winston Churchill Tries to make a good case for his father's resignation
(pp. 233-50) ,^^Garvin is more apt here calling Randolph a "genius without
control ..." who in this case lost all. Garvin, Chamberlain, II,
p. 275.
52Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Collings, December 26, 1886, Chamber-
lain Papers JC 5/16/120. Collings also acted as a channel of communication
between G. 0. Trevelyan and Chamberlain as Trevelyan was beginning to seek
reconciliation with the Liberal party. G. 0. Trevelyan to Joseph Chamber-
lain, December 25, 1886, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/70/20.
^^Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Collings, December 26, 1886, Chamber-
lain Papers, JC 5/16/120. "My speech has brought many letters from Glad-
stonians sick of the strife and hopeful of reunion." Harcourt must have
known well the divisions and doubt in the Liberal party. Hurst, Liberal
Reunion, p. 135.
5'^Jesse Collings to William Harcourt, December 27, 1886, quoted in
Hamer, Liberal Politics, p. 162. Hurst, Liberal Reunion, p. 21. Hurst
regards Collings' letter as part of Chamberlain's "caucusmonger ' s over-
thoroughness," and unimportant in any case since Collings was an "unim-
portant man." There is no proof nor even suggestion that Chamberlain en-
couraged Collings to write. Neither the letter to Collings of December 26
nor any other letter to the Chamberlain-Collings correspondence suggests
this course. Hurst's failure to regard Collings as anything more than an
"unimportant man" blinds him to the more likely possibility that Collings,
who was very friendly with Harcourt and, as such, was respected by him,
could write directly and be well received by Harcourt.
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lain Paplrf'j?\A6A2r''?."K^'r' ^^""^^^ 5, 1887, Chamber-ir-ape s, JC 5/1 /121. Chamberlain, protecting his rear, had Hartine-ton issue an announcement that Chamberlain was keeping him fully informedof the negotiations. IVo days later. Chamberlain made another abortiveattempt to bring Hartington to the Conference, remarking that since he andTrevelyan were willing to go further than Hartington in the direction
of self-government, "there is a danger that in your absence~we may
t rl i''''^^^
^P^""^-" ^^^^^ Chamberlain to Lord Hartington, January
6, 1887, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/22/128. Hartington didn't move.
5 7Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Collings, January 10, 1887
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/122. Chamberlain had harsh words for the
Labouchere section of the party. "Gladstonianism is becoming more sec-
tional and more irreconcilable, and I do not want to reunite with a party—
or faction—controlled by Labouchere, Lawson, Conybeare and Co." Joseph
Chamberlain to his son, Austen, January 11, 1887, Austen Chamberlain Papers,
AC 1/4/5/5. Collings agreed with this assessment. Jesse Collings to
Henry Fowler, December 27, 1886, quoted in Fowler,
quoted in Fowler, Viscount Wolverhampton, p. 217. Chamberlain, PoUtiaal
Memo%r, p. 248.
Chamberlain, Politioal Memoir^ p. 253. Chamberlain drove the
knife in even further by asserting that 32 million loyal Britains must
wait upon 3 million disloyal Irish.
5%urst, Liberal Reunion^ p. 286. Chamberlain showed the letter
to his fellow radical Liberal Unionist, W. S. Caine, who, realizing Chat
its contents would inflame the "approaching sections" of the Liberal party,
asked him to "[tjhrow it in the fire." Quoted in Ibid., p. 279.
^^Henry Felling, Social Geography of British Elections^ 1385-1910,
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967, p. 166. The agricultural laborers
voted heavily Unionist.
Jesse Collings to Joseph Chamberlain, May 13, 1887, Chamberlain
Papers, JC 5/16/24.
^'^The Times, May 20, 1887, p. 5. Caine in a fit of exuberance
added that the first result of the election "will be a renewal of peace
proposals on the part of the Gladstonian leaders." Caine later returned
to the Liberal party. Chamberlain was pleased, too. "St. Austele's
[sic] election has been a great blow to the Gladstonians." Joseph Chamber-
lain to Austen Chamberlain, May 19, 1887, Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC
1/4/5/4.
^'^Ibid. The final tally was 3,540 votes for the Liberal, Mr.
M'Arthur, versus 3, 329 for the Liberal Unionist, Mr. Brydges Williams.
This bye-election points up one of the major defects of Henry Fellings'
Social 'Geography of British Elections where he deals exclusively with
the general elections. This bye-election had larger repercussions than
the 1892 General Election which the Liberals won handsomely. Felling
worte that the Unionists "never came near winning the seat" (p. 166).
He would have gotten quite an argument from both sides 1887.
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5 months, Collings never said a word in favor of or opposition to it He
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Tuckwell i^adieaZ Parson, p. 71. Garvin, Chamberlain, ll,
p. 296. Clayden, Coa^^t^on, p. 281. Garvin, Chamberlain, II, p 307The Bill became law on August 23, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 33). Garvin
suggests that the Bill lowered over 100,000 rents by an average of 14%.
6 5Joseph Chamberlain to Robert Dale, April 25, 1887, quoted inGarvin, Chamberlain^ II, p. 318.
^^Clayden, Coalition,^. 283. For Finch Hatton's remarks, see
3 Hansardy CCII, January 26, 1886, 473.
^^3 Hansard, CCCXIX, August 11, 1887, 138. The Labourers*
Allotments Bill was sponsored by Mr. Ritchie, President of the Local
Government Board, Mr. Stanhope, Parliamentary Secretary to the Board,
and Mr. W. H. Long. For Harcourt's speech, see, ibid., August 11, 1887,
146-48.
^^Ibid.y 150-52. Collings angrily denounced Gladstone for going
out of his way "to speak of me as a man whose views he never sympathized
with (150).
^^Ibid.y 153-55. Collings was pleased enough with the Government '
s
Bill to defend it against Henry Cobb's Private Member Bill, though that
Bill was closer to Collings' views. Tbid.y 152. Cobb's amendments were
compulsory acquisition at a '^reasonable price," allotments of more than
one acre, and requiring just a certificate from the Local Government Board
and not an Act of Parliament to allow compulsory acquisition of land,
Clayden, Coalitiony p. 283. Tuckwell, Radical Parson, p. 148.
^^Tuckwell, Radical Parson^ p. 149, Appendix E, pp. 250-53.
^Garvin, Chamberlain,
,
II, p. 312. Tuckwell, Radical Parson,
pp. 72-75, especially p. 74 for Cobb's return to the Liberal party.
Trevelyan had returned in May 1887. The Times, May 17, 1887, p. 10.
Clayton points out, too, that the Liberals made strong gains in the muni-
cipal elections in November 1887. Clayden, Coalition, p. 389. Joseph
Chamberlain to Lord Hartington, September 12, 1887 and October 27, 1887,
quoted in Garvin, Chamberlain, II, pp. 318, 321.
^^Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Collings, September 18, 1887,
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/124. Chamberlain had accepted the Government's
request that he be Chief Commissioner for Britain in a fisheries dispute
with the United States. Garvin, Chamberlain, II, p. 317.
CHAPTER V
ACTS AND REALITIES (1888-92)
The five years (1888 to 1892) saw Collings reach the apex of
his political influence and legislative achievements. 1887 had seen
the Conservatives and the Liberal Unionists realize that they must con-
trol their unruly and unstable coalition against a growing Liberal and
Irish Nationalist opposition. The 1887 Allotments Act (which owed much
to Collings' views) had been one of the first fruits of that realization,
but that Act had been a comparatively easy one since both sides of the
coalition were in favor of allotments. However, the succeeding years
required new measures, measures which could not hope to satisfy both
Radical Unionist and Tory. The Conservatives "were inclined to move
slowly or not at all" and the Whig Liberal Unionist were not inclined
to push them, so the Radical Liberal Unionists (especially the Birming-
ham group) pressed the Conservative Government to give what had been
considered "Liberal" social and political reforms.^ In fact, a number
of social reform measures were passed with Liberal support, the Local
Government Act (1888), Free Education Act (1891), and two measures
which owed much to Collings' influence, the Allotment Appeals Act (1890)
and his finest legislative achievement, the Small Holdings Act (1892).
Yet the "Unionist" alliance's attempt to undercut the Liberal
party's support in the counties did not succeed. The attempt failed
because the Radical Unionists could not make the Government give what
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alone could have made reform viable, the devolution of power to popularly-
elected local authorities. At the same time, the Radicals in the Liberal
party took up the cry, and by 1892 the Liberal party as a whole had made
that issue the touchstone of their "Newcastle Programme."
Though Collings achieved the measures which he had proposed over
10 years before and though he hailed their effects, the measures did
not bring large numbers of allotments and small holdings. The scope of
the measures was restricted, their clauses complicated, and the author-
ities which enforced them were removed from the laborers* direct control,
all of which frustrated the working of the measures. These problems
sprang from the very heart of the alliance. The "moderate and practical
measures" did not meet the needs of the agricultural laborer and in the
end the laborers returned to the Liberal fold.
it it 'k -k it
The hopes for reconciliation that had existed in 1886 and 1887
had been blasted by events and personalities, and by 1888, the militants
on both sides held sway. In February and March 1888, the Gladstonians
struck at the Biirmingham Unionists and threatened their political bases.
On February 15, 1888 at the annual meeting of the Allotments
and Small Holdings Association (the new name for Collings' Allotments
Extension Association) at the National Liberal Club in London, a majority
composed of Liberals and Irish Nationalists, deposed Collings from the
Presidency of the Association. The majority argued that because the
Association was suffering from party divisiveness it must be supported
by one section or the other, and added that only Gladstone and the Liberal
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party would offer effective support. Collings, chairing the meeting,
stated that he did not mind another being made President, but he resented
the devious methods by which the motion was brought up without notice.
Collings added that the country would understand that he was "being
kicked downstairs" in the interests of making the organization a Home
Rule Association.^
Some Liberals defended themselves arguing that Collings had used
the Association as a Conservative electioneering weapon, a charge that
Collings emphatically denied. The Liberal Unionists reacted angrily
to Collings' ouster, charging the majority with "ingratitude and bad
taste" since Collings had been its principal founder and had "done
more than all the other leaders of it to promote its objects." They
considered the Association had become simply a "party society" and a
new Association concerned with the interests of the rural laborers must
be established.^ Chamberlain agreed, and in March he wrote Viscount
Wolmer, the chief Liberal Unionist whip, that the Liberal Unionists
should start a new laborers' league with Collings at the head of it.^
Before Chamberlain and Collings could take any action, they had
first to fight off Liberal attempts to destroy their political base in
Birmingham. In March, only shortly after Chamberlain returned from his
mission to the United States, the Liberals in a series of well-conceived
moves orchestrated by Schnadhorst captured the party machinery beginning
with the Ward Committees, the Divisional Councils, and finally the
Birmingham Liberal Association itself. Chamberlain and the Radical
Unionists repudiated the Liberal Association, and within a short time
they created the Birmingham Liberal Unionist Association to regain
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political control of the city. By May, the crisis was over and the
Birmingham Radical Unionists counterattacked the Liberals not only in
Birmingham, but in the countryside.^
\
The formation of Collings' Rural Labourers* League must be seen
in this context, the regeneration of the Radical Unionist bases of power,
and Collings' reassertion of his position as a leading champion of the
agricultural laborers. On May 12, 1888, in Birmingham before a large
contingent of Liberal Unionist and some Conservative MP's, Chamberlain
inaugurated this new organization dedicated to pressing to the fore
the "claims and practical grievances of the rural population," He
recited Collings' early achievements and pointed out that the Conserva-
tive Government's 1887 Allotments Act was "based upon the principles
and main lines" of Collings' proposals. He castigated the Liberals
for throwing Collings out of his own organization. Those gathered at
this meeting repudiated that action and with full confidence in Collings,
they inaugurated, with Collings as its President, the Rural Labourers'
League, an organization that was to be dedicated to the laborers and
not party interests.^ The meeting went very well, and the organization
like Chamberlain's National Radical Union soon spread throughout Britain.
To extend the League's influence, its organizers established in
December 1888 its official organ The Rural World (subtitled A Journal
Advocating the Interests of Rural Labourers, Artisans, Cottagers, Farm-
ers, and the Country Population Generally), a weekly. The first issue on
December 22 set the tone and character which the paper followed until
its demise due to wartime shortages in 1915. The first page often
began with an editorial on an "important" national political or
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agricultural matter. The next two pages usually dealt generally with
national news, political news, legislation affecting agriculture, com-
mentary on Parliament (from the Radical Howard Evans who was a Unionist)
The following pages were devoted to the work of the League, local news
of interest to the laborers, and practical hints on using allotments
and small holdings to the best advantage. The advice on agriculture and
P^^^^^ culture was clear, concise, and simply written, which suggests
that the paper was intended to reach (and not condescend to) the labor-
ers. The Rural World continued this format until 1906 except for the
periods just before a general election when the number of its pages
was expanded to cover national news and local candidates from the
Unionist viewpoint.
The Rural Laborers' League, despite statements from its organ-
izers about its nonpartisan nature and Collings' denial of any party
affiliations of the League, was as much a political organ of the
Liberal Unionist party as it was the organizer and defender of the
laborers' interests. The organization of the League depended upon the
largesse of the League's titled Vice-Presidents and Liberal Unionist
(and later Conservative) party funds, and the work of its paid and
unpaid agents.^ Ostensibly, the policy of the League was to bring
about the creation of a large number of peasant proprietorships. It
advocated that policy through The Rural World with a weekly circulation
of 10,000 copies (occasionally 30,000 or more copies), through corres-
pondence and pamphlets from the League's Central Office (in Birmingham),
and especially through its paid agents and local village volunteers
who distributed the League's literature, organized local meetings and
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talked to the laborers "in the fields, in the cow-sheds, on the roads,
in the village inns, or anywhere else where their fellows were to be
II
8
found." The political aspects of the League were encouraged and the
League and Tlie Rural World were used to put the Unionist case before
men "who would not otherwise listen to it!'^ This was especially help-
ful to the Liberal Unionist and Conservative cause as the League acted
as a counterweight to Gladstonian efforts (often through Collings' old
organization, the Allotments and Small Holdings Association) to win
over the laborers.
The real differences over social reform between the Radical
Unionists and the Conservatives were openly exposed and rubbed raw
over the contemplated reform of local government, and the Radical
Unionists and the Radicals still in the Liberal party became increas-
ingly embittered over how much reform was really being attempted. In
March 1888, the Conservative Government, having at last resolved the
disputes within the Cabinet and with the Liberal Unionists and especiall
Chamberlain, allowed C. T. Ritchie, the President of the Local Govern-
ment Board, to introduce the Local Government Bill. The issues about
franchise, financing and administrative reforms had been decided well
before the Bill was introduced and were not seriously challenged—except
for a provision to deal with licensing public houses which the Conserva-
tives dropped after strong initial opposition. Rather, the debate
revolved around the nature and extent of the devolution of powers to the
popularly elected county and district councils.
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Collings welcomed the Bill warmly with the view that the laborer
deserved a vote in the control and management of his local affairs be-
cause the local authorities everywhere touched his "domestic life."
Collings did not doubt that the Quarter Sessions did their work well,
but they had little work to do because they had no rating powers. As
for the local sanitary authorities, they were unrepresentative, did
little hard work, and were consequently overwhelmed by the work that
accounted in Collings' eyes for much of the backwardness and lethargy
In the rural districts. This Bill allowed no ex officio members, no
plural voters or voting papers, no nominated members, thus "the whole
management of affairs was in the hands of the electors, women included."
Collings' speech in support of the Second Reading was made in
the belief that the Conservative Government seriously intended to
devolve powers upon the county and district councils, a belief of which
he was soon disabused. In the Committee stage, the Conservatives
dropped the provisions for district councils v;ith the excuse that those
provisions v/ould keep the Bill from being passed that session. In
Committee, Collings had to defend the county councils against Conserva-
tive attempts to limit their powers by restricting their borrowing and
lending policies. He argued that the central issue of the Bill was "to
decentralize" power and to encourage the county councils "to carry out
the necessary work of improvement. ..." In pursuit of that view,
Collings supported, giving the county councils full power to assist
emigration by the poor— though he personally disagreed with that solu-
tion—because only real power to effect change would bring out "the best
men" to do the work of the councils. Collings' views on the necessity
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of the devolution of power were not accepted, and he was forced to put
up with vague guarantees that district councils would shortly be estab-
lished and that substantial powers would soon be given the county coun-
cils.
There were many who agreed with Collings that the devolution of
power to the local authorities was primary, but they were, almost to a
man, Liberals. But by then, between Collings and the Liberal party,
the deepest animosity existed. Henry Lucy in his A Diary of the Salis-
bury Parliament described the Liberal reaction when Collings rose to
speak on the Local Government Bill. The Liberal MP's, many of them old
friends and companions of Collings, "rose in a body and left the House,
with even ostentatious signs of indifference." Inhere once Collings
had received the Liberals' cheers, they had to come that day from the
Conservatives, and when he rose the "cheers were freely given."^^
Collings' words were not soothing to his old friends on the
Liberal benches, as he called them rabble-rousers—Jack Cades— , liars,
and "pretended" friends of the Bill who only wi shed to kill it.^^ In
turn Collings' ex-allies, denounced him as a partisan whose "very poli-
tical existence depended on the breath of [the Conservative party's]
nostrils," and who dared to advise the Liberal party "which was no
longer identified with him, and with which he had no affinity and no
relationship."^^ That real animosity of good allies turned bitter enemies
was illuminated during the Committee stages, as Liberal attempts to
create parish and district councils and to give greater powers to the
county councils were easily beaten back with Collings voting against
most of them to save the Bill.
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Collings, speaking in support of the Second Reading, called
the Bill a "sound, honest, decentralizing measure," but later in the
same speech (though on the next day), he retreated from the view claim-
ing only that the Bill was "capable of full and genuine development."
The latter was much closer to the truth.
The Liberals were less generous, claiming that the Bill was
fettered by the inclusion of cooption for council positions, property
requirements for chairmen of the county councils, failure to alter the
appointive system of magistrates, and failure to reform vestry elections,
village charities or the poor law administration. It was as Sir Walter
Foster, then President of the Allotments and Small Holdings Association,
called it, a Bill "full of distrust of the people from beginning to
end. "19
A further problem was that the business of the councils required
of the councillors large amounts of time and an independent income.
Collings—inadvertently perhaps—had assured the country squires that they
had "no cause for apprehension," and a recent study of the county councils
elected in January 1889 supports that view. Most of the new councillors
"came from very much the same classes" which had served on the Quarter
Sessions, and the Justices of the Peace made up a little less than half
of the councillors and a little more than half of the aldermen.
Even where the Liberals were successful in county council elec-
tions, few made real efforts to help the rural laborers. Alienated from
the council and the councillors—as only a few "working class" candidates
had been elected
—
, the agricultural laborers quickly lost interest in
the county councils, and by 1892, the elections were only rarely con-
tested (at least through the First V/orld War). The County Councils Act
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did not change the basic structure of British rural life, and thus it did
little to stem the migration of laborers to the towns and cities of
Britain.
Collings and his allies recognized that failure. In 1889 in
The Rural World they agitated for district councils and the devolution
of power to both county and district councils. The paper noted that
the Boards of Guardians obstructed the Allotments Acts as its "authors
and advocates desire (d) . "^^ In fact, district councils were not even
attempted by the Conservatives, and they were only instituted in 1894
under Liberal party auspices. Collings had convinced neither the
Conservatives nor many Liberal Unionists to decentralize power to the
local authorities, or to reach down to assist the rural poor. His later
efforts to give the rural laborers practical schemes for establishing
allotments and small holdings were crippled by the inadequacies of the
County Councils Act.
Except for these attempts to push the Conservatives to amend
the Local Government Act, the Birmingham Radical Unionists directed their
energies toward reassessing and reestablishing their political bases. In
that vein. Chamberlain wrote Hartington (and then to Salisbury) in Jan-
uary 1889 that he was "quite prepared for a hum-drum session this
year."
However, the Unionists needed to look ahead and find a popular
reform
package. Chamberlain proposed two programs, free schools,
and as an
experiment, a small holdings measure. "I do not want the
government to
commit themselves at this moment, but I want them to
be friendly and to
leave themselves free to take these questions up if
they find sufficient
popular support
. ""^^
1A2
However, Chamberlain's activities were aborted when the Conser-
vatives in Birmingham created political turmoil over their lack of
representation. Long and careful work by the Radical Unionists along
with Salisbury's and Balfour's intervention on their side prevented
the problems from getting out of hand, and by the end of 1889, the
Radical Unionists had restored their control over the city.^^
Collings, meanwhile, was hard at work. In a speech in May 1888,
just before the formation of the Rural Labourers' League, Harcourt de-
rided the newly-forming organization as Collings' "one-horse gig" ready
to be pulled about by some of the cows from Collings' slogan (Three
Acres and a Cow).^^ Collings did not like the characterization and,
under that goad and with a very intense commitment to the rural
laborers, he spent a year establishing the League throughout the British
countryside. Collings even ventured into rural Liberal divisions— in
one case, the Chesire Division of Cambridgeshire—to rally the agricul-
tural laborers to the Unionist cause. By August 1889, The Rural World
could point to the rapid spread of the League, and its successful ef-
forts on the laborers' behalf. Collings' was primarily responsible
for the League's growth and achievements, but as had happened before,
he had badly exhausted himself.
Collings had been under a tremendous strain not only in his
political activities, but also in his personal affairs. His single-
minded commitment to politics which had distracted him from his business
combined with the difficult economic situation to bring him close to
bankruptcy. Chamberlain, aware of his friend's plight, organized a
turst fund to pay Collings an adequate salary. Collings contemptuously
refused the salary—on the principle that he would not be free to vote
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his conscience-but he apparently took the whole f2000 sum as an interest
free payment.^''
Collings' exhaustion from his political work and his difficult
financial situation caused a mental breakdown, a recurring problem
whenever Collings worked himself beyond his limits. In November, The
Rural World admitted that Collings' health had "in plain words, broken
down through overwork," and it was hoped that his trip to Egypt with
the Chamberlain party would restore his health. ^8 Mary Chamberlain took
good care of him, and by mid-December, his health had improved. The
party enjoyed Egypt, and the change and new activities revived Collings.
By early January 1890, he was again "full of life and spirits" and
ready to face the new session.
Collings returned to the Commons in time to take part in a
debate on a government measure to amend the 1887 Allotments Act to
allow appeals from the local sanitary authority's decision to the
"democratically elected" county council which could after an investi-
gation bypass the sanitary authority and direct that allotments be
given. In 1888, Collings (and others) had attempted to amend the Act,
but the Government refused to consider it. Then in October 1889, Cap-
tain E. H. Verney, a Liberal, won a closely contested bye-election in
North Buckinghamshire, because, it was believed, the local authority
had wrongly refused the laborers allotments despite strong Local Govern-
ment Board pressure to grant allotments.
Not surprisingly, the debate turned into an argument over the
effectiveness of the 1887 Allotments Act and whether this amending Bill
would really improve its effectiveness. C. T. Ritchie, the President of
the Local Government Board, argued that though he did not have complete
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returns, he did know that 1^00 laborers had been supplied allotments
directly by the local authorities, and 2J300 other persons supplied
allotments with the assistance of the local authorities, and this did
not include those voluntary arrangements between a landlord and his
tenant. In fact, Ritchie's figures were based on the first annual
report of the Rural Labourers' League. ^2 Collings defended the accuracy
of those figures (indeed he argued that the local authorities had
directly supplied allotments to more than 2^00 laborers), and though
the Act had been in existence for only 18 months, more than 8000 men
had benefited from it. The 1887 Act was in Collings' opinion more
successful than almost any other allotments measure passed, and he ad-
vised the Liberals to use the Act and not raise "Party feeling" by
denouncing it . ^ ^
The Liberals argued that Ritchie should have had the Local
Government Board returns and that their absence proved that the Govern-
ment had taken up the issue only to avoid further bye-election losses.
Without the Government's returns, the House could not know the effective-
ness of the 1887 Act, especially as some Liberals saw Collings' League
as a "nondescript and mongrel body" in whose figures they placed little
reliance. Thus Collings and the Rural Labourers' League became the
center of the dispute because the Government relied upon his organiza-
tion's credibility while the Liberals had little choice but to attack
him and the League.
Underneath the debate on the effectiveness of the 1887 Act,
the Radicals and the Unionists illuminated the central question left
unresolved in the County Councils Act, namely, who should apply the Act.
Henry Cobb brought the problem into sharp focus when he attempted to
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Instruct the Committee for the Second Reading to create parish councils
with the power to acquire and manage land for allotments purposes be-
cause allotments were "an absolutely local matter," and the solution
was not to supersede an inefficient local authority, but to make that
local authority efficient. ^ 5 The Government's position was unequi-
vocal. If Cobb's Instruction was carried, they would abandon the Bill.
The debate over Cobb's Instruction showed that the agricultural
reformers were divided into those who worked for immediate beneficial
measures for the rural laborers and those who argued that any legis-
lation was unworkable without popularly elected district and parish
councils with powers to facilitate allotments. Collings chose the first
view.
I know of no legislation in this country which has not been
built up step by step; and I hope my Hon. Friends are not
going to prevent the taking of such a tremendous step for-
ward as this Bill will enable us to make.^^
Cobb's Instruction was defeated by only 39 votes, a small number con-
sidering that the Government's nominal majority was close to 100.^^
On June 26, the Bill passed the Third Reading without a discussion as
the Liberals had already registered their dissent. Collings congratu-
lated the Government on the passage of the Bill which he considered
would be an immense boon to many rural laborers. But, the last word
belonged to Captain Verney, whose bye-election victory had precipitated
the Bill, and who voiced his "absolute uncertainty" that the Bill would
have any effect.
Collings in 1882, 1887, and in 1890 had been instrumental in ob-
taining the passage of Allotments Acts which promised to give an allot-
ment to each agricultural laborer who wanted one. Collings' figures
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(from the Rural Labourers' League) even if not totally correct showed
a quantitative jurap in the number of allotment holders. His work in
and out of Parliament brought admiration and respect from the laborers
for his "knight errantry" in their behalf. 39
Balanced against those successes were the many times the Acts
were ignored, objected to, and not enforced. Trustees of charity lands
leased their lands on a long-term basis to farmers rather than divide
the lands into allotments. Boards of Guardians charged higher rents
for allotments than they did to farmers who cultivated large farms.
Local sanitary authorities spun out the procedures putting the Act
into force, or they ruled that the lands in question did not fall under
the provisions of the Allotments Acts. When the laborers tried to
enforce the provisions, they found them complicated and costly, and
most disheartening, the Acts had no provisions to limit the sums
which the landowners could charge for their allotments. Too often the
laborers' hopes were dashed.
The Radicals had argued that those problems could only be solved
by representative local governments with control over the local author-
ities, the trustees of local charities, and even the Charity Conmiis-
sioners. Collings had recognized the force of those arguments as his
support for district councils and vestry reform proved, but he had not
been able to convince the Conservative Government to adopt those poll-
cles. Those policies ran counter to the interests of landowners, farmers,
and many clergy who thought that popular local government meant their
political demise. In the face of those powers within the Conservative,
Liberal Unionist, and even Liberal parties, Collings retreated from his
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"radical" position, and worked instead to increase the efficiency of
the Allotments Acts, and by constant intervention in Parliament, to
make the Government implement those provisions already in the Acts.'^^
Collings had changed. By emphasizing "practical" and "step
by step" reform, Collings accepted Liberal Unionism as a compromise
between advanced Liberalism and reformed Toryism. In choosing that
compromise, Collings began the long movement away from his close con-
nections to the agricultural laborers.
Although the Elementary Education Act of 1891 lies outside
the scope of this paper, the debates illuminated the nature of Collings'
compromise. Long before Collings had founded the Birmingham Education
Society in 1868, he had been committed to free education, national,
i.e., non-denominational, schools, and popular control over the schools.
Yet in 1891, he sacrificed local control to secure "much-needed relief
to the poorer classes." Collings admitted that he still believed in
local control of education, but he recognized that attempts to secure
that control would cause the Government to jettison the Bill. So
Collings asked the Coraraions to pass the Elementary Education Bill because
he believed that the laborers "would rather have free education im-
mediately and allow other things to come in due course."**^
This Act, however, forced the rural poor into denominational
schools. The eminent Liberal MP, James Bryce maintained that in the
rural districts where the denominational school was often the only
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school, nonconformist parents would be forced to send their children
there. Bryce felt that the nonconformist child would be treated dif-
ferently and barely tolerated by the school authorities, and although
the nonconformist parents paid for the school through the rates, they
would have no control over its teachings. Bryce expected "a sort of
rural revolt" over this issue and he hoped that national schools would
be established. Popular control in the rural districts meant civil
and religious equality in nonsectarian schools, and Collings in support-
ing the Elementary Education Act repudiated local control and alienated
many rural supporters.
Harcourt caught the sense of the Radicals' disenchantment with
Collings when he remarked that having joined Collings to fight for the
principles of the National Education League, "the chances of carrying
out those principles have been defeated by the very gentlemen who were
then the leaders of the Birmingham League." Harcourt added that he still
adhered to those principles and he regretted that Collings had abandoned
them."^^
Collings, hemmed in by his alliance to the Conservative party
and his estrangement from the Liberal party, chose to fight for "practi-
cal reforms." In doing so, he gained increasing Conservative party
appreciation, but he lost the cutting edge of his Radicalism. To speak
of the amelioration of the harsh conditions in which the rural poor
lived could too easily be construed as a matter for pity and charity
rather than the need to alter the degradation caused by political and
economic factors.
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The Radicals attacked Collings because they recognized where
his views might lead, and they posited alternatives which could change
the substance and the structure of power. In 1888, the Radicals were a
small group within the Liberal party, but by 1892, their constant emphasi
on representative local government provided the Liberal party with an
important issue which it adopted for the 1892 General Election.
Although Collings was in Parliament for another quarter of a
century, he did not see the passage of another of his Allotments Acts.
The succeeding Acts were passed by the Liberals, and in 1908, Collings
opposed the Liberals' consolidating Act which became the basis for all
allotments legislation to this day.'^^ The allotments question passed
^
from his hands even as he approached his most significant legislative
achievement, the Small Holdings Act of 1892.
The passage of the Small Holdings Act (1892) cannot be viewed
apart from the political situation during 1891 and 1892, so closely j
interwoven were the small holdings question and the politics which
brought the question to fruition. Chamberlain recognized that these
two years were crucial, for if the Liberals could not win a victory
at the coming general election with Home Rule as part of their platform,
then they would "never" win on those lines .^^^ To counter Liberal hopes
for victory, the Birmingham Unionists with Chamberlain and Collings in
the lead pinned their hopes for victory on social reform programs.
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Beginning in 1891, Chamberlain and Collings moved to stress
labor questions. Chamberlain cast his net wide to gather in the
support of the working classes with programs like old age pensions,
workmen's compensation, amendments to the Factory Acts, housing legis-
lation, and a large extension of allotments and small holdings.
Collings concentrated on persuading the rural laborers to support the
Unionist party.
As part of their campaign. Chamberlain and Collings sought to
push the Conservative Government in that direction also. In December
1890 and January 1891, they confronted the Government over its sanction
of a Charity Commission's scheme for the Dauntsey Trust in Wiltshire.
In 1884, Collings and Chamberlain had intervened in that dispute and
forced a settlement more favorable to the laborers, but the Charity
Commissioners were attempting to overturn that compromise.
At this point Chamberlain and Collings intervened for Important
social and political reasons. Chamberlain stated these succinctly
when, in his letter to Hartington (and Salisbury), he erupted over the
injustice done the poor by this scheme to use the charity's money for
higher education for the rural middle classes instead of financial
assistance and elementary education for the poor, terming the scheme
"a continual and barefaced robbery on the part of the pedants of the
Charity Commission." He added that the Government could not win a general
election without the laborers' support, yet this scheme was bound to
alienate the laborers from the Unionist party and would give the Liberals
an election issue on the "betrayal of the interests of the labourers."^®
Collings had written earlier that there was no stronger Government supporter
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than he was, "but one thing I cannot do [J I cannot surrender the just
rights of the labourers to my party or to any Gov[ernment] . " If the
Government sanctioned this scheme, Collings and Chamberlain angrily
promised to fight it not only in Parliament but in the counties also,
and if the Government persisted they would retire from politics.
That threat moved Hartington and Salisbury to action, and the
scheme was tabled. The controversy was finally settled in Collings*
favor in June 1892~just before the General Election—when a revised
scheme was passed calling for the building of an agricultural technical
school and for using the charity's endowments to assist poor scholars. ^0
This victory and others Collings achieved by his advocacy of the
laborers' position in Parliament enhanced his reputation among the
laborers. He used his reputation to advance the Unionist cause among
the laborers. As the general election approached and the Conservative-
Liberal Unionist coalition struggled to gain popular support, Collings'
influence increased
.
In June 1891, Collings wrote Salisbury (through Viscount Wolmer)
a memorandum on what the "Unionist" party must Jo to win in the counties
Collings noted that the "Gladstonians"—he never called them Liberals
—
were making strong efforts to regain their rural supports and they had
three factors favoring them: (1) most of the local papers were Glad-
stonian, (2) many Unionists were apathetic and did not realize how ig-
norant the poorer voters were of the real issues, and (3) in many
parishes, the farmers who were generally Unionist were antagonistic to
the laborers.
Collings suggested that the Unionist party should carefully
choose speakers for the rural districts who knew about allotments, small
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holdings and other Acts passed by the Government for the laborers'
benefit. Most important, Collings believed that the best way to get
the laborers* votes was "through the agency of nonpolitical organiza-
Hons which can put the facts before them with most effect and secure
the necessary attendance to do so." That was exactly the tack taken
by the Rural Labourers League, one which was having fine success.
Collings realized that his suggestions seemed to be "of a
commonplace order," but it was those commonplace ideas "repeated to the
point of weariness, and not by high politics that the rural districts
are to be won." Gladstone had been saved by the rural vote in 1885,
defeated by it in 1886, and in 1892, the rural laborers would decide
the election, In this appraisal of the political situation, Collings
had carefully drawn attention to his organization and its importance
in the upcoming election. The point was not lost.
Collings' point was reinforced as the Liberals in mid-1891
began their election campaign. In August, J. R. Robinson of The Daily
News wrote a series of articles (ending in the autumn) describing the
villages, homes, amusements, wages, employment. Poor Law administration,
and the laborers' views of themselves and their needs. By the autumn
of 1891, the "village problem" was considered "one of the pressing
anxieties of the tirae."^^
On October 1 and 2, the National Liberal Federation and large
numbers of Liberal supporters met at Newcastle-upon-Tyne and adopted
for the Liberal party a wide series of reforms known collectively as
the "Newcastle Programme." Gladstone proclaimed Irish Home Rule the
first priority, but among the many other programs, legislation for rural
reform was generally given the next priority.
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By late 1891, the feeling among observers was that the campaign
would be fought primarily in the rural constituencies. In November, a
Liberal, a Progressive Farmers' candidate, won a surprising bye-election
victory over Lord Lymington, a supporter of the Rural Labourer's League,
in Devonshire, a Liberal Unionist stronghold. In December, the Liberal
victor, George Lambert, spoke to the Conference of Agricultural Dele-
gates that had been called by the Liberal party to give the agricultural
laborers a platform on which to express their views. The National
Liberal Federation solicited their advice and prepared policy state-
ments for Liberals to speak to in the election campaign. As a mark of
the importance of the conference, Gladstone addressed the laborers in
a rousing speech designed to renew his electoral appeal among the
laborers.
The RiO'dl World attacked the conference with the comment that
Gladstone was just "using" the laborers, and that most of the speakers
were not rural laborers, but leaders of rural associations.^^ Despite
the paper's dismissal of the conference, it was apparent that the
Liberals had mobilized around the issue of rural reform, and they were
using it successfully as an electioneering weapon.
The Liberal's success with that issue caused the Liberal Unionist-
...
Conservative coalition to take immediate steps to regain the initiative. ;
On January 29, 1892, the Rural Labourers' League organized their own
agricultural laborers' conference. The main speaker was Henry Chaplin,
and in his address he promised, for the Government, housing for the poor,
representative district couacils, vestry reforms, and especially small
holdings. He added that the Government Bill on small holdings would
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"bridge over the gulf that now existed between the farmer and the labourer
and.
.
.bring all classes of the agricultural interest closer together. "58
Small holdings had been discussed at the Cabinet meeting of
January 8 called to determine what programs could be brought In and
finished this session. Of the possible issues (small holdings, free edu-
cation and local government for Ireland, and district councils ) small
holdings was given the nod. On February 2, Salisbury called for the
establishment of a system of small holdings using government funds for
their acquisition. In words reminiscent of Collings* own, he added "I
don't think that small holdings are the most economical way of culti-
vating the land, but there are other things that are more important than
economy. Salisbury's words record the significant shift in opinion
that had occurred in the Unionist coalition's view toward small holdings.
That shift can best be appreciated by the reactions in May and
June 1888 by two important political figures in the Unionist coalition
to Collings' attempt in May 1888 to pass a Small Holdings Bill. The
leading opponent of the Bill in the Commonswas a highly respected figure
in agricultural matters, who became the President of the Board of Agricul-
ture in 1889, "Squire" Henry Chaplin. In a strong speech against the
Second Reading, Chaplin marshalled facts to demonstrate that small
holdings had not worked on the Continent, had not worked in England in
the past, and, in his view, would not work in the future.
In June 1888, at a banquet of the Liberal Unionist Club in honor
of Collings for his services to the Unionist party. Lord Hartington,
the principal speaker (as leader of the Liberal Unionist party), replied
to Sir William Harcourt's attack that, as Vice-President of the Rural
Labourers' League, Hartington should have supported Collings' Bill.
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Hartington disagreed claiming that the guiding resolution of the League
was two-fold: to implement the 1882 and 1887 Allotments Acts, and to
improve by all legitimate means the social and material condition of
the laborers by making rural life more prosperous and attractive.
Without apparent artifice, Hartington concluded, "Well, I want to know
what has that to do with the Small Holdings Bill.
.
Still, Collings did have impressive bipartisan support when he
spoke for the Second Reading of his Bill to supply small holdings to
laborers and members of the village population. Collings remarked that
to understand this Bill, it was necessary for a man "to have spent his
life in close connection with the rural districts, and also to have a
elear knowledge of the present conditions of the large towns . " Any man,
like himself, who had experienced both conditions realized that the
"social condition" of the people was the gravest problem facing Britain.
Collings reminded the House that it was the decaying countryside
which caused the laborers to migrate to the large towns and manufacturing
centers. Earlier, towns growing by "leaps and bounds" had been able to
absorb the migrants, but, Collings believed, the towns had reached their
limits if not already surpassed them.^^ He did not doubt that the laborer
moved to the towns for better wages, but in doing so the laborer dis-
placed another, who displaced another—bringing more competition and
lower wages
—
, until at the end, the broken man and the pauper were
thrown upon the rates.
Through many proposed schemes to find work for the unemployed,
Collings felt that no scheme would prove beneficial while the land was
under-utilized. Britain imported at least f25,000,000 worth of food
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yearly—including eggs, apples, butter, and cheese—yet Britain could
produce these herself. Collings argued that it was "a silly waste of
time to talk about Protection," or free trade in land as long as land
was purchased for status. The solution was to allow small cultivators
facilities to compete in price and quality with small cultivators abroad.
In the Bill, Collings proposed that the purchaser pay one-quarter
of the full purchase price, while the state through the local authorities
advance the other three-quarters which would become a permanent rent
charge on the land. Collings preferred this form of quasi-ownership so
the state could mandate that the small holdings not be sublet or sub-
divided, or used for other than agricultural purposes. The occupier
would also be allowed to borrow money from the state for a dwelling or
improvements so that the occupier could be free of the "harsh tyranny"
of the moneylender. Collings added that the time was most favorable
for this experiment because the marketable value of land had deterior-
ated, and landowners sought any buyer.
Collings admitted that it was almost impossible to pass the
Bill this session; besides, he felt that the matter was too big for any
Private Member's Bill, so he urged the Goverrjnent to make the Bill its
own. In almost despairing tones, he concluded, "I want something done
by anybody— I do not care who it may be— in this direction. "^^ The
Government did not take up his proposal but it did promise him a Select
Committee to be chaired by Chamberlain. And Chamberlain told che Govern-
ment that he expected them to keep an open mind on the subject.
Chamberlain could confidently tell the Government to keep an
open mind, because he knew that the Select Committee was biased toward
small holdings. \^±le the Conservatives were split on the issue, the
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Liberal Unionists and Liberals on the Committee were almost to a man
committed to small holdings (of some type); the result was never in
doubt. Most of the witnesses were favorable to small holdings, and
where they differed it was over how to increase peasant proprietorships.
The witnesses did a very creditable job in presenting their cases, and
their evidence was impressive in its details and in its totality.
Still, the obvious preponderance of members and witnesses in favor of
small holdings suggests that the Conservative Government had established
a ratifying body rather than an investigative body. Appointing Chamber-
lain to be the chairman of the Committee rather than a less partisan
MP lends some credence to this view; as does the fact that the Select
Conmiittee considered only Collings' Small Holdings Bill which the
evidence of the witnesses fully supported.
In April 1889, the Select Committee was appointed from MP's
interested in agricultural questions, including Sir Edward Birkbeck,
Viscount Curzon, Sir William Hart Dyke, James William Lowther, and most
importantly Henry Chaplin (all Conservatives); Halley Stewart, Henry
Broadhurst, Henry Cobb, and Richard Haldane (all Liberals); and Collings
and Chamberlain. Collings, as he wished, was called first, and testified
on April 5 and 30 and May 3 and 7 with great skill and in some detail on
the condition of the agricultural laborers and their need for small
holdings. However, in the Committee Collings was skillfully questioned
by his old opponent, Henry Chaplin, and the results were damaging to
Collings' position.
Chaplain questioned Collings' view that small holdings could be
cultivated more profitably than large holdings, that is, that the return
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to a small holder was comparatively greater per acre than that to a
farmer of a large holding. When asked if he had made any calculations
to support that view, Collings replied that he had not because he had
no way of estimating the amount of labor the small holder and his
family put in. Then, Chaplin inquired, how could he compare the gross
returns if he could not estimate the labor requried to bring those
returns? Collings replied that he could not.^^
Chaplin questioned Collings on the cost of providing buildings
for small holdings. Under some pressure Collings admitted that a build-
ing—usually a house with a barn for the animals— for a 10 to 15 acre
holding could cost as much as f200. Collings argued, however, that the
small holder could and often did much of the work himself so that the
cost was quite likely to be much less. When Chaplin expressed skepti-
cism about Collings* scheme of loans for putting up buildings and sur-
prise that Collings had not detailed this aspect, Collings replied
angrily, "I consider I have gone sufficiently far when I place the small
holder of the right character on a small holding..-. " Collings left the
C Q
workings to the new occupying owner.
Chaplin then delved into Collings' figures that some f30,000,000
of food were imported from countries which had small holdings. Collings
had intimated that those foods were produced by small holders, but as
Chaplin demonstrated, anywhere from 76% to 99% of the imported food came
from the large farms of the United States and Canada. Collings replied
that he had only meant to show that the imported food "which this
country is so eminently fitted by nature to produce" could be produced
by small holdin^.^^
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Collings also found his "facts" under attack. He had held (from
the 1881 Census) that the rural population had decreased some 15% in
the decade from 1871 to 1881, but the corrected Census showed an 8.2%
decrease, though he argued that that was still bad enough.''^ Collings
had given the figure for the agricultural classes as 1,383,000 (of whom
870,798 were agricultural laborers), but that figure did not include
farmers and their wives and families, and other non-laborers employed
on the land, which brought the total agricultural classes to over
2,000,000.*^^ Finally, it was an article of faith with Collings (and
many others) that the enclosures had taken land from the rural poor and
forced them off the land. However, Chaplin demonstrated that in Cornwal
which had the largest decrease in population (1871-81), enclosures had
not been responsible for the decrease.
Collings' testimony had been weakened (though later witnesses
asserted the essential correctness of his view of the rural situation),
and Chaplin and other committee members had demonstrated that a small
holidngs measure raised considerable social and economic difficulties.
In the face of those concerns, Collings retreated to his basic premise.
[Sjupposing it could be shown, for instance, that a single
farmer or a company could farm half a county with machinery
and a handful of wage-paid labourers, I think the State
would discourage or even prevent such a system* It would
be a rich and rotten state of things . . .^^
The best source of "national safety and national strength" was a strong,
numerous, and prosperous peasantry. With that view neither Chaplin nor
any other Committee member disagreed. The thrust of the evidence was
that to create that prosperous peasantry, small holdings were the best
alternative.
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The Connnittee wrote that their Report kept three objects in
view: (1) land must be made available for small holdings to attract
persons to the land, (2) the intending occupiers must be assisted with
loans on reasonable terms, and (3) some means must be found to enable
agricultural laborers to raise themselves to small holders. With those
objects to guide them, they considered Collings' Bill and accepted its
main principles; the local authorities would borrow money from the state
and pay three-quarters of the purchase money for the small holding, with
this money being a perpetual quit-rent, and thus prevent the occupiers
from subletting or subdividing the land. The local authorities were
also given the right to reacquire the land for full compensation to the
occupier when the land was needed for public purposes. The Report with
the full backing of the Committee was sent to the Commons for quick
action. ^ ^
The recommendation for quick action was ignored. Only when
the political situation turned critical for the Unionist coalition, and
when Chamberlain, the new leader of the Liberal Unionist party in the
Commons (after Hartington had moved to the Lords), pressed for the Bill
did the Conservative Government put aside its fears and allow Henry
Chaplin, the President of the Board of Agriculture, to introduce the Bill
On Februray 22, 1892, Chaplin introduced the Bill. The proposals
he admitted were "entirely novel to our legislation," but this measure
should be viewed in "the nature of an experiment which the Government
have decided, after full consideration that it is right and expedient to
make.""^^ The chief object of the Bill was to effect the wider distribu-
tion of land among the people and to resurrect the yeoman class. There
was, Chaplin felt, a widespread and general desire among the laborers
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themselves, "although I believe it to be of comparatively recent growth;*
that the experiment be tried. Chaplin admitted that he was unsure
whether a system of small holdings could work, but he did feel that
this measure offered a practical possibility for its success. "^"^
The Government Bill was much like the one recommended by the
Select Committee with one crucial difference. Instead of accepting
Collings' proposal for a perpetual rent-charge, (i.e., quit-rent), the
Bill provided for the small holding to be subject to restriction on its
use for 10 years, at which time the occupier could pay off the loan,
and the land would be his alone. The Bill provided that the county
council rather than a district or parish council be responsible for the
acquisition of small holdings. The Bill did not give the county councils
compulsory powers to acquire land nor did it allow the county councils
to lend money to the occupier for buildings.
R. B. Haldane, himself a member of the Select Committee, made
the most cogent critique of the Bill from the Liberal side. Haldane
rejected the scheme for allowing the small holder to purchase his holding
Chaplin should know "the feeling of repugnance which some of us have to
the creation of any new system of land tenure that would not be subject
to public control." The perpetual rent-charge was needed to restrict
the occupier from sub-dividing or subleasing the land or using it for
other than agricultural purposes. Haldane also argued that compulsory
purchase powers were needed to acquire land at reasonable prices in the
face of landowners who used their monopoly of land to charge "exorbitant"
prices. Finally Haldane expounded on the need for a representative local
authority such as a parish council to meet the laborers' demands for land
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at a reasonable price. Haldane concluded by calling the Bill a good
first step which the Liberals would in no way hinder, but they would
attempt to widen the scheme and harmonize it with the "advanced opinions"
of agrarian reformers. '^^
The Liberal strategy was apparent. They would not hinder the
Bill's passage for fear the Government would dissolve over that issue
and blame the Liberals for not passing the Bill.^^ At every chance,
the Liberals exposed the weaknesses of the Bill, and when possible, they
challenged the Government on those points, but at no point did they
really try to obstruct or delay the Bill. For both sides, the appearance
of favoring the Bill was a political necessity.
Collings was in an uncomfortable position on the Bill. To a
large extent, it was as he had proposed in his Bill. But, without the
perpetual rent-charge, Collings believed that the whole purpose would be
undermined. Subdivisions, subletting and money-lenders would soon de-
stroy the holdings, and shortly thereafter the land would be bought up
and relet at very high rents. Collings chose to welcome the Bill, and to
defend it against Liberal critics, but at the same time, he made a
restrained but strong attack on the Bill for doing away with the per-
petual rent-charge.
The Liberals were very quick to attack the Bill for its lack of
compulsory powers for the purchase of land. Collings before the Select
Committee had freely admitted that he left compulsion out of his Bill,
because if the Bill contained such powers, it probably would not become
law.^^ In the Commons, he was more circumspect arguing that compulsion
for small holdings was more difficult and involved because of the large
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amounts of land involved. Collings added that it was a great mistake
to attribute the successes of the Allotments Acts to the compulsory
clauses. That statement is quite surprising since Collings had long
argued that many allotments were given voluntarily because the com-
pulsory clauses were there in reserve. Apparently Collings was playing
up to the Conservatives in this debate.
The Liberals responded angrily to Collings' arguments for omit-
ting compulsion from the Bill. Francis Channing, a leading agrarian
reformer, stated that without compulsion the Bill would be ineffective.
Channing saw no difficulty in using compulsory clauses to acquire small
holdings, and he brushed aside Collings' and Chaplin's arguments about
the problems of using compulsion. "If compulsion was necessary in deal-
ing with small plots of land it is ten times more necessary when you
are dealing with larger areas." During the Committee stage, the Liberal
R. T. Reid argued that one problem with the Bill was the Government's
failure to give facilities for the compulsory acquisition of freeholdings
.
He, too, dismissed Collings objections as without substance.^
The Government's reasons for not accepting compulsion had more to
do with their philosophic opposition to compulsion than to any problems
with it. The Liberals demonstrated that the methods were available if
the will was there. Probably Collings was correct that, if the Bill
contained compulsory clauses, it would not pass. However, by accepting
this "practical" measure, Collings relinquished a "radical" Bill which
in earlier days he would have supported and which could have done more
to facilitate the growth of small holdings. It has been suggested that
the greatest single weakness of the 1892 Act lay in its failure to give
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compulsory powers, and in 1908, in the Small Holdings and Allotments
Act, the Liberals gave the local councils compulsory powers to acquire
land by sale or hire for small holdings.
Henry Cobb made an attempt to instruct the Committee considering
the Bill to create parish councils and let them acquire, sell, let, and
manage small holdings. Ceilings opposed the motion (as he had done
before) on the grounds that it would destroy the Bill. Besides, they
were "not creating a sort of Newcastle programme, but a practical
measure." This motion if passed would destroy the possibility of passing
the bill this session, and Collings anxiously wanted the Bill as soon as
possible. Despite the Unionist coalition's opposition, there was much
support for making parish councils the local authority and Cobb's motion
lost by only 27 votes.
The most strongly contested proposal was the Government's decision
to allow outright purchase of the holding by the occupier rather than
accept the Select Committee's recommendation of a perpetual rent-charge
to assure the proper use of the small holding. The Conservatives (and
many Liberal Unionists and some Liberals) opposed that recommendation
because they felt that it violated the sanctity of the right of private
property. Chaplin believed that the land when it was paid for should
belong to the owner without qualification: "the owner is at liberty
to do what he likes with it; and I ask why should he not be so?"
The Radicals were in fact arguing for a new type of state inter-
vention. One Liberal argued that the House had no right to use national
funds to create "a class of individuals" who after paying back their
purchase money would then become land speculators or landowners
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because of government funding. R. B. Haldane reminded the Government
that the purpose of the Bill was not only to create a "yeoman class,"
but to put that class on the land. Collings made common cause with the
Radicals because he saw that the Government's proposals would allow land
speculation and absentee landlords rather than cultivated small holdings.
The effort was in vain.^^
Collings and Chamberlain refused to accept that decision.
Collings argued that the Government was advancing public money at "won-
derful terms" which they could not get privately and which the occupiers
could use for their private benefit and not for the community's benefit.
Collings did not see why Chaplin had brought in a Bill for peasant pro-
prietorships if he intended land speculators to reap the benefits.®^
The growing opposition to this clause caused Chaplin to retreat
somewhat from his position. Chamberlain made a vigorous speech opposing
this clause because he felt that no landowner would sell his land if
he thought the occupier might turn the land to a factory, factory houses,
or worse. Chaplin found that speech "so reasonable and temperate" that
he promised to reconsider the question in the same spirit.
Chaplin, in the end, refused to budge from his view of the
sanctity of private property, but he did compromise somewhat by inserting
two provisions: (1) before a small holder could sell his land, he had
to offer it to the county council first, then the original landowner or
his successor, and finally the adjoining landowners before offering it
it for free sale, and (2) the restrictions on small holdings were extended
from 10 to 20 years. Chaplin also made the Bill more palatable to
Collings by reducing the occupier's down payment to 20% and allowing
county councils to hire land and lease it for small holdings when the
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price of land near a town made its purchase price too high.^^ Collings
was still not altogether pleased with the Bill, but he congratulated
Chaplin on the ''skill and success" with which he had piloted the Bill
through Committee and on the Bill's character "so far as it goes."
The Liberals accepted the Bill as only a first step. Henry Cobb
saw this Bill as essentially a yeoman's Bill, that is "a Bill to enable
men in the comparatively good position in life to get land—and I do
not believe it will be the least good to one in a thousand of the agri-
cultural laborers." One other Liberal critic called the Bill "a huge
sham" which could not make good its claim to turn thousands of laborers
into occupying owners. Those views were supported by a report of a
Departmental Committee on small holdings in 1966 which suggested that
the strong emphasis on providing small holdings for sale hurt the Act,
because only a few would-be small holders could afford to buy them.
There can be little doubt that the passage of the Small Holdings
Act (1892) was motivated by political pressure emanating from real
economic distress among the rural classes of Britain. The Liberal MP
Herbert Gardner saw the Bill as part of an electioneering programme
"brought forward by the Unionist coalition" to outbid the promises of
(
Liberals and Radicals in rural constituencies. He quoted The Times of
that morning (March 21, 1892) to the effect that the Unionists did not
have to worry about the success or failure of the Bill because this
experimental Bill "however hopeless and however foredoomed to failure is
political capital while it lasts." Gardner added that the Government
wasted two years before suddenly, in the last session of a "moribund
Parliament," it found that necessity for the Bill's passage. Significantly
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Gardner concluded that he was going to vote for its Second Reading
because the Bill moved far enough to enable the Radicals to "force the
hands of the Liberal Leaders in the future who may not be willing to go
quite so far along the Radical road in regard to land reform as we would
wish. In that sense alone, the Small Holdings Act was a success.
The deteriorating political situation of the Unionist coalition
had forced the Government to find a popular measure to restore its
viability, and it had settled upon the Small Holding Bill for that
purpose. It was a tribute to Jesse Collings that his Bill opposed so
vehemently only four years before should be considered the measure on
which the Government staked its reputation in its last session.
The passage of the Small Holdings Act promised benefits to the
laborers, and the Unionist coalition felt it only right that the laborer
thank them with their votes. On February 6, 1892, in his Memorandum,
Chamberlain had written Balfour that the Rural Labourers' League and
its Rural World not only brought the laborers national and local news,
but brought them the Unionist point of view. In order to continue that
good work, and increase its rural agents and the circulation of The
Rural Worlds the League needed an additional £5000.^^
The Liberal Unionists had already recognized the importance of
the League and its v;ork, and had contributed £5000 for its operations
in 1890, 1891 and into 1892. The appeal for Conservative funds was
apparently successful as The Rural World in mid-February reported that
its circulation was up and that the League had greatly increased the
number of agents who were visiting the rural areas and establishing
9 7
close contacts with the laborers.^
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Beginning with January 1892, The Rural World acquired a new
subtitle, The Best Family Newspaper for all Classes of the Rural Popu-
lation, a new face-lift with a front and back cover, large numbers of
advertisements, and an enlargement of the size of its issue to 20 pages
or more. The extra pages carried better coverage of world, national,
and especially local news, greater coverage of Unionist election meet-
ings, news about the work of the Rural Labourers' League, the progress
of the Small Holdings Bill, and for the first time endorsements of
Unionist candidates for election to Parliament
.
In mid-May with the passage of the Small Holdings Bill assured,
many Conservative MP's pressed for a dissolution in June. Chamberlain
and his political analyst, J. Powell-Williams, opposed a dissolution
then. In the course of his analysis, Powell-Williams acknowledged that
for the time being the counties were leaning toward the Liberals, and
the Unionists had "nothing to gain that I can see in the Counties by
bringing it [the election] on." The Conservatives won out and the
election was set for early July.^^
In early June, The Rural World concentrated on championing the
Unionist cause. The paper included articles on the "priest-ridden
Irish peasants" and appeals from Northern Irish nonconformist ministers
to their British brethren to support the Unionist cause. On June 10,
The Rural World published a very long article "An Address of the Rural
Labourers' League to the Rural Population," in which Collings, and Austen
Chamberlain, as the League's honorable secretary, listed the many Acts
which the Unionist Government had passed in its six years and appealed
to the laborers to vote Unionist so that further reforms would follow
100soon
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Despite their appeals, the laborers at the General Election
turned to the Liberal party. The Liberal victory was gained mostly in
the counties as the Liberals increased their representation in the
English counties from 65 to 103 seats, and won 46 out of 58 counties in
Scotland and Wales, giving the Liberals 149 county seats to 143 for the
Unionists. As in 1885, the strength of the Liberal party lay in the
counties. The county MP's wanted a parish councils bill—"these parish
councils have taken hold of the agricultural labourers.... "^0^ That
weight of opinion made itself felt when, after Home Rule was thrown out
by the Lords in 1894, the Liberals turned to a Parish and District
Councils Bill.
Collings had misjudged the desires of the agriculture laborers,
and he had been unable to motivate them to vote Unionist in large num-
bers. His failure to pull the laborers into the Unionist camp at the
General Election damaged Collings' prestige in the eyes of the Unionists,
and he never again enjoyed the influence and power which he had held in
the year from mid-1891 to mid-1892.
In Parliament, too, Collings lost prestige and influence. In
the period 1888-92, Collings was required to defend Unionist programs
he did not fully believe in. Unlike Chamberlain, he lacked polish,
style, and penetrating intelligence, and he sometimes fell into repeating
the Government's position with further enlightenment. On April 10, 1892,
ft
Gladstone exploited that weakness and savaged Collings, calling him
"the Hon. Member for Bordesley, the faithful henchman of my right hon.
friend [Chamberlain], who would cordially re-echo that or any other
opinion. "^^^ That description was well-received and well-remembered.
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The truth is, Col lings was much more than merely an echo. He had spirit,
humor, warmth, compassion, and intelligence, but the phrase stuck and
has been taken by recent historians as the measure of the man. Few
looked beyond the phrase to find the real person underneath.
In July 1892, Collings found that he was being given an honor
he sincerely believed worthwhile, a Privy Councillorship. Chamberlain
had very strongly recommended Collings for the honor, and Viscount Wolmer
and the Duke of Devonshire (Hartington) readily concurred, and Collings
was put at the top of the Liberal Unionist list to receive honors.
Chamberlain wrote Collings of the honor, and Collings, full of warmth
and love, thanked Chamberlain heartily for arranging it.^^^
On August 18, Collings wrote Salisbury to thank him and Her
Majesty for the honor. He felt that he had performed his services to
the Unionist cause from a sense of duty as Britain passed through this
grave crisis. He regretted the election results, but at last the Home
Rule question would be fought out, and the Unionist party was never so
united as it was then to defeat that scheme. Collings added that the
"Liberal Unionists were prepared to make any sacrifice for the cause of
the Union," a policy which the Government had had smoother by passing
"so many beneficent measures for improving the condition of the people."^
That statement sums up the transformation that Collings had
undergone from advanced Radical to Liberal Unionist. The themes of
the "Radical Programme" were no longer dominant; they were embedded in
legislation, however imperfectly. Collings stressed the conservative
nature of his reforms, an element that had always been present, but
was no longer muted by fiery passions. Seemingly when Collings embraced
171
Unionism, he drew away from the Radicalism of his early days. In that
retreat he lost sight of the agricultural laborers for whom he cared
SO much.
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FOOTNOTES
^Chamberlain, Politiaal Memoir, pp. 11^-11. On pages
he discussed, sometimes eloquently, the travails of making the alliance
work.
^Collings and Green ^ - Collings , II, pp. 197, 200. The whole
incident and the attendant reaction is described on pages 197-202.
Collings, though chairman of the meeting, had not been given advance
notice that the motion would be brought before the meeting. A very
brief account is given the Rural 'World, December 22, 1888, p. 6. The
Times, February 16, 1888, p. 8 for an account of the meeting.
^Ibid., pp. 199-202. Green charged that Collings had long
protested against any "political" use of the Association. In the
Rural World account. Chamberlain charged that the Liberals had elected
only Liberals to the executive committee so as to take over the Associa-
tion. Chamberlain also attacked Harcourt's support of the ouster of
Collings (p. 6). The Times, February 16, 1888, p. 8. In his speech
Collings had argued that if "ever there was a subject which ought to
be free from party spirit in every way it was the allotments question. .
Joseph Chamberlain to Viscount Wolmer, March 13, 1888, Chamber-
lain Papers, JC 5/74/1.
^Garvin, Chamberlain, II, pp. 354-56. See also Michael Hurst,
"West Midland Politics," pp. 45-46, though Hurst felt that Chamberlain
still did not have full control of Birmingham politics. Also Barry
McGill, "Francis Schnadhorst and Liberal Party Organization" in Peter
Stansky (ed.). The Victorian Revolution: Government and Society in
Victoria's Britain, New York, New Viewpoints, 1973, pp. 270-71, reprinted
from the Journal of Modem History, XXXIV, No. 1, March 1962, pp. 19-39.
^Rural World, December 22, 1888, p. 6. This was the first issue
of the Rural World. Collings remained President of the League (known
after 1910 as the Rural League) until its dissolution in December 1919.
Collings and Green, Collings, II, p. 203.
^Joseph Chamberlain Memorandum, The Rural Labourers League,
Chamberlain Papers, JC 6/5/6/5. This Memorandum was r^ritten around the
beginning of February 1892. This can be corroborated from a letter from
Chamberlain to A. J. Balfour of February 6, 1892 in the Balfour Papers
49773, H33-35 to which this Memorandum was attached. See Collings
and
Green! Collings. II, pp. 203-5, where Green dwelt upon the assistance
given the laborers by the League and denied emphatically that the
League
was a handmaiden to any political party. However, the Chamberlain
Memorandum stated (talking about the League's agents): They are
Union-
ists." Hereafter cited as Chamberlain Memorandum, Rural
Labourers
League
.
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Collings and Green, Callings, II, p. 205. The figures on
the RTAVal World's ciruclation come from the Chamberlain Memorandum.
The paid agents numbered six before 1892, but rose to over 25 during
the period just before the 1892 General Election. Also see Chamber-
lain's letter to Balfour accompanying the Memorandum where Chamberlain
wrote half-huraorously that if a laborer read the Rural World, he was
"instantaneously converted to Unionism." February 6, 1892, Balfour Paoers
49773. '
^Rural World, August 3, 1889, p. 389, August 31, 1889, p. 431,
November 30, 1889, p. 600, February 19, 1892, p. 154, February 26, 1892,
p. 173.
^'^The first issue (December 22, 1888) contained many small arti-
cles including "Land for the Labourer" by Professor James Long, a regular
contributor, articles on bee-keeping, Denmark dairy farming, Norvegian
local option (for public houses), forming a cooperative to buy allotments,
cold storage of fruit, drainage of land, determining the weight of eggs,
and other agricultural topics. No single issue ever again had this many
articles, but all aspects of farming were addressed by succeeding issues.
For a short time during the 1890' s, the paper did carry serialized
fiction for the enlightenment of its readers.
^^3 Hansard, CCCXXIII, March 19, 1888, 1642-78. For the debate
over the devolution of powers, see ibid., CCCXXIV, April 19, 1888, 1805-
22 and Josef Redlich and Francis W. Hirst, The History of Local Govern-
ment in England, second edition with an introduction and epilogue by
Bryan Keith-Lucas, London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1970, pp. 202-6.
Hereafter cited as Redlich, Local Government in England. The politics
that resulted in the 1888 Act are discussed in J. P. D. Dunbabin's "The
Politics of the Establishment of County Councils, " in The Historical
Journal, VI, 2 (1963), pp. 226-52. Hereafter cited as Dunbabin, "Estab-
lishment of County Councils."
^^Ibid., CCCXXIV, April 19, 1888, 1822.
^
^Actually the district councils section was poorly drawn and
seemingly inefficient. Sir Charles Dilke records that he attacked the
district councils section for adding "another to all the numerous author-
ities already existing, instead of, as we suggested, reducing their
number." Dilke Memoirs, Dilke Papers, Add. MSS 43941, f. 76-77. Gwynn
and Tuckwell, Dilke, II, p. 271.
^^3 Hansard, CCCXXIV, April 19, 1888, 1464, 1484, and 1443-45,
1483-86, 1492-98.
^^Henry Lucy, A Diary of the Salisbury Parliament, London:
Cassell & Company, 1892, p. 50. Lucy added that since the Liberals
refused to hear him, the Conservatives all agreed that they should do
so, but each wanted the other to stay and by the end of Collings' speech,
the benches on both sides were nearly empty.
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Ecmsard, CCCXXV, April 20, 1888, 42-43. Jack Cade was afifteenth century "radical" who championed the cause of the poor against
the landowners. Chamberlain in the early 80 's had been called a "Jack
Cade" by his Tory opponents. Ironically, Collings in his book Land
Reform (1906), pp. 138-39 had the highest praise for Jack Cade and his
struggle against injustice.
^'^Ibid., 45 (H. Gardner) and 59 (Halley Stewart). Gardner in
an appropriate quotation remarked that Chamberlain's and Collings'
actions reminded him of the stage directions of a Sheridan play, "Enter
Tibumia mad, in white satin, followed by her confidante mad, in white
muslin." (47.)
^^Ibid., CCCXXIV, April 19, 1888, 1822 and CCCXXV, April 20,
1888, 43.
^^Ibid., CCCXXV, April 20, 1888, 53-56. Sir Walter Foster's
comments summed up the Radicals' critique of the Bill. Not all Radicals
agreed on tht view. One Radical, Sir John Brunner, supported the Bill
in hopes of dislodging the landoimers who had dominated Cheshire
politics. Brunner had sent Ritchie detailed suggestions for the Bill
and encouraged him to persevere. Stephen Koss, Sir John Brunner:
Radical Flutoerat, 1842-1919j Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1970, pp. 166-67. Hereafter cited as Koss, Brunner.
^^J. p. D. Dunbabin, "Expectations of the New County Councils
and their Realization," in The Historical Journal^ VIII, 3 (1965), pp.
378-79. Hereafter cited as Dunbabin, "Expectations of New County
Councils." The county councils followed the precedent of the munici-
palities both in franchise and in electing councillors who then elected
aldermen from their own members or outside the council. The aldermen
tended to be a bulwark of the "established classes."
^'^Ibid.y p. 363, ff., 375. Even in Wales, where the Liberals won
overwhelming victories, the county councils did little to assist the
laborers (pp. 369-70). Rural Worldy June 8, 1889, p. 293 for the lack
of interest by the laborers in the county council elections.
^^Rural World, February 2, 1889, p. 76, October 26, 1889, p. 537,
and November 16, 1889, p. 565 (front page editorial).
^^Joseph Chamberlain to Lord Hartington (Private), January 21,
1889, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/22/143. Hartington was then the inter-
mediary between Salisbury and Chamberlain.' With regard to small holdings,
Chamberlain asked, "Why should not English, Scotch & Welsh farmers have
a chance of becoming owners as well as the Irish?"
2^Hurst, "West Midland Politics," pp. 49-55. Garvin, Chamber-
lairiy II, pp. 438-42. The antagonism between the Conservatives and
Radical Unionists remained high for a number of years after.
^^The Times, May 11, 1888, p. 10.
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2 6Collings had spoken in Cottenham of the Cheshire Division at
a successful meeting in June. Rural World, June 29, 1888, p. 325. In
August, the League publicized its success there in getting the Board
of Guardians to let 113 acres for allotments. In the same issue, the
paper editorialized that new branches were springing up because of the
League's "extraordinary" successes. Ibid., August 3, 1889, p. 387.
^"^George Dixon to Joseph Chamberlain, April 4, 1888, Chamberlain
Papers, JC 5/27/6, June 6, 1889, JC 5/27/7, September 10, 1889, JC 5/27/8,
and September 15, 1889, JC 5/27/9. There is no record of Collings having
the money, but in the September 15 letter, Dixon felt that Collings would
accept it if given a lump sum.
Rural World y November 16, 1889, p. 566. The party included
Chamberlain and his new wife, Mary (an Endicott from Massachusetts),
Chamberlain's son Neville, and the Kenricks. Mary Chamberlain to her
mother, Mrs. Endicott, November 14, 1889, Austen Chamberlain Papers,
AC 4/3/115. They all felt fine except for Collings who had "been
wretchedly of late."
^^Mary Chamberlain to Mrs. Endicott, November 18, 19, and 20,
1888, Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 4/3/117, Joseph Chamberlain to
Austen Chamberlain, December 17, 1889, and January 2, 1890, Chamberlain
Papers, JC 5/12/9 and JC 5/12/11 respectively. It was during this trip
that Garvin felt that Chamberlain "crystallized" his Imperialist views.
Chamberlain^ II
, pp . 447 , 452-56
.
^°3 Hansard, CCCXLII, March 24, 1890, 1725-26. The measure was
the Allotments Act (1887) Amendment Bill.
'^^Ibid.y 1728 and 1743. The issue had generated great emotional
appeal as the laborers had fought for 15 months to get the local authority
to use the compulsory clauses of the 1887 Act and were turned down by a
one vote majority.
^^Ibid., 1742 and 1761. Also The Times, October 23, 1889, p. 6,
where Collings used those same figures.
^^Ibid.y 1780-82. To illustrate the effectiveness of the 1887
Act, Collings pointed to the Conservative MP Sir Edward Birkbeck who
had taken the allotments issue to the county council and made the council
offer allotments (1781). Birkbeck had long been a strong supporter of
allotments.
^^Ibid.y 1761-62 (F. A. Channing) and 1743 (W. Harcourt) . Henry
Cobb was much gentler to the Rural Labourers' League when he called it^^
a "respectable body, [though] ... we have not much confidence in it."
(1771.)
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^^Ibid., CCCXLIV, May 2, 1890, 26. Cobb also noted his prefer-
ence for allowing laborers to lease allotment lands instead of purchas-
ing them as it would save "considerable expense" (53). Sir Walter Foster
reminded the Conservatives that the Liberals had argued in 1887 that
the Board of Guardians were the "worst authorities in the kingdom" to
handle allotments. That contention had been proved. Tbid.
^
CCCXLII,
March 24, 1890, 1727.
^^Ihid., 55.
^'^Ibid., 61.
^^Ibid.y CCCXLVI, June 26, 1890, 90.
^^Departmental Committee of Inquiry into Allotments, Report,
October 1969, Cmnd. 4166, p. 14. The number of allotments rose from
353,821 in 1886 to 448,586 in 1890. M. K. Ashby, Joseph Ashby of
Tysoe, Cambridge: Cam.bridge University Press, 1961, p. 114. Hereafter
cited as Ashby, Joseph Ashby. Rural Wortd, July 6, 1889, p. 337, Novem-
ber 16, 1889, p. 566, and June 29, 1889, pp. 328-29 where Collings was
publicly thanked for his efforts on behalf of the agricultural laborers.
Almost every issue of the Rural World in 1891 and 1892 carried on its
back pages stories of the laborers' success in getting allotments.
^^3 Hansard, CCCXXXVII, July 2, 1889, 1253, CCCXXXIX, August 15,
1889, 1340, CCCXLI, February 18, 1890, 573, CCCLI, March 10, 1891, 549-95.
Tuckwell, Radical Parson, Appendix E, pp. 250-53, where Tuckwell documents
the failure of the 1890 Act. The laborers were finally offered some
land, but it was done voluntarily by two landowners and at too high a price
for the laborers. Tuckwell noted that even by February 1892, the Local
Government Board did not know how many allotments had been given under
the 1887 and 1890 Allotments Acts.
^^Ibid.y CCCXLII, March 25, 1890, 1815, 4 Hansard, V, May 31,
1892, 363-64. An example of the amount of effort that Collings put into
his interventions in Parliament and the frustration of that intervention
can be seen in Collings' questions on the Broughall Charity Lands , where
he finally forced the 1882 Act to be enforced only to have the trustee
charge too high a rent for the land. 3 Hansard, CCCXXXVI, May 17, 1889,
370, CCCXXXVII, July 2, 1889, 1252-53, CCCXXXIX, August 15, 1889, 1341,
and CCCXLII, March 25, 1890, 1815.
^^Ibid., CCCLIV, June 23, 1891, 1276. Collings sought to blame
the strong voluntary, i.e., denominational, school system on the Liberal
party and its 1870 Act. Collings praised the Bill for bringing free edu-
cation to all the poor especially in the rural districts.
"^^Ibid., CCCLV, July 8, 1891, 649-51.
""""Ibid., 671.
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^Departmental Committee of Inquiry into Allotments, Report.
1969, Cmnd, 4166, p. 15.
'^^Garvin, Chamberlain^ 11, p. 508.
^'^Ihid.
, p. 511-12.
"Joseph Chamberlain to Lord Hartington (Private)
,
January 17,
1891, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/22/151. Chamberlain added' that he felt
more strongly about this "than about any other domestic question. . . It
^^Jesse Collings to Viscount Wolmer, December 17, 1890, Lord
Salisbury Papers. It was only when this letter failed to make the
Government table the scheme that Chamberlain intervened. Joseph Chamber-
lain to Lord Hartington (Private), January 17, 1891, Chamberlain Papers,
JC 5/22/151.
^^Lord Hartington to Joseph Chamberlain, January 20, 1891,
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/22/55. Hartington noted that Salisbury did
"not love the Charity Commission, and is in favour of the labourers
v[ersus ] the middle classes." Rural Worlds June 3, 1892, p. 443.
^^For a recognition of Collings' work for the laborers against
the "manipulations" of the Charity Commissioners see Rural World,
August 31, 1889, p. 435.
^^Memorandum by Mr. Jesse Collings, Viscount Wolmer to Lord
Salisbury, June 27, 1891, Lord Salisbury Papers. Hereafter cited as
Collings Memorandum. The Liberals were especially successful in ap-
pealing to the laborers because of their antagonism to the farmers.
Collings, at the beginning of the Memorandum, had strongly urged that
the Conservative party and Liberal Unionist party merge to form the
Unionist party, a move which would negate the strong opposition on both
sides to voting for the other party.
^^Ibid. The emphasis was Collings'.
^^Clayden, England Under the Coalition, p. 552,
^^Ibid.y pp. 540-42. Garvin, Chamberlain, II, p. 516. The main
points of the "Newcastle Programme" can be found on those pages.
^^Ibid.y pp. 546, 553-54. The Liberal George Lambert turned a
Liberal Unionist majority of 1,689 votes into a 1,212 vote Liberal
majority in the So. Molton division. Collings had toyed with the idea
of sending members from the Rural Labourers' League to disrupt the Con-
ference by proposing anti-Home Rule motions. He rejected the idea as
being a "little dramatic and unreal." Jesse Collings to Joseph Chamber-
lain, November 28, 1891, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/28.
^'^Rural World, February 5, 1892, pp. 101, 103.
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^^Ibid.y p. 114.
_
^9ciayden, England Under the Coalition, p. 565. The Cabinet dis-cussion xs found in Lord Salisbury to Queen Victoria, January 9 1892Letters in the Royal Archives, CAB 41/22/9.
6O3 fensarci^CCCXXVI, May 16, 1888, 499-504. Chaplin remembered
that during the agricultural depression no agricultural class "suffered
anything to compare with the misery and poverty of the small free-
holders in Lincolnshire." (500.) Chaplin had expressed this same opinionm his attack on Collings' Amendment to the Queen's Address in January
1886. Ih^d., CCCII, January 26, 1886, pp. 456-63.
^^The Times, June 6, 1888, p. 12. In his toast to Collings,
Hartington admitted that he didn't agree with everything Collings said.
The guiding resoluting of the League-written by Collings~can be found
in Rural World, December 22, 1888, p. 1.
^23 Hansard, CCCXXVI, May 16, 1888, p. 450. Collings' speech is
found in columns 447-62. Among the Liberals who joined Collings to
introduce the Bill were the Radicals Henry Cobb, Henry Broadhurst,
Robert T. Reid, R. Burt, and H. P. Winterbotham.
^^Ibid.y 452. Collings noted that every few years, London
added a population as large as that of Birmingham. It was becoming
apparent that it was "dangerous to put a population the size of Birming-
ham into London every few years, nearly all of them coming from the
country, unless we can find the means of subsistence for them."
^""Ibid., 462.
^^Joseph Chamberlain to Lord Hartington (Private)
,
January 21,
1889, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/22/143.
^^Great Britain. Parliament, House of Commons Select Committee
on Small Holdings together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes
of Evidence, and Apprendix, Report, 1890, pp. ix, reprinted by Irish
University Press, Shannon, Ireland, 1969, pp. iii, ix (623, 630). I have
used the original pagination with the lUP pages given in parenthesis.
Hereafter cited as Select Committee on Small Holdings, Report, 1890, 313.
In May 1889, Henry Cobb was replaced by Mr. Seale-Kayne. The membership
on the Committee went from 17 in 1889 to 15 in 1890.
^'^Ibid.y p. 74 (106). Collings reirarked that a laborer would
get up at 5 o'clock and work on his small holding as a "relaxation and
pleasure." The Report of the Select Committee stated that "the preponder-
ating evidence" suggested that small holdings were profitable enough for
their owners to pay their rents and survive the agricultural depression
in good shape.
^^TDid., p. 75 (107).
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Z^?^"^" ^""^ ^9 (111)- Of the £3,800,000worth of cheese imported, £2,900,000 or 76% came from the U.S. and
Canada. Of £2,244,000 worth of hams, £2,225,000 or 99% came from theU.S. and Canada. In this way, Chaplin accounted for at least £17 300 000
of the £30,000,000 of food which Britain imported, only to have Collings
say that that had not been his argument anyway.
Ibid., p. 11 (43). There was a decline of about 10% in the
number of agricultural laborers in this period.
Ibid., p. 12 (43). Collings earlier had compared the 1,383,000
figure rather than the over 2,000,000 figure to Britain's total popula-
tion of 26,000,000 in showing the decline of the agricultural classes.
"^^Ibid.y p. 74 (106).
"^^Ibid.y p. 13 (45).
'^'*Ibid., p. X (630).
"^^Ibid.j pp. xi-xvi (631-36). Scotland was considered separately
in a subsection of the Bepovt and minor modifications were included for
any Small Holdings Bill which would include Scotland. [pp. xvi-xviii
(636-38)].
^^4 Hansard, I, Feb ruary 22, 1892, 911. Chaplin speech is found
in column 911-25.
'^'^Ibid.
,
917-18. Chaplin^ as his questions to Collings before the
Select Committee showed, did not believe that the required capital for
land and buildings could be found for small holdings. Still, with the
reduced price of land just then, the experiment had a "fair and reason-
able prospect of success. . . Sir William Harcourt congratulated
Chaplin on his "conversion," and added that since he now favored small
holdings, "There will be no one left to be converted." (926.)
'^^Ibid.y 920-24. The Bill did not allow houses to be erected
when the holding's annual value was less than f25, and only one dwelling
if the value was over that—the upper limit of a small holding being
defined as 50 acres or f50.
'^^Ibid.y 934-37. Haldane also favored the quit-rent since after
it paid off the State, the money would be given to the counties for their
use.
^^Chamberlain had suggested just such a course to Balfour if the
Liberals pressed too hard for an early dissolution. See Joseph Chamber-
lain to A. J. Balfour, January 31, 1892, Balfour Papers, 49773.
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Hansard, I, February 22, 1892, 937-41. Collings defended the
county councils as the best local authority and the lack of compulsory
purchase powers. He did ask Chaplin to allow a 15% down payment by
a purchaser rather than 25%.
8 2 Select Committee on Small Holdings, Report, 1890, p. 116 (148)
.
Where Collings admitted that he preferred the compulsory clauses, but the
opposition to them was so great and the present system so expensive and
time-consuming that he didn't believe any compulsory clauses would be
effective. See also Proceedings of the Select Committee, p. xxxix (659), '
where Collings joined with the solid Conservative bloc to defeat an
amendment for compulsory powers.
Hansard, II, March 21, 1892, 1376. Shaw Lefevre had earlier
commented that the cost of compulsion for allotments prevented the local
authorities from using it more than once or twice, but "the effect of
compulsion was very great" in causing allotments to be given. He assumed
a similar principle for small holdings. (1370).
^^Ibid., March 24, 1892, 1699-1700 (Channing), IV, May 9, 1892,
382 (Reid)
.
Chaplin had argued against compulsory powers to force the
leasing of small holdings, because it would require setting up a system
of rent valuation which he saw as a difficult task. Reid dismissed
Collings' objections that local authorities would not put up buildings
on leased lands by showing that it was already being done.
^^Departmental Committee of Inquiry into Statutory Small Holdings,
First Re-port, 1966, Cmnd. 2936, p. 9.
^^4 Hansard, III, April 4, 1892, 628, 654-57. Collings believed
that the parish councils had too small a rateable value to have much
money to acquire small holdings. Collings preferred district councils
as the best local authority for small holdings.
^"^Ibid., IV, May 12, 1892, 765. Another Conservative had argued
that he would personally be sorry to see some owner borrow noney, but
the occupier should be the "absolute owner." (755). Shaw Lefevre agreed
(764).
^^Ibid., 765 (Winterbotham) , 768 (Haldane), 769 (Collings) and
777 for the vote.
^^Ibid., 793-94.
'^^Ibid., May 13, 1892, 837-39 (Chamberlain), 843-44 (Chaplin).
'^^Ibid.y V, May 27, 1892, 68, 74-75.
'^^Ibid., IV, May 13, 1892, 863, and May 17. 1892, 1131
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^^Ibid., February 22, 1892, 944 (Cobb), and IV, May 12, 1892,
777 (Storey).
^'^Departmental Committee of Inquiry into Statutory Smallholdings,
First Report, 1966, Cmnd. 2936, p. 9.
Hansard,
,
II, March 21, 1892, 1343-44, 1348.
^^Chamberlain Memorandum, The Rural Labourers' League (February
6, 1892), Chamberlain Papers, JC 6/5/6/5. Also Joseph Chamberlain to
A. J. Balfour, February 6, 1892, Balfour Papers 49773.
^^Lord Woimer to Duke of Devonshire (Lord Hartington, who had
assumed his father's title in December 1891), September 5, 1892, Devon-
shire Papers 340. 2503 A. This enclosure contains the receipts and
expenditures of the Liberal Unionists for 1890, 1891, and up until
September 1892. Rural World, February 19, 1892, p. 154, which contained
an article with an appeal for support of the League's work.
^^Rural World, January 1, 1892, February 5, 1892, passim. For
coverage of the Small Holdings Bill see April 1, 1892, pp. 262, 264,
April 15, 1892, pp. 303-4, and April 29, 1892, pp. 353-54. The April
29 article (a reprint from the Birmingham Daily Post) gave much attention
to Collings' struggles to pass Allotments and Small Holdings Acts. The
article concluded by noting that the 1892 Small Holdings Act was "the
direct outcome of his political life and work."
^^Joseph Chamberlain to A. J. Balfour with Powell-Williams'
letter enclosed, May 15, 1892, Balfour Papers 49773. With some sagacity,
Powell-Williams remarked that if they waited until October and the
Liberals won a small majority the Unionists might be able to stay in office
until February 1893. Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Collings, May 27, 1892,
Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/130.
^^'^Rural World, June 10, 1892, pp. 463-64. Collings and Austen
Chamberlain stated that the contest was not between Liberals and Con-
servatives, but between "Home Rulers and Unionists." (emphasis theirs.)
The articles on Ireland are found on June 3, 1892, p. 443, June 17,
1892, 491-92, and June 24, 1892, 509-12.
lO^Emy, Social Politics, p. 47. The importance of parish councils
to the agricultural laborer is cited in Henry Labouchere's letter to
Herbert Gladstone, August 27, 1892, Herbert Gladstone Papers quoted
m
Ibid.
lO^Lucy, Salisbury Parliament, p. 403.
10 3The correspondence about the Privy Councillorship is found
in
the letters. Lord Woimer to First Earl of Selbornc (Private) ,
December 31.
1891, Salisbury Papers; Duke of Devonshire to Lord
Salisbury, May J,
1892, Salisbury Papers; and Jesse Collings to Joseph
Chamberlain, July 26,
1892, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/32. Garvin conjures up the
beaming
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^easure of that simple, sterling heart" from his own head. Garvin,Chamberlazn^ II, p. A95.
^Q'^Jesse Collings to Lord Salisbury, August 18, 1892, Salisbury
CHAPTER VI
THE DOraTURN (1S92-1920)
"Never glad, confident morning again!"—Howard Evans,
Radical Fights^ p. 98.
The 1892 election had been a sharp rebuff to Collings and the
|
Liberal Unionists in the rural districts. Collings and his friends
explained this defection of the counties to the Liberals by agreeing
that the Liberals had misled the rural laborers with "fervent promises"
and "misrepresentations. " The Rural World observed that, where the Rural
Labourers* League's agents had been active, the Unionist candidates had
been returned because in those constituencies the laborers had not been
"seduced by the wily ways and unscrupulous promises of a certain class
of politicians." John L. Green, the editor of The Rural World and
Collings' close friend (and biographer), wrote that the Liberal strategy
had been to lie and misrepresent the Unionist position. He concluded
that, in order to counteract the Liberals,
the rural labouring population should be educated—shown
who are their friends in the political world; and this
should be repeated again and again, and on every possible
occasion.
^
Collings in a letter to Lord Salisbury of August 1892 commented that the
future lay with the "Unionists^ and their duty was to vigilantly expose
the doings of the "Separatists" and then, "by repetition of plain
facts
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and truths," demonstrate to the poorer classes "the real nature of the
political situation."^
The first chance to expose the "Separatists" came naturally
enough over Irish Home Rule. On February 13, 1893, Gladstone in a power-
ful and compelling speech introduced the Government of Ireland Bill as
the only means other than coercion and repression for dealing with the
Irish question. Chamberlain in reply dissected the Bill and revealed
its weakness and flaws, and throughout the debate in the Commons he was
its leading opponent.
Collings spoke with some effectiveness against the Bill, but
mostly he turned to The Rural World to provide the forum for his attacks
on Home Rule. For the paper, he wrote a series of articles on the
Committee sessions in the Commons giving the clause discussed, a synop-
sis of the debate heavily biased against the Liberals, and finally the
vote on the clause so as to demonstrate that only the Irish Nationalist
votes had saved the Bill. At some points, his passions turned vicious,
as when he described a "priest-ridden" Irish Parliament under the in-
fluence of the "terrorists" of the Land League who would tax the people,
including the Irish Protestants, to subsidize Roman Catholic schools.
Where the Liberals called for trust in the Irish people, Collings painted
a dark picture of the plight of the "loyal" Irish Protestants at the
mercy of the Roman Catholic majority.^
Basically, Collings never accepted the Irish Nationalists as
representative of the real interests of the Irish, because he never be-
lieved that the Irish Nationalists represented a national group, separate
from a British nationality. The Nationalists were at best misguided and
dangerous, and at worst "a conspiracy inspired and paid for by the avowed
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enemies of England." He believed (as did Chamberlain) that if the Irish
tenants were given land and if the Irish Nationalists could be held in
check, political and social unrest would disappear. In his view,
these new Irish small farmers were content, and no longer supported or
favored Home Rule. In 1914, he contended the issue had shifted to a
struggle between the British Government and its Irish opponents who sur-
vived only by financial aid from overseas.^
There appeared in Collings' utterances a concept of a British
Empire built by freeborn men for their posterity. Angered by Gladstone's
Bill because it failed to subordinate the Irish Parliament to the "Im-
perial" one, Collings denounced the policy which he saw directed toward
the "repeal and disintegration" of the United Kingdom. There was no
need for an Irish Government Bill, because Ireland was already represented
in a democratic kingdom with England, Scotland, and Wales. ^ Later, in
the full blush of his imperial views, he attacked the "Little Englanders"
who had no regard for the future of Britain because they did not under-
stand the meaning of patriotism. As he learned in his short trip through
India, those who cried "India for the Indians" were foolish people, since
they did not understand the Indian people or the problems involved in
governing them. India needed that handful of Englishmen to govern her
efficiently and honestly. In that mystical guise under which so many
late Victorians cloaked so many earthier motives, Collings spoke of the
duty of Englishmen to sacrifice party and personal considerations to
maintain the integrity of the United Kingdom and its Empire and "hand it
down to those who came after them unimpaired in its glory and power.
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The problem of Ireland had somehow merged in Collings' mind (as
it had with Chamberlain) with that of the British Empire, Ireland in
some not wholly explicable way was a key element in Collings' divergence
from the Radicalism of his earlier days. Though a firm believer in
local self-government, he denied that principle first in Ireland and then
as regards the "backward" peoples of the Empire. Culturally ethnocen-
tric and imbued with a sense of nationhood from his formative days in
Birmingham, he was unaware of the cultural and societal forces swirling
in Ireland and later the Empire.
Collings failed to regard Irish Nationalism in more than simple
economic and political terms, and he was unable to comprehend the
cultural nationalism and social restiveness which underlay Ireland's
rebellion against England's domination. He saw the interests of English
and Irish laborers alike met by his programs and thus, given his cer-
tainty of the superiority of British parliamentary democracy to any
alternative, he rejected the claim of the Irish Nationalists to the
leadership of the Irish people.
While the battle over Home Rule grew more intense, the Liberals
In an attempt to gain popular and Parliamentary support introduced, on
March 21, 1893, the Local Government (England and Wales) Bill, better
known as the Parish Councils Bill. The debates on the Bill were post-
poned until after the Home Rule measure was killed in the Lords. Glad-
stone wished to resign over the Lords' action, but the Cabinet refused.
In November, the Commons settled down to the Second Reading of the
Parish Councils Bill.
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Collings welcomed the Bill as the enlargement and completion
of the 1888 Local Government Act- He had few disagreements with the dis-
tricts councils part of the Bill since Henry Fowler, President of the
Local Government Board, had adopted the 1884 Liberal Government's pro-
posals. However, he wished the Government to affirm that the parish
councils would in fact be given real power to control the local admin-
istrative business including especially allotments and charities.^
However, Collings did object to a subsection in one clause which
extended the power of the Charity Commissioners over all charities with
endowments up to f500. He immediately organized a Parliamentary oppo-
sition arguing that this provision removed from the parish council
control over this most important facet of rural life. Confronted with
growing hostility to the provision, the Government dropped it, but not
before Collings denounced them over this issue. ^ (In his biographical
section on Collings, Green discussed this issue as though it were the
most important aspect of Collings' intervention in the debate, and con-
sidering Collings' distaste for the Commissioners, it could well have
been.)l°
After some 40 days in the Commons, the Bill was sent to the Upper
Chamber where the Lords seemed ready to destroy the Bill. While
Chamberlain and Devonshire (Hartington, after the death of his father,
sat in the Lords, as the Duke of Devonshire) worked in Parliament to
meliorate the Lords' antagonisms, Collings tried pressure through The
Rural World. In two numbers, the paper warned the Lords not to oppose
"compulsory hiring of land" because it was a popular issue which the
Liberals could use as an electioneering weapon. The paper also bluntly
warned the Upper Chamber that it was seriously overestimating the
detrimental effects of the Bill, and that by their actions, the Lords
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were alienating the poorer classes. The Lords, however, did persevere
with some alterations, and the Liberal Government though tempted to fight
them decided reluctantly to accept this revised version in order to have
something to show for the session.
Collings was generally pleased with the provisions of the Local
Government Act (56 and 57 Vict. c. 73), especially the ones providing
for direct election of parish and district councils by men and women rate-
payers and the breaking of the church's hold over property in a parish.
Re was displeased that administering the clause which allowed the ac-
quisition by hiring and purchase was so expensive as to be almost un-
useable. Despite a financial limit on expenditures, Collings believed
that this Act would give rural laborers more control over their own lives.
Equally important, Collings believed that the Act would "put an
end to the business of the political agitator." When the rural popula-
tion learned by experience what local government could and could not
accomplish, they would no longer be victimized by "wily politicians"
who sought to mislead them. The rural population had been fooled in the
1892 General Election as they were led to expect a "seventh heaven" once
they acquired parish councils. Collings was still bitter about that
loss, and in his mind, the Liberal victories were due to lying politi-
cians and not to the Liberals' better reading of the laborers' desires.
After the passage of the Local Government Act, The Rural World
began a steady and unceasing attack on the Liberal Government. Following
Gladstone's retirement in March 1894, the paper maligned Lord Rosebery's
Government as "A Conspiracy Against the British People" which offered
nothing to the rural laborers despite the depression which was destroy-
ing British agriculture.^'*
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In February 1895, The Rural World assented that the agricultural
classes viewed the present Government as completely unresponsive to
their needs. In March and April, the Liberals were attacked for their
efforts to help the Irish in hard times, while refusing to do anything
for British agriculture. The paper expanded its coverage of local issues
and national agricultural problems, and applauded the Unionist programs
while denigrating the liberal ones.^^^
In the meantime, the relentless pressure on the divided Liberal
Government took its toll and Rosebery resigned after a defeat on a snap
vote. In the June 29 Rural Worlds Collings explained the situation,
writing that the "Unionist" Government had called for elections for a
mandate to restore confidence in Britain at home and abroad and to attend
to social reform measures which the British people wanted. He concluded
by adding that this election was not between Liberals and Tories, but
between Separatists and Unionists . ^
In July, during the campaign, The Rural World delivered its
message to the agricultural laborer: vote Unionist. Manifestoes and
articles promising agricultural reforms were a staple of each issue, and
the rural classes were warned not to be deceived again by "Gladstonian"
promises. The Unionist campaign in the counties was very successful,
and although the Unionists had only a small margin in total votes,
the votes were so spread out that they won 165 seats to the Liberals'
65, contributing in large measure to the Unionist parliamentary majority
of 152 over their combined opponents. Although the parliamentary major-
ity was large, the total vote was decided by a small group of swing
voters who apparently identified with the Liberal Unionists
.
^ As
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recognition of the Liberal Unionist influence and the emergence of the
Unionist party, Devonshire and Chamberlain were given seats in the
Cabinet. Collings was appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the
Home Department, an office in which he labored until August 1902 when
Balfour dismissed him.^^
Collings had once again achieved a minor office as a reward for
his work, if not for his cause. At the Home Department, he infrequently
dealt with agriculture, and as a member of the Government, he could not
on his own propose agrarian reform measures. For eight years, he had
retired from the forefront of the battle, he returned to the
struggle, it was to a changed arena.
The changes with which Collings had to cope x^/ere a culmination
of social and economic forces altering the nature of rural and industria
Britain. By 1895, one change was immediately apparent. The provision
of allotments was no longer a divisive political issue, indeed, both
Liberal and Unionist parties had committed themselves to allotments
—
and the laborers' votes. In a little over 20 years preceding 1895, the
number of allotments had almost doubled, and by that year it reached
482,901, a number that appears to have met the demand by the rural
classes for part-time holdings.
The number of allotments increased dramatically in the twentieth
century, because of bad economic conditions, but the increase came not
in the rural areas, but in the urban ones. The need at different times
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for exLra money or a better diet caused urban dwellers, many of whom
had rural backgrounds as laborers or tenant farmers, to push for al-
lotments, which were generously supplied by borough councils under exist-
ing allotments legislation. A 1916 survey by the Board of Agriculture
found that urban allotments were more ^'thoroughly cultivated, liberally
manured and intelligently cropped" than rural ones, and that the urban
plots yielded crops equal to those of the best market-garden land.
The survey explained the poor performance of the rural allotments with
the statements that the agricultural laborer saw his allotment simply
as a continuation of his daily work and not as a recreation and that he
already grew enough vegetables for his family in his home garden and
saw no need to extend himself working on his allotment.
The survey showed great ignorance of the countryside. Those
laborers who still had small allotments were not the best cultivators
of the land. Those cultivators had most often either migrated to the
cities or emigrated abroad or they had passed beyond the need for part-
time allotments to the desire for fulltime small holdings. The campaigns
of the 1870 's and 1880 's had placed allotments as ends in themselves,
but by the late 80' s, Collings among others saw allotments as only a
temporary stage, the first rung of the ladder, which led to a small
holding or even a farm. By the mid-nineties, the first rung had been
achieved, and small holdings became the real issue.
The problems involved in the creation of peasant proprietorship
must be viewed in the economic context of the late nineteenth century
Britain. From at least the mid-nineteenth century, British agriculture
had been made subservient to a capitalist industrial system which yielded
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high profits to its owners and investors, profits which were made
possible by the low wages paid to their workers. The resulting economic
system depended upon plentiful cheap food which, it soon became apparent,
could be better purchased from foreign countries as payment for British
investments, manufactures, and machines. By the 1870' s, Britain's
political and economic power was so considerable and so certain that it
was no longer a "revolutionary" concept to hold that Britain could be
fed safely and cheaply from her overseas markets.
Ceilings, however, did object to that view. Many people, he
argued, were blinded to what was happening because for so long they had
regarded trade and manufacture as the bases for their livelihood and not
agriculture. Thus, if a few steam engines or iron girders were improted,
there were outcries from trade journals and chambers of commerce, but
the yearly importation of cheese worth £7,000,000 received little notice.
Yet Britain was as fitted to produce cheese as she was steam engines
and iron girders.
Under "free trade," Britain's trade and commerce had risen to new
heights, but that same policy had brought her agriculture into open
competition with nations who were unrivalled in the production of agri-
cultural staples. The results were disastrous. The British farmer un-
able to control imports soon found himself undersold in his home markets,
and too often he was driven from or left the land. British manufacturers
by their shortsightedness had sacrificed the home market for foreign
trade.
Collings questioned why there was such "virtue" attached to the
word "exports." Why were sales to East Anglia or Devonshire which could
just as easily be called "exports" less important than "sales" to Germany
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or the United States?^^ His queries raised no great debate. The
crucial judgments had been made years before and carried out on those
assumptions. As one recent scholar has observed, the "decision to cut
the British farmer's throat was taken in Westminster," and he could
have easily added, in Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool, Birmingham and in
the other industrial centers of Britain.
The effects on a neglected and undercapitalized agriculture
were not at once apparent—though Collings on his travels had observed
them in the 1850's. In the 1850's and 1860's, the profitability of
livestock, permanent pasture, and fodder crops eroded the "high farming"
acreage devoted to cereal crops, a mainstay of the agricultural laborer.
As the jobs in agriculture declined so did the number of laborers. Even
though the agricultural laborers had won substantial wage increases in
the "revolt of the field" in the early 1870' s, they were still among
the most poorly paid and housed workers in the country, with no security
of tenure, no fixed rent, and little chance to lease or buy more land.
Then, beginning in 1875 and lasting for more than 20 years,
British agriculture faced a very serious depression. In the first phase
(1877-82), a series of bad seasons hurt harvests and necessitated a
rise in prices, at the very time that food imports, especially wheat,
flooded the British market. In the second phase (1890-96), the depres-
sion intensified as cattle and wool prices fell sharply along with cereal
to
prices, wheat reaching its lowest point in 1894.
The response of many fanners to the crisis was to cut expenses,
which in practice meant labor since, by 1889-93, labor costs totaled
55% of production costs. The laborers' wage rates were generally
maintained
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during these years, but the farmers hired fewer laborers or turned to
other types of farming, especially dairying, where fewer though more
efficient laborers were needed. That type of farming meant grassing
down more land which led to the "unkempt and dilapidated landscape" which
Collings so deplored. In some cases, the farmers turned to horticulture
—
which Collings encouraged—because it was relatively profitable even
during the depression and it depended upon laborers. Where no diversi-
fication took place, laborers, tenants, and small owners had no choices
but to leave the land.^^
Collings was deeply distressed that the 1901 Census demonstrated
that, in 50 years, the agricultural population had declined precipitously
from 1,254,000 laborers in 1851 to only 621,000. Worst of all, the cream
of the youth were leaving for the urban areas and depriving a struggling
rural society of their vigor and intelligence.^^ For Collings, those
figures represented not only a national tragedy, but a personal one. He
wrote lovingly of the laborers who, though rough in their ways and
expressions, "were upright in their dealings, conscientious in their work,
and faithful in their domestic relations." They bore with love and for-
titude "one another's faults and shortcomings," but they shunned and
condemned the dishonest man. He believed that there were no finer
gentlemen than country laborers who lived life with courage, common sense,
patience, fairness, and good humor, and he paid generous compliments to
the "unconscious heroism" of their wives and daughters and their stead-
fast moral force in country life.'^"
Where the laborers left the land, their holdings were consoli-
dated into large farms which were planned and run as commercial ventures.
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These consolidated farms chose large-scale cereal cultivation or more
efficient dairying or stockbreeding, and were the agrarian capitalist
response to the increased competition of imports. One recent historian
has commented that this process of consolidation resulted from the
economic unfeasibility of capital-intensive "high farming" which had
predominated at the mid-century. The depression hastened this transi-
tion and paved the way by 1900 for a different rural Britain.
Collings recognized those trends, but he also saw implications
that others missed. He saw in the countryside the rise of a new "land-
ocracy" made up of newly wealthy traders and industrialists who bought
land for social prestige and treated it as a business. This type of
landowner with little or no knowledge of agriculture left the affairs
of the farm to a bu'^siness agent who too often "applied the canons of the
strictest political economy to his business relations with his tenants."
The strictest economy meant turning the land to grass. As the land
went to grass, the rural population departed and with them gone, the
village tradesmen— the wheelwrights, blacksmiths, carpenters, and others
lost their independent livelihood. The nation was poorer for their loss
The general view of the depression held by many commentators
then and now is that the change to medium and large holdings at the
expense of small holdings benefited Britain. In 1900, the newly emergin
rural Britain was greener but more dilapidated, employing fewer laborers
but doing it more wisely. Professor P. J. Perry sums up the prevalent
view with the comment that by 1900, Britain "had become a sea (not a
desert) of generally extensive farming with islands (not oases) of
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intensive methods—" a view directly contrary to Collings who saw in
1900 a Britain in the terms enclosed within the parentheses.
By 1900, Collings observed that as the political power of the land-
lords had waned, so had the feudal remnants of deference and control,
"that peculiar relationship, so attractive in many ways" between the
landed families and their workers. That relationship was illustrated
by a Devonshire farm which in Collings' youth had given its laborers
free access to the kitchen and engendered among them a feeling of pride
and commitment to their farm. More recently when he returned, however,
he found that the men were no longer permitted to enter the house, and
their wages were paid to them through an open window. The laborers
had become mere wage slaves with no commitment to the land or its produce
With that feudal sense of obligation gone, Collings believed
that a new basis for agriculture was necessary, and that basis was com-
mon ownerhsip of the soil. The landowners as a very small group were
exposed to the hostility of landless men stirred by the arguments of
Henry George, Alfred R. Wallace, Karl Marx, or others- In Europe, the
landowners were not exposed to that hostility because "the landed aristoc
racy is intermingled with a landed democracy, and the two interests are
not antagonistic, but identical." Such a landed democracy could come to
Britain, Collings thought, through the creation of a system of occupying
ownerships. For the first two decades of the twentieth century, its
goal was creation of just such a system.
* * * * *
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For Collings and Chamberlain, the year 1902 marked a decisive
break in their political fortunes and an uneasy transition in their
personal relationship. In July 1902, when Salisbury resigned, his nephew
Arthur James Balfour became Prime Minister. He made several uninspired
Cabinet moves and some minor changes which included the dismissal of
Collings. Upon receiving his notice, Collings was deeply distressed.
He was also depressed to find that his financial position was so shaky
that he could not remain in Parliament without salary. He did, in fact,
remain, most likely with Chamberlain's assistance
.
More than likely, Collings was dismissed because, though a hard
worker in the department, he was outclassed in the Commons by the Liberal
opposition. Moreover, his health which, because he continually overworked
himself, was failing. And though he defended the Education Bill of 1902
in public, in private he bemoaned the Bill and its provisions and worked
to change it.^^ Collings was Chamberlain's man, but Chamberlain appears
not to have entreated Balfour to keep him. Perhaps Balfour's reasons
convinced Chamberlain, but perhaps the circumstances merely revealed that, /
although he and Collings were still friends, they had now drifted apart.
Their political courses had separated after 1895, and Chamberlain had found
in his wife, Mary, a strong person to share his thoughts and affections,
and thus he was less dependent upon Collings' warmth and sympathy.
Collings' dismissal was important because he was no longer in
position to influence government policy. After Chamberlain's stroke in
July 1906, Collings had a reduced base within the party from which to
use Chamberlain's remaining influence on behalf of the Land Purchase Bill.
Chamberlain had acted as Collings' protector and his avenue to real power,
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and, without Chamberlain's influence, neither Collings nor his supporters
could force through Collings' measures.
It was also important because Collings' demotion further iso-
lated Chamberlain in the Government, for despite any differences between
them, Collings was Chamberlain's loyal supporter. At that moment, Chamber-
lain was indispensable to the Government, but when that altered, as it
did over Tariff Reform in 1903, Chamberlain could only rely on his son
Austen (then Postmaster-General), for support in Government circles. The
split in the Cabinet over "fiscal reform" caused Chamberlain to resign
from the Government and begin his extra-Parliamentary tariff reform
crusade.
For Collings, the tariff reform movement was crucial, because in
1903, he amalgamated "fiscal reform" with land reform in what became his
major political theme. As late as 1895, Collings had shovm little
interest in protective duties except to denounce them as unreal solutions.
In 1892, he had written that the rural laborers did not believe that a
"small duty" on corn would benefit them and they would "listen to no
arguments that will endanger the 'cheap loaf.'"^^ Yet, in 1903, Collings
grabbed hold of the issue with all the desperation of a new convert to
the faith because it offered a solution to the twin difficulties facing
Collings* land purchase scheme, money and profitability.
Collings took up Chamberlain's proposal that the surplus money
raised by the "bounties" on imports be used for social reforms, which for
Collings meant the purchase and facilitation of occupying ownerships.
Chamberlain's proposed levy of 2s. per quarter for wheat and 5% on other
imported foods would provide those funds.
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The bounty on wheat was vital because it was the grain most used
for food and it was the most widely imported cereal grain. Collings
argued that a bounty of 30s. an acre would allow domestic producers to
grow wheat at a profit. Collings argued that if 7,000,000 acres (out
of Britain's total of 48,000,000 acres) were turned over to wheat culti-
vation by occupying owners, they would supply Britain's need for wheat.
The cost of the bounty would be only £10,500,000, but the wheat grown
would be worth £39,500,000 and straw and offal worth £9,000,000. By
putting men and women to work on their own land, fiscal reforms would
lead to a vast reduction in pauperism and unemployment.^^
In 1905, Collings enlarged on those themes in his book. Land
Reform. He discussed the origins of the land question, its present
difficulties, and the solutions—fiscal and land reform. He had hoped
to use the book as part of the election campaign, but publication was
delayed until after the General Election, and by the time it appeared,
the Unionist party had suffered a devastating defeat, their numbers fall-
ing from 402 seats in 1900 to only 158 in 1906, giving the Liberal,
Labour and Irish Nationalists parties an overwhelming majority of 354
seats.
The Liberals came into power in 1906 determined to write a new
land policy. During that year, a departmental committee (with a Unionist
majority from the previous year) of the Board of Agriculture studied
small holdings and despite many laborers' preference for tenancies, the
report opted for ownership because the majority under Collings' influence
believed that the "magic of property" would keep rural people on the land
while a tenancy would not.^° In 1907, the Liberals ignored the committee'
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recommendations in favor of small tenancies with the local authorities,
usually county councils, as landowners. In the following year, they
reconfirmed this principle, although in this measure they consolidated
within the Act previous small holdings legislation including Collings*
1892 Act, thus allowing the cultivators the option of ownership, but
only with the 20% down payment (required by the 1892 Act).^^
Collings and his supporters in the Commons and Lords made re-
peated efforts to include in the bills loans to tenants for the full purchase
price, but at every stage the Liberal Government refused. He then de-
clared the legislation unjust and immoral because it was a "communaliza-
tion" of land not at the landlords' expense, but at the "sweated" tenants'
expense. The tenants repaid the money lent them by the State, but the
land belonged to the county councils. He believed that the Government
had given in to its "socialist'* followers and to those Liberals who
feared that occupying owners would join with landlords against the Liberal's
"socialistic" schemes. He concluded by declaring that the Liberal party
should be ashamed of the Act.^^
However disgraceful the Act appeared to Collings, it proved a
real success. In 1908 and 1909, county councils acquired 60,889 acres
(one-fifth of those by compulsion), and by December 31, 1909, 36,845
acres were allotted, though only 28 acres were purchased by the occupier.
Yet even with this increase of 2,793 small holdings and tenancies, their
numbers in those years continued to decline and by 1909, the number of
holdings, of 1 to 50 acres fell to only 245,856, down almost 30,000 from
1885. Often those holdings were either consolidated into larger units
on grounds of "agricultural economy" or absorbed by the constantly ex-
panding cities.
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In the face of the continuing declines in small holdings,
Collings worked to convert the Unionist party to his policy. In the
years of drift in Balfour's Government~1904-05"Collings experienced
some successes. Since the introduction of his Land Purchase Bill in 1895,
Collings had gradually modified his scheme as a means to greater political
support. In that effort, he not only proposed the creation of peasant
proprietorships, but also help for large farmers who wished to purchase
land from the owners. That provision attracted support among farmers,
and in February 1904 the Central Chamber of Agriculture proposed to
discuss the Bill at its annual meeting.
There was opposition at the meeting to this measure, so Collings
asked and received permission to speak for his Bill. He defended his
Bill, and a resolution approving it was passed by an almost two to one
majority. The measure enjoyed growing approval by local chambers as well
as the Central Chamber, and by 1915 hundreds of agricultural associations
were pressing Parliament for its passage.
Collings achieved further successes because he used the "fair
trade" program to combine farmers and laborers and even landowners into
a faction which later became identified as "the agricultural interest"
within the Unionist party. In 1905, Collings scouted the notion of a
separate agricultural party- It was not that he disagreed with the idea;
rather he felt there was not then a unanimity as to what an agricultural
party would propose as its program.
By 1907, the situation had changed. With Chamberlain incapaci-
tated by his stroke, Collings became one of the most vociferous advo-
cates of fiscal reform and social reform legislation, a position which
brought him into increasing conflict with Balfour. In August, Balfour
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publicly repudiated not only Collings' small holdings program, but
attacked the philosophical presuppositions underlying it. Balfour
stated that sixty years ago the "nation" had made its choice in favor
of industrialism over agriculture, a position Balfour agreed with and
which the country must accept. He continued that if Great Britain
wished to increase its prosperity, the increase must be urban and not
rural. It therefore followed that no small holdings proposal could con-
tain even the beginning of a solution to Britain's social problems.
The animosity between Collings and Balfour exploded into public
view when Collings accused Balfour of lack of leadership. In October
he issued a lengthy statement denying any personal antagonism; he argued
that the question was one between the party and the party leadership.
Collings said that the Unionist party instead of proposing popular social
reform had limited itself to a policy of "negation" which confined it
to resisting attacks on institutions. Thus the party leadership and a
very small minority of the party were attempting either to force the
majority of the party to drop the issue of tariff reform or to strangle
it through delay. In this negative policy, they were only hurting the
party, because the next general election would be fought over two issues,
tariff reform and land reform. With a calculated slap at Balfour,
Collings regretted Balfour's speech as a "cold douche" on the efforts
of the Unionist majority to press those issues. '^^
In the following months the antagonism between Balfour and
I
I
Collings only sharpened. In 1908, plans were drawn up for an agricultural
party whose members, though nominally members of the major parties,
would vote together on all agricultural matters, especially on those
issues benefiting the rural laborers directly. Its program would
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revolve around Collings' Land Purchase Bill. The idea of such a party
appealed to Collings, especially as it provided a position from which
he could challenge Balfour's hold on the Unionist party. Whether the
party would ever have materialized as an important pressure group is very
doubtful, but whatever hopes Collings had for his place in it ended with
his incapacitating accident in March 1909.^"^
Still, the antagonism between them festered. In the spring of
1910, Balfour attempted to woo agricultural reformers from Collings'
scheme. He threw his support behind a plan by Sir Gilbert Parker and
R. D. Blumenfeld, the idiosyncratic conservative editor of the Daily
Express^ to establish a Land Bank to lend money to laborers seeking to
purchase their holdings. Blumenfeld made a "rude personal onslaught"
on Collings and wrote that the scheme of state-aided land purchase was
socialism. He concluded that Collings' long advocacy of land reform had
been ineffective and that it was time that the work should be entrusted
to someone who would and could accomplish something.
Collings in an angry but controlled reply observed that Blumen-
feld' s words were not good natured and that they were resented by many
friends of the Express. More to the point, he advised the editor that
Unionist policy would not be carried out "through a Land Bank or any
other financial corporation but through the state," and he thought that
Blumenfeld 's "clever" paper was backing the wrong program.
This challenge to his position and his scheme prompted Collings
to call a meeting of the Unionist party with Balfour in attendance on
April 14 to endorse his measure. The meeting did agree that the party's
land policy was occupying ownership, but it was unable to get a commitment
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from Balfour to support Collings* program. However, Balfour was forced
to choose the most economical scheme, which in effect meant Collings',
because the costs of the land bank were higher. Balfour thus dropped his
support of Parker's scheme, and, though Parker tried again to convert
the Unionist party to his plan, he did not succeed and his idea expired,
and to this day land banks do not form part of small holdings legisla-
tion.
Collings had won the decisive victory in the struggle to direct
the Unionist party's program on small holdings. He won because he no
longer embodied the agrarian radicalism of his earlier days. Continuing
rural depopulation convinced Collings that the laborers no longer had
the political power or the political will to transform British society.
That will would emerge not from the clash of classes but only from the
combination of agricultural classes against their common enemy, industrial-
ism. The Purchase of Land Bill had already welded laborer and farmer, and
landowners (some of them already members of the Rural Labourers' League)
came to add their strength to the efforts to halt the inroads of agrarian
capitalism. This alliance of classes had long been unofficially under-
stood, but in July 1910, it surfaced when the Rural Labourers' League
changed its name to the Rural League "so as to include within its scope
all classes in the rural districts interested in land reform. . -
In 1914, in his last major writings—a monument to his own life
%
and work
—
yThe Colonization of Rural Britain appropriately subtitled A
Complete Scheme for the Regeneration of British Rural Life, Collings
completed the final stages from "Agrarian Radical" to "Conservative
^
Pastoralist." In this work, Collings explicitly defined his enemy:
205
"Capitalism, Industrialism or Commercialism. " Under connnercialism,
there was a new idol, the "moloch of cheapness," by which capitalists
compelled wage earners to work for low wages to produce the "surplus
value." The capitalists in their race for wealth used people like tools,
only to discard them when they were broken or old. The results of that
policy were everywhere to be seen, labor unrest, bitter hostility toward
capitalism, and workers' lives made harder, grimmer, and duller. That
state of affairs could not endure. The proletariat was being seduced
by socialist proposals to place the instruments of production and dis-
tribution in the hands of the state.
Collings to a great extent was justifying the socialists* critique
of capitalism, but he would not accept their solution. He was by belief
and practice a nonconformist individualist who had risen by his own
exertions in the 1850 's and 1860 's from near poverty to economic security
and from obscurity to prominence. Individualism, "the chief motive power
of human action," was at the bedrock of his character, and he did not
question the axiom that competition was the process by which individual-
ism was nurtured, and that private property was individualism' s external
manifestation. Socialism denied that view, and reduced the individual
to a "dead level" with everyone, and to a mechanical part of the com-
munity with "no freewill, no independence of thought or action. ...
It was in response to the socialist challenge that Collings
developed his "Complete Scheme" for regenerating rural life. The
Colonization of Rural Britain took his reforms—from his earliest years
onward—industrial and agricultural education, housing, charities, land
reform, and fiscal reform and combined them to develop his wish for a
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society of independent occupying owners free of the crassness of and
domination by the large organizations of an industrialized, urbanized
capitalist Britain. The transition of Collings from the practical
reformer of his earlier years to the nostalgic dreamer of his later
ones was at last complete, and the programs which had once heralded
democracy and freedom of livelihood now trumpeted a republic of the
(agricultural) saints
•
Raymond Williams in The Country and the City has characterized
Collings' position as "retrospective radicalism." Collings' emphases on
obligation, charity and assistance to the needy were an affirmation of
traditional values in the face of an economic system which appeared to
reduce all social relations to a "crude moneyed order." Collings had
correctly criticized the effects of that system, but at the moment of
choosing a path of action, he opted for the past, for an organic society
rather than an increasingly atomized one. Contemporary scholars have
condemned his choice without clearly understanding either the situation
or the considerations which affected the availability of options. To a
large extent, many have failed to fathom the complexities of late Vic-
torian society.
The writing of The Colonization of Rural Britain coincided with
Collings' retirement from active political life. He was constantly
hobbled and in pain from his accident, and his health gradually gave
way. In 1913, Collings resigned from the Presidency of the Birmingham
Chamber of Commerce, a post he had held for 15 years (1898 to 1913)
while Birmingham grew in population and Industry—but in ways that were
deeply disturbing to Collings— to the first rank of Britain's industrial
centers.
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In April, Mary Chamberlain wrote in confidence that Chamberlain
frustrated by the work he could not do, had decided not to seek reelec-
tion and because he had "always shared his most private concerns" with
him, he wanted Collings to know. 55 Collings was unsure whether to
follow Chamberlain's example and retire, when a deputation of Conservatives
and Unionists visited him in December to determine his views. However,
the Conservatives had another reason for the visit; they wanted Collings
either to spend large sums for the "benefit" of the constituency or to
retire and give way to a wealthy man—a "milch cow" who would spend large
sums. Collings angrily denounced them and their view of politics and
dared them to oppose his candidacy. They backed down and Collings ob-
served: "These are not men to be run away from." But then, hearing
that Chamberlain was about to announce his retirement and wanting the
best for his loyal constituency, Collings decided "to go out of harness
at the same time as Chamberlain with whom I had worked in unbroken union
and friendship for over half a century. "^^
The election did not come soon enough, as the First World War
intervened, and Chamberlain died in harness. Collings was deeply de-
pressed at "the unexpected death of my dearest and much loved friend."
Beatrice Chamberlain, Chamberlain's daughter, who knew Collings well
wrote lovingly "Your loss can hardly be called second even to ours, or
to anyone, but Maryb. . . ."^"^
Collings bore that grief and others as he gave his remaining
strength to the war effort. He helped the Rural League mobilize volun-
teers and later conscripts for the war and in 1915 he wrote a propaganda
piece, "The Reasons Why We Are At Wai;" to help rouse the British people in
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their fight against Germany. 58 in that same year The Rural World
folded because of wartime exigencies.
The war did have one unintended result for Collings, when
the question arose of what to do with the servicemen after the war was
over. A number of parliamentary committees were set up to deal with
this matter. In late 1916 and early 1917, Collings who was ill had his
two able lieutenants John L. Green and Belville Stanier testify before
the important Agricultural Sub-Committee of the Reconstruction Committee
in favor of Collings* land purchase measure. Green was pleased to note
the sub-committee did recommend greater facilities for the purchase of
small holdings, grants for the development of rural industries (Green's
own intrest), and better education especially on agricultural topics
for the rural areas.
When the war ended, Lloyd George, the leader of a Liberal-Unionist
coalition, promised in his manifesto to provide ex-servicemen with small
holdings and allotments and money and facilities for them to purchase
their land. The coalition won the election and on March 28, 1919, the
Government introduced the Land Settlement (Facilities) Bill, which did
not, however, provide for the purchase of land. Green, with Collings'
assistance, drafted an amendment to include that provision. In the
Commons, the Government refused to consider it, but Green induced several
lords who were also members of the Rural League to add the amendment to
the Bill in the Lords. The Lords did, and sent them back to the Commons
where, after some hesitation, the Government accepted them. Thus, the
Act embodied Collings' principle of occupying ownership with the state
providing the full amount of the purchase price. ^° The long struggle
was over.
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With that Act, the Rural League, its impetus diminished, its
strength depleted, and much of its program enacted, met in November
1919 and decided to disband at the end of the year. In one last action,
the League presented Collings with a silver tray "to commemorate his
life-long work on behalf of Rural Britain. "^1 That ceremony was the
culmination of a life's work devoted to the crusade for a Britain free
from ignorance, want, and degradation.
When Collings died on November 20, 1920, he had, as he had
bragged over and over again, brought the question of allotments and
small holdings to the front rank of politics, and his work lived after
him. The Land Settlement Act was judged by the Departmental Committee
on Statutory Smallholdings as "the outstanding effort in the modern
history of land settlement in England and Wales." Despite economic
problems including an agricultural depression beginning in 1921, the Act
had by March 1926, provided small holdings to 24,319 persons, and the
county councils held 29,532 small holdings totaling 438,022 acres,
which were enormous increases over any previous measure. Although
the Act was not Collings' work, it owed much to his advocacy in the
early 1880' s when he had kept the issue alive in the political arena.
With all the credit due him, Collings had miscalculated the
laborers' wish to purchase land. On an equal basis, given the option of
purchase or tenancy, the vast majority of cultivators chose tenancies.
The Liberals had been correct in their premises; the laborers for fear
of the problems of ownership and taxes, and for personal reasons chose
the security provided first by the 1907 Small Holdings and Allotments
Act, and by later legislation. The key postwar Act, The Agriculture Act,
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1947, ended the practice of allowing small holders to purchase their
holdings, and instead encouraged the use of tenancies as the bottom
rung on a ladder to large farms. That provision had the backing of the
farmers who wished to exclude the possibility of unfair competition
between small holders and ordinary farmers. The clash of interests
between farmer and occupier which Collings had sought to erase proved
too strong in the end. Ironically, as Collings had foreseen, it was
a socialist government which terminated his plan for independent, self-
sufficient small owners.
Collings' plan derived from his vision of a rural Britain which
set the tone for a nation, bred free men not wage slaves, and upheld
the dignity of the individual. However unrealistic that vision, he had
stood up and fought for it, and had made changes which affected the future
His vision never came near fulfillment, but along the way he made
possible the enormous extension of land for allotments and small hold-
ings. Those rural people who cheered him understood that. Many politi-
cal historians and commentators have not.
Collings correctly diagnosed the problems that were disrupting
British agriculture, and, if his solution was not acceptable, it was not
from a lack of pressing it. The problems lay far deeper than he or
anyone imagined, but unlike so many, he grappled with the problems, and
in his failure, we can better comprehend the nature of late Victorian
and Edwardian society. Collings had written of another:
The failures of such men— their apparently hopeless mistakes
—
die but the spirit that animates them lives. It would be dark
indeed if the torches of these eager runners were allowed to
go out.^^
The words stand equally well for his oi^ life.
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^Rurat World, July 22, 1892, pp. 582, 58A (for Green's comments).
See also The Times, September 20, 1895, p. 4 for Collings' views on the
Liberals in the 1892 election.
2jesse Collings to Lord Salisbury, August 18, 1892, Salisbury
Papers. Collings had recommended as early as July 1892 that the Conser-
vative party and the Liberal Unionist party should amalgamate into the
"Unionist" party in order to draw the ardent adherents of both parties
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to Joseph Chamberlain, July 22, 1892, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/31.
Also Jesse Collings to Charles Harding, July 9, 1895, Chamberlain Papers,
Fiedler-Harding correspondence.
^Jesse Collings, The Meaning of Home Rule with Notes on the 1893
Bill Addressed to the ''Man in the Street,'' London: Charles Jones Limited,
1911, pp. 32-33. The Notes on the 1893 Bill (pp. 29-112) was reprinted
from Collings' articles appearing in The Rural World during 1893. The
Meaning of Home Rule (pp. 1-28) was added as an introduction to this
pamphlet by Collings for his attack on the 1911 Home Rule Bill. Hereafter
cited as Collings, Meaning of Home Rule. The Rural World issues for 1893
were not available in the British Museum Collection at Colindale because,
so I was informed, they had been destroyed by the bombing during the
Second World War.
^Jesse Collings to Lord Salisbury, August 18, 1892, Lord Salisbury
Papers. Collings, Rural Britain, II, pp. 473-74. In footnote 2, p. 473,
Collings averred that many Irish cultivators feared "that their position
under an Irish Parliament would be far worse than it would be under the
Imperial legislature at Westminister." Collings, Meaning of Home Rule,
p. 112. The Times, November 7, 1911, p. 11 and November 16, p. 13.
^4 Hansard, VIII, February 14, 1893, 1458. Collings added that a
Parliament that was "good enough for Scotland and England is good enough
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"
^The Times, September 20, 1895, p. 4. Collings and Green,
Collings, II, pp. 242-43.
74 Hansard, XVIII, November 3, 1893, 132. Collings was pleased
with the allotments sections of the Bill which allowed parish councils to
be substituted for the allotments managers created under the 1887 Allot-
ments Act and that district councils could hire as well as purchase land
by compulsion. He disagreed that the Local Government Board and not the
county council should be allowed to issue the Provisional Order to acquire
allotments as the county council was better fitted to understand the local
problems. Ibid., X, March 21, 1893, 720-21.
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^Collings and Green, Callings^ II, pp. 219-20.
^^ural World, January 12, 1894, and February 9, p. 82. Chamber-lain was very anxious that its main provisions should become law
Fowler, VvsQOunt Wolverhampton, p. 271, Garvin, Chainberlain, II. pp.587-88.
Hansard, XXI, February 16, 1894, 623. Rural World, March 9,
1894, p. 155 for details of the Act. But see Collings, Land Reform,
pp. 184-85, and ff. 1, p. 186 which shows that only 270 acres of land
had been compulsorily hired and none purchased by March 31, 1902. The
Liberals strenuously objected to two amendments, (1) that the population
necessary for a parish council be 300 people despite general Commons'
approval of a 200 person limit and (2) that the parish councils no
longer have the right to run the parish charities, and that the Charity
Commissioners have discretionary power to decide if the parish should
govern the local charity. Ibid., March 1, 1894, 1147.
^^Ibid., XVIII. November 3, 1893, 132.
^^See especially Rural World, March 16, 1894, p. 173 and April 20,
p. 275. The latter article contended that the rural classes—landlords,
farmers, and laborers—were regarded by the Liberals "as beneath serious
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^^Ibid.
,
February 8, 1895, p. 90; February 22. p. 130; March 20,
p. 222; April 5. p. 236; May 7, p. 303; June 29, p. 453.
^^Ibid., June 29, 1895, p. 453. The article is not attributed to
Collings, but see Jesse Collings to Charles Harding. July 9. 1895, Chamber
lain papers. Fiedler-Harding correspondence and Collings' letter in The
Times of September 20, 1895, p. 4, for identical wording to parts of
this article. Collings put much effort into pushing for a united "Unionts
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^^Ibid., July 6, 1895, pp. 478-80, July 13,, 498-99 and July 20,
p. 518 for the Unionist manifestoes and articles.
^"^Ibid., August 3, 1895, p. 547. The Unionist margin over the
Liberals in the English counties was only some 27,000 votes. For the com-
position of the House of Commons in 1895 see F. H. McCalmont, MaCalmont'
8
Parliamentary Poll Book, British Election Results 1832-1918, 8th edition
with introductory and additional material by J. Vincent and M. Stenton,
Brighton-Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1971, Part III, p. 104. Hereafter
cited as Vincent and Stenton, MaCalmont 's Farliamentary Poll Book.
IQjesse Collings to Lord Salisbury, July 2, 1895. Salisbury Papers
for Collings' acceptance of Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the
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Home Department. Collings was appointed to serve by his chief SirMatthew White Ridley on July 3, 1895. HO 45/9989/B18870 Public RecordUr rice
.
l%ewlin Smith, Land for the Small Man, New York: Knickerbockeri'ress, 1946, p. 30. Smith estimated the laborers with holdings of morethan one-quarter acre and less than one acre reached 51,441 in 1895
more than double the number in 1886 (p. 23). Hereafter cited as Smith,Land for the Small Man.
^^Departmental Committee of Inquiry into Allotments, Report
y
London, 1969, Cmnd. 4166, p. 17. The 1916 survey observed that local
competitions and shows helped improve the cultivation of the allotment,
and the bulk buying of manures and lime helped keep down the cost while
the ready urban market provided the impetus for good crops. During
wartime, both rural and urban allotments expanded, but for the most part,
the urban emphasis remained (pp. 19-20).
21lt is instructive to note that after 1895, Collings never again
introduced an allotments measure, and that, beginning in 1895, he intro-
duced his Purchase of Land Bill which was a small holdings measure.
Collings and Green, Collings, II, Chapter 27 passim. Smith, Land for the
Small Many p. 42 suggests that the allotments campaigns of the 70' s and
80 's were just a political strategem to keep alive the issue of land
reforms while the "public provision of small holdings was not practical
politics." I think he is reading history backwards. There is no sug-
gestion that Collings and other land reformers did not see allotments
as an answer until they realized that allotments alone would not bring
about the changes they desired.
Perry, British Farming in the Great Depression^ 1870-
1914, an HistoricaZ Georgraphy ^ Newton Abbot , Devonshire : David & Charles
,
Ltd., 1974, p. 15. Hereafter cited as Perry, British Farming.
^^Collings, Land Reform, pp. 285, 287, 291-92. Collings cited a
contemporary's estimate that the gross value of produce sold by all farms
in the United Kingdom dropped by £73,839,600 per annum in the years 1872-
77 compared to 1892-77, while the annual profits from all farmers went from
£43,286,000 in 1872-77 to annual losses of f 1,694, 000 in 1892-97 (p. 290).
The figures are somewhat distorted as the years 1872-75 were unusually
good years for British agriculture.
^^Perry, British Farming^ p. 15.
'^^Tbid.:y p. 36. The wheat acreage in 1882 was 3 million acres;
by 1894, it had dropped to less than 2 million acres. The price of wheat
imported from Chicago to Liverpool dropped from 16s. (80 p.) per quarter
in the late 1860's to only 4s. (20 p.) per quarter in the early 1900's
and this decrease in price accounted for one-half the fall in wheat prices
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Depopulation in England and Wales, 1851-1951, London: Routeledge & Kegan
Paul, 1957, p. 14 for wheat prices. Hereafter cited as Saville, Rural
Depopulation.
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Ri^al Depopulation, pp. 8. 12-15, 68 ff. 1, 59-61. In 1851, the relation
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1911, it was 78.1% to 21.9% (p. 61).
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frequented by tramps and other "low" characters for a small farm and a
'•refined ideal." (p. 489.)
M. L. Thompson, "English great estates in the nineteenth
century, 1790-1914," in the Proceedings of the first international
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Perry, British Farming
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3 0Collings, Rural Britain^ I, pp. 260, 262-63.
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Perry, British Farming^ p. 144.
^^Collings, Rural Britain, II, p. 485, ff. 1.
^Collings, Land Reform, p. 281.
^'^Jesse Collings to Joseph Chamberlain, August 13, 1902, Chamber-
lain Papers, JC 11/10/2. Collings added that he was sorry to trouble
Chamberlain, but since Chamberlain was head of the Liberal Unionist
party, Collings didn't want to take any steps without his knowledge and
advice. Also see Amery, Chamberlain, IV, pp. 471-72 (and repeated in
ibid, y V, pp. 16-11).
^^Gardiner, Harcourt, II, p. 529 where Harcourt relates how he
"savaged" Collings in the debate over the Children's Liquor Bill and
that Collings cut a "ridiculous figure" in the debate (March 20, 1901).
Joseph Chamberlain to Jesse Collings, November 21, 1902, Chamberlain
Papers, JC 11/10/6 for Collings' depression over his dismissal from of-
fice. Bernard Holland, The Life of Spencer Compton, Eighth Duke of
Devonshire, Vol. II, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911, p. 283.
Sir Henry James wrote Devonshire on August 6, 1902 enclosing a "wail from
Jesse Collings," and agreeing with him that the Education Bill was a
"smashing blow" to the Liberal Unionist wing of the party. For a public
statement by Collings, see Rural Worlds November 1902, p. 246.
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.
. .
and sunshine" to his life. The warmth in their letters consists in
remembrances of past times. See Jesse Collings to Joseph Chamberlain,
August 23, 1896, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/39 and reply by Chamberlain,
August 25, 1896, Chamberlain Papers, JC 5/16/132.
^^Amery, Chambevlain, IV, 472, (V, p. 77). For the infighting
within the Cabinet, see ibid., V, passim and Fraser, Chamberlain:,
Chapter 10.
^^Jesse Collings, 38,000,000 Per Annum," in The Nineteenth
Century, Vol. XXXII, No. 190 (December 1892), p. 968. Collings was
sure that the nation would not submit to a tax on imported foods. He
argued talk of the Unionist party being favorable to Protection gave
much trouble to county candidates and even cost some of them their seats
at the last election.
^^Collings, Ixind Reform, pp. 293-99, 303. For the farmers' sup-
port of bounties, see A. H. H. Matthews, Fifty Years of Agricultural Pol-
itics, being a history of the Central Chamber of Agriculture, 1865-1915,
London: P. S. King & Son, Ltd., 1915, Appendix 4, pp. 405-7. Hereafter
cited as Matthews, Agricultural Politics.
^^Hermann Levy, Large and Small Holdings, A Study of English
Agricultural Economics, translated by Ruth Kenyon with considerable
additions by the author, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911,
pp. 134-36. Collings did not sign the majority report because one pro-
vision directed that credit be given the landlords to improve their
lands, but not to small holders or laborers who wanted to acquire land.
Hereafter cited as Levy, Large and Small Holdings. Collings and Green
Collings, II, pp. 255-56 for a brief summary of Collings' separate report.
^'^Ibid.y p. 144. Levy argued that the Liberals had responded to
the needs of "modern agriculture" in their legislation. He argued that
up to 1880 the champions of small farms had economic tendencies against
them, but that "more recent" agricultural developments had been in their
favor (p. 152). The Liberal measures included powers of compulsory land
purchase by local and central authorities.
^^Collings, Rural Britain, II, pp. 336, 341-42. One Liberal MP
said he had opposed Collings' amendments because so "long as they are
tenants they are against the landlords and with us, but as owners they
will be the landlords themselves." (p. 336.) Some Liberals were also
unhappy that the Act did not give the option of ownership. R. E. Prothero
(Lord Ernie) in 1913 observed that he was bothered that the county coun-
cils took all the men's money and the land too (p. 342). Collings ob-
jected to the Act on practical matters also, because he believed that the
charges for the sinking fund, management, repairs, and insurance made the
operation of the Act more expensive than purchase (pp. 138-39).
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"""^ '^^^^ Holdings, pp. 96-98. Farms in the neigho d of large cxtxes tended to be small, possibly because land was soexpensive. Levy found that holdings of 5 to 50 acres disappeared Incounties which bordered large towns and cities, while in ruralcou^^iestheir numbers increased. Levy argued that the demand for small andmedium farms (up to 500 acres) was vigorous while there was little de-mand for large farms (pp. 102-5).
r^77' '"'^ft^^^^'
Agricultural Politics, p. 211. Collings and Green,ColUngs, II, pp. 247-48. Matthews was the official historian of theCentral Chamber of Agriculture.
Hansard, CLXXX, August 16, 1907, 1851-53 for Balfour's
speech. For Collings' review of the speech see ibid., October 1, 1907
p. 9. '
''^The Times, October 1, 1907, p. 9. Collings denied that he had
consulted with anyone before attacking the party leadership. Obviously,
many felt that he was just espousing Chamberlain's views. On September
24, Collings had commented that the Unionist party was like a movement
wandering in the wilderness without a Moses to lead them. Ibid., Septem-
ber 24, 1907, p. 8 and September 26, 1907, p. 4 for Sir John Kennaway's
defense of the party leadership.
^-^For the possible formation of an agricultural party, see Matthews,
Agvicultuval Politics, Appendix 5, "The Agricultural Party," pp. 408-15
written by an anon3rmous author in December 1908 giving cogent reasons for
such a party. On March 5, 1909, Collings, returning from the French Na-
tional Agricultural Society meeting in Paris slipped on the ice at Charing
Cross Station, broke his thigh and was in intense pain for many days. The
Times, March 16, 1909, p. 13 and March 20, p. 13. Coll ings never re-
covered from the accident as his bone never set properly and he was in
constant pain and was unable to walk very far without some aid.
^^Blumenfeld made his attack by commenting after Collings had
written a letter to the Daily Express dissociating himself from a Bill
proposing the creation of a Central Land Bank to assist in creating oc-
cupying ownerships. Jesse Collings to R. D. Blumenfeld, April 4, 1910,
Blumenfeld Collection, Coll. 2. Collings' acid reply was his letter of
April 11, 1910, Blumenfeld Collection, Coll. 3. Blumenfeld apologized
for the attack, but he continued to support Parker's solution. R. D.
Blumenfeld to Jesse Collings, April 12, 1910, Blumenfeld Collection, Coll.
4, and Collings' reply on April 14, 1910, Blumenfeld Collection, Coll. 5.
^^Collings and Green, Collings, II, pp. 279-80 for Green's ac-
count of the meeting. Sir Gilbert Parker to R. D. Blumenfeld, August 15,
1910, Blumenfeld Collection, Park. 15. Also The Times, August 6, 1910,
p. 10; August 10, p. 10; October 11, p. 10, for Collings' views of the
Unionist party's position. Departmental Committee of Inquiry into
Statutory Small Holdings, First Report, 1966, Cmnd. 2936, Chapter II,
especially pages 25-37. Also see Final Report, June 1967, Cmnd. 3303.
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II, p. 278.. Also Matthews, Agricultural Politics, Preface p vii
where Colllngs is included in the "Agricultural Roll of Honour" with afarmers and landowners (Francis Channing was the only otherRadxcal so honored).
^^Collings, Rural Britain, I, Introduction, pp. xxii-xxiii,
xxvi-xxviii, Collings' passionate disgust with the capitalist system is
reflected in his view that the "Stock Exhange is the great gambling area,
where Mammon is God, and the Stock and Share lists forms the Gospel."
(p. xxii.) Collings cited Mr. W. C. Anderson, President of the Annual
Congress of the Independent Labour Party (March 24, 1913) for the view of
the degraded existence of the workers.
^2collings, Land Reform, pp. 422-23. Collings says as much in
Rural Britain, but never so explicitly as he does in this quotation from
Sir Thomas Erskin May's Democracy in Europe (no page number given).
^%aymond Williams, The Country and the City, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1973, pp. 35-36. The complexities have begun to be
delineated, as in Charles Wilson, "Economy and Society in late Victorian
Britain," in the Economic History Review, 2nd Series, XVIII, No. 1,
August 1965, pp. 183-98.
^^G. Henry Wright, Chronicles of the Birmingham Commercial Society
and Chamber of Commerce, A.D. 1783-1913, Birmingham: n.p., 1913, Chapter
51. Allen, Birmingham and Black Country, Part IV, Chapter 3, "The New
Industries." For Collings' health see The Times, March 3, 1914, p. 9.
^^Mary Chamberlain to Jesse Collings, April 23, 1913, quoted in
Amery, Chamberlain, VI, pp. 984-85. Mary t,rrote that the matter was still
"absolutely private" as Chamberlain did not want to make it public yet.
^%emoranda, December 15, 1913, Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 1/4/
4/30. The memoranda list no author, but the internal evidence, especially
on the close relationship to Chamberlain, and the author's writing and
speaking style, it is without a doubt Collings. In 1911, Collings had
received a presentation from his constituency praising his 25 years as
their representative. Collings and Green, Collings
^
II, p. 281. The
Times, July 31, 1911, p. 11.
^^Telegram of Jesse Collings to Austen Chamberlain, July 3, 1914.
Letter of Beatrice Chamberlain to Jesse Collings, July 7, 1914 in Jesse
Collings, Memorial Book of Joseph Chamberlain. Collings put together this
book of articles, letters, and speeches of Chamberlain and included at
the end of the book the telegrams and letters between himself and Chamber-
lain's family relating to Chamberlain's death. Collings gave the book
(bound in red leather with gold trim) to Chamberlain's grandson and name-
sake, Joseph Chamberlain, on February 16, 1916. The book is now in the
local history section of the Birmingham Central Free Reference Library.
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^^Jesse Collings, "The Reasons Why We Are At War," London- TheRural League^ 1915. The pamphlet accused the Germans of wishing r^eover Europe and using any means necessary including "atrocities" toreach that goal (pp. 8-10, 16-17).
T> 1 • c^!^''^^''
Britain, Ministry of Reconstruction, The Agricultural
Qn7i''^p
°^ Reconstruction Committee, Report, 1918, Cd.yu/9, Part I. The Sub-committee was appointed in August 1916 "to considerand report upon the methods of effecting an increase in the home-grownfood supplies, having regard to the need of such increase in the interests
of national security." For the adoption of Collings' principle of landpurchase, see Part II, p. 64. Collings and Green, Collings, II, pp. 297-
98. Green also testified before the Departmental Committee on the
Settlement and Employment of Sailors and Soldiers on the Land "
(p. 287.)
^°Collings and Green, Collings, II, pp. 301-5 and especially
pp. 303-5 where Green dropping his usual laconic style gives a fine ac-
count of how the amendment was saved. The Act was also significant in
that no county council could refuse to honor a tenant's claim to pur-
chase his land after he had occupied it for 6 years.
^^Ibid.y p. 309. Stanier and Green also received thanks for their
good work as did Lord Lansdowne. The Times, December 15, 1919, p. 11.
^^Departmental Committee of Inquiry into Statutory Small Holdings,
First Report, 1966. Cmnd. 2936, pp. 15-16. However, some 17,958 holdings
were on bare land, an unpromising soil for making a living off the land
(p. 25).
^^Ibid., pp. 24,26.
^'^Collings, Rural Britain, I, p. 262. The quotation has no
attribution Riven.
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